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I
INTRODUCTION
1

The independent counsel statute has been one of the most—if not the
most—controversial federal laws of its time. A presence on the national stage
2
for twenty years, it will expire on June 30, 1999, unless Congress affirmatively
acts to save it. As the other articles in this issue of Law and Contemporary
Problems attest, the statute’s future seems bleak, perhaps even if substantial

1. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994).
2. See id. § 599 (providing that the Act will expire five years after the enactment of the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108 Stat. 732, which was enacted
on June 30, 1994).
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revisions are made. Numerous other sources also have heaped praise, criticism,
and everything in between upon the statute. A law with so dark a beginning
and so storied a political history may be doomed to extinction.
Among all of the political upheaval over the independent counsel statute
since its enactment, politicians, legal scholars, and laypersons alike often cannot help but lose sight of one aspect of the statute that has remained unchanged—it is a statute that, like any other, generates law by its existence and
through its interpretation. Unlike the other currently available sources on the
statute, this article is not a normative critique of the law, a review of the politics
surrounding the statute, or a history of investigations under the statute. Instead, it provides a comprehensive legal history of the independent counsel
statute from its inception in 1978 until its apparent last hurrah in 1999. The article’s purpose, therefore, is to set forth the law that the statute has created, but
to allow others to evaluate for themselves the merits of the statute and the
praises and criticisms of it in this volume and elsewhere.
The article proceeds in four parts. Part II briefly summarizes the history of
the statute and outlines its current provisions. Part III analyzes the statute’s
triggering mechanisms, the procedures by which an independent counsel appointment is or is not made. Part IV addresses the complex relationships between an independent counsel and other relevant actors in the political system:
the public, the “Special Division of the Court” that oversees independent counsel investigations, the Attorney General and the Department of Justice, and
Congress. Part V focuses on a specific legal issue of great importance to the
statute’s past and future: the role of the independent counsel in the history and
practice of the government’s evidentiary privileges, including the attorneyclient privilege and the President’s executive privilege.
II
THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL STATUTE
A central question of representative democracy is whether the government
can be trusted. The independent counsel statute, officially the Ethics in Gov3
ernment Act (the “Act”), has served for twenty years as the answer to a more
specific version of this question, a version even more specific than whether the
government can be trusted to investigate itself. The question, which is at the
core of this symposium, strikes at the heart of the executive branch of our constitutional system: Can the Attorney General and the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) be trusted to investigate and prosecute criminal wrongdoing by the
President or persons close to him? The Act demonstrates that our political
leaders have concluded that the answer is “no.”
The Act was intended to provide a mechanism by which certain investigations of allegations of misconduct by high-level political officials could be un3. Pub. L. No. 95-521, tit. VI, 92 Stat. 1824, 1867-73 (1978) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. Z
§§ 591-599 (1994)).
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dertaken by a prosecutor whose activities are outside the President’s direct supervision. Congress’s goal was “to establish ‘a neutral procedure for resolving
the conflict of interest that arises when the Attorney General must decide
whether to pursue allegations of wrongdoing leveled against . . . [his] close po4
litical associates.’” The statute’s tumultuous history and the evolution of its
provisions, however, have demonstrated the elusiveness of achieving this purpose in practice.
A. Brief History
The tragedy of Watergate inspired the creation of a permanent statutory
scheme for appointing an officer, independent from the supervision and control
of the President, to investigate and prosecute crimes by high-level federal offi5
cials. President Nixon’s misconduct, of course, prompted calls for greater scrutiny of high-level government officials generally. In addition, a particular episode during the Watergate period—the “Saturday Night Massacre”—
reinforced the principle that criminal investigations of the President or persons
close to him must be handled by an officer with political independence. Before
the “Massacre” occurred, Nixon had become convinced that Archibald Cox,
the “special prosecutor” appointed by Attorney General Elliott Richardson to
investigate the scandal, was not an impartial investigator, but rather a partisan
6
prosecutor bent on bringing Nixon down. Nixon insisted that Cox be fired, but
Richardson and Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus each resigned
rather than carry out the order; third-in-line Robert Bork was then appointed
7
Acting Attorney General and promptly fired Cox on October 23, 1973. The
dismissal of Cox caused the Senate and House Judiciary Committees to hold
hearings on whether legislation was necessary to give special prosecutors a
8
statutory guarantee of independence. To head off this inquiry, Leon Jaworski
was quickly appointed as a new special prosecutor to continue the Watergate

4. Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Banzhaf v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1167,
1168 (D.C. Cir. 1984), and citing Special Prosecutor Provisions of Ethics in Government Act of 1978:
Hearings Before Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov’t Mgt. of the Sen. Comm. on Govt’l Affairs, 97th Cong.
1-3 (1981) (statement of Sen. Cohen) [hereinafter 1981 Senate Hearings]).
5. See generally KATY J. HARRIGER, INDEPENDENT JUSTICE: THE FEDERAL SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR IN AMERICAN POLITICS 40-72 (1992); see also S. REP. NO. 103-101, at 5-8 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 748, 748-52 (discussing the Watergate scandal as the impetus for enacting
the Act); S. REP. NO. 100-123, at 1-3 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2150, 2150-52 (same). A
full discussion of Watergate itself is beyond the scope of this article; many fine sources on the events
exist, including one by the special prosecutor. See LEON JAWORSKI, THE RIGHT AND THE POWER:
THE PROSECUTION OF WATERGATE (1976); WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, FINAL
REPORT (1977). Other interesting sources include RICHARD BEN-VENISTE & GEORGE FRAMPTON,
JR., STONEWALL: THE REAL STORY OF THE WATERGATE PROSECUTION (1977); CARL BERNSTEIN &
BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN (1974); JAMES DOYLE, NOT ABOVE THE LAW: THE
BATTLES OF WATERGATE PROSECUTORS COX AND JAWORSKI (1977); KEN GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD
COX: CONSCIENCE OF A NATION (1997).
6. Cf. HARRIGER, supra note 5, at 42 (discussing the pre-Saturday Night Massacre developments).
7. See id.
8. See id. at 29, 43.
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investigation; Congress ceased its discussions after it determined that Jaworski
9
was both de facto independent from Nixon and doing his job well.
Although future special prosecutors might be able to replicate Jaworksi’s
success, many Americans believed that only statutory independence could prevent another Saturday Night Massacre. By 1978, therefore, Congress concluded that legislation was in fact necessary to restore public confidence in gov10
ernment. The outcome was Title VI of the Ethics in Government Act of
11
1978, which established for the first time in the United States a codified structure for the appointment of an independent officer—first called a “special
12
prosecutor,” then renamed an “independent counsel” —in future scandals.
The enactment of a statutory procedure was not the only possible outcome
of the Watergate scandal. DOJ argued—and continues to argue—that it can
adequately investigate and prosecute almost every case of criminal wrongdoing
by federal officials, even those near to the President; in situations where a significant conflict of interest exists, the Attorney General could and would
13
choose voluntarily to appoint an ad hoc special prosecutor.
Several previous scandals involving the President or his close associates had
resulted in ad hoc appointments by Attorneys General of “special prosecutors,”
including the Teapot Dome scandal in the Harding Administration, the 1951-52
tax scandals in the Truman Administration, and the appointments of Archibald
14
Cox and Leon Jaworski in Watergate itself. In fact, some observers asserted
that the success of the Watergate special prosecutors, who forced the resignation of the President and obtained several high-level convictions, proved that
15
the system worked without any statutory structure. In the end, however, Congress concluded that relying solely on the Attorney General’s integrity and on
political pressures would not be the sufficiently visible action needed to restore
16
the post-Watergate public’s faith in government.
9. See id. at 29-30, 43.
10. See id. at 43-44; see also S. REP. NO. 95-170, at 2-4 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4216, 4218-20 (reviewing the history preceding the Act’s enactment); id. at 5-7, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4221-23 (summarizing the purposes of the Act).
11. Ethics in Government Act, Pub. L. No. 95-521, tit. VI, 92 Stat. 1824, 1867-73 (1978).
12. This change in title was made in the 1983 amendments to the Act. See Pub. L. No. 97-409, § 2,
96 Stat. 2039, 2039 (1983). Congress believed that the label “independent counsel” had less negative
connotation: “This change would remove the Watergate connotation of a special prosecutor investigation and would help spare the subject of such investigation adverse public reaction.” S. REP. NO. 97496, at 19-20 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3555-56.
13. See Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing testimony of Associate Attorney General Rudolph W. Guiliani in 1981 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 92-94, and Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 1982: Hearings on S. 2059 Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov’t
Mgt. of the Sen. Comm. on Govt’l Affairs, 97th Cong. 5-7 (1982)).
14. See HARRIGER, supra note 5, at 13-39 (discussing pre-1978 ad hoc appointments of special
prosecutors); Jerome J. Shestack, Foreword: The Independent Counsel Act Revisited, 86 GEO. L.J.
2012, 2012-13 (1998) (same).
15. See HARRIGER, supra note 5, at 53.
16. This position also was advocated by the highly influential American Bar Association, which
issued reports strongly urging Congress to reject the ad hoc appointment system in favor of a mandatory statutory scheme that would “trigger” the appointment of an independent prosecutor in appropriately defined cases. See id. at 49, 62-64.
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The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 was only the first generation of the
statutory independent prosecutor scheme. Congress reviewed, debated, and
17
18
19
revised the statutory procedures in 1983, 1987, and 1994. During the deliberation of each round of amendments, Congress reviewed the successes and
20
failures of the Act, only to conclude that renewing the Act, with amendments,
was the best outcome. Even a President who later found himself subject to the
21
Act agreed with its necessity:
This law, originally passed in 1978, is a foundation stone for the trust between the
Government and our citizens. It ensures that no matter what party controls the Congress or the executive branch, an independent, nonpartisan process will be in place to
guarantee the integrity of public officials and ensure that no one is above the law.
Regrettably, this statute was permitted to lapse when its reauthorization became
mired in a partisan dispute in the Congress. Opponents called it a tool of partisan attack against Republican Presidents and a waste of taxpayer funds. It was neither. In
fact, the independent counsel statute has been in the past and is today a force for
Government integrity and public confidence.22
23

The current version of the Act is the product of the persons, events, and
scandals that shaped and reshaped the text and its procedures and provisions
into their current form.
B. Overview of the Act
The Act provides the procedures for beginning, operating, and concluding
an investigation by an independent counsel. The most detail is provided in the
Act’s procedural mechanisms, particularly in those that trigger the application
of the Act, but other important topics also are addressed. The Act, at least in
17. See Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 (1983).
18. See Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293.
19. See Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108 Stat. 732.
20. See S. REP. NO. 97-496, at 3-4 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3539-40
(summarizing Congress’s views of the Act after four years); S. REP. NO. 100-123, at 5-14 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2150, 2154-63 (discussing successes and failures of the Act for its first
nine years); S. REP. NO. 103-101, at 10-23 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 748, 754-68
(reviewing the pros and cons of the Act after 15 years).
Congress also examined the operation of the Act in practice. See generally S. REP. NO. 103-101, at
1-9 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 748, 748-53 (reviewing the history and operation of the
Act). See also S. REP. NO. 100-123, at 6-8 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2150, 2155-57
(reviewing independent counsel investigations from 1978-87); S. REP. NO. 103-101, at 12-13 (1993),
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 748, 756-57 (reviewing independent counsel investigations from 198794); id. at 13-14, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 757-58 (summarizing the outcome of each independent counsel investigation from 1978-94).
21. See OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL, REFERRAL TO THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES PURSUANT TO TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE, § 595(C), H. DOC. NO. 105-310
(Sept. 9, 1998), reprinted in THE STARR REPORT: THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL’S COMPLETE REPORT
TO CONGRESS ON THE INVESTIGATION OF PRESIDENT CLINTON (Pocket Books 1998) [hereinafter
STARR REPORT].
22. Statement by President William J. Clinton upon Signing S. 24 [Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108 Stat. 732], 30 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1383 (July 4,
1994).
23. In a notable and amusing coincidence, the Duke University School of Law graduated the Act’s
impetus—Richard M. Nixon, class of 1938—and one of its most prominent appointments—Kenneth W.
Starr, class of 1973.

PRIESTERETAL.FMT

12

06/07/99 12:00 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 62: No. 1

general terms, attempts to resolve most issues that will arise when an independent counsel investigation is appropriate.
1. The Players. The Act cannot be understood without first identifying the
principal actors in the statutory scheme. The identity of several actors is
obvious; they are ordinary federal government institutions. These include the
President, Congress, the Attorney General, and DOJ. The independent
counsel, of course, is the investigator and prosecutor whose office is created
and defined by the Act. Finally, however, one important actor was created
specifically for the purposes of this particular Act. The “Special Division of the
Court” is a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, appointed by the Chief Justice of the U.S.
24
Supreme Court. Each of these actors, including the unusual Special Division,
has critical functions in the Act’s process.
2. Triggering Mechanisms.
a. Covered persons. The Act does not apply to every federal criminal
investigation. Instead, its coverage is “triggered” only in certain situations.
The first important limit is the Act’s restriction to only two categories of
25
persons: mandatory covered persons and discretionary covered persons.
Application is limited to these two categories to achieve the Act’s overall
purpose: to investigate allegations of criminal conduct in those situations where
investigation by the Attorney General or DOJ does or could give rise to a
conflict of interest.
Mandatory covered persons include those individuals for whom a conflict of
interest is presumed to exist by virtue of the close relationship or connection of
the persons to the President, Attorney General, or DOJ. The Act requires that
an independent counsel be appointed to undertake any and every investigation
of such a person. Such mandatory coverage encompasses the President and
Vice President, the Cabinet, the Executive Office of the President, and highlevel officials in DOJ, the CIA, the IRS, and the President’s national election
26
campaign.
Discretionary coverage, by contrast, allows the Attorney General to request
an independent counsel appointment to investigate in situations where the conflict of interest is not presumed by the Act, but where an independent investigation nevertheless is appropriate. Such discretionary coverage is available for
Members of Congress when appointing an independent counsel is “in the pub27
lic interest,” or for any person if the Attorney General “determines that an

24. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(a) (1994) (providing for the appointment of the Act’s Special Division
court under the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 49).
25. See id. § 591(b)-(c).
26. See id. § 591(b)(1)-(7).
27. Id. § 591(c)(2).
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investigation or prosecution of [that] person by [DOJ] may result in a personal,
28
financial, or political conflict of interest.”
b. Threshold inquiry. The Act is triggered in the first instance when the
Attorney General “receives information sufficient to constitute grounds to
29
investigate” whether a covered person has committed a serious federal
30
crime. The Attorney General need not take this received information at face
value, however, when deciding whether grounds to investigate exist. Instead,
31
the Attorney General may also consider only two other factors: the specificity
32
of the information and the credibility of its source.
After receiving the
information, the Attorney General has thirty days to determine whether to
33
proceed further. It is significant, however, that the Act does not require the
Attorney General to make any reports to the Special Division at this stage; the
Attorney General’s threshold inquiry determination is not reviewed by any
other actor.
If the information is either not credible or not specific, the Attorney Gen34
eral “shall close the matter.” If, on the other hand, the Attorney General
finds that the information is specific and credible, or is unable to make a conclusive determination either way, then he or she is bound to make a determination that sufficient grounds for investigation do exist, and thus “shall . . . com35
mence a preliminary investigation,” which is the next stage of the Act’s
triggering mechanisms. Each time the Attorney General begins a preliminary
36
investigation, he or she must “promptly notify” the Special Division.
The Act also provides that the Attorney General must consider—in each
and every investigation—before any action is taken even at the initial triggering
stages—whether the Act requires his or her recusal from the statutory proc37
ess. The Attorney General must recuse him- or herself when the allegations
involve the Attorney General directly or any person “with whom the Attorney
38
General has a personal or financial relationship.” The Attorney General must
file a report with the Special Division stating the recusal determination and the

28. Id. § 591(c)(1).
29. Id. § 591(a).
30. See id. (defining such a violation as “any Federal criminal law other than a violation classified
as a Class B or C misdemeanor or an infraction”).
31. See id. § 591(d)(1) (“[T]he Attorney General shall consider only—” specificity and credibility.)
(emphasis added); id. § 592(a)(2)(B)(i) (forbidding Attorney General from considering whether accused had required mens rea for crime when finding that the received information is not specific or
credible).
32. See id. § 591(d)(1).
33. See id. § 591(d)(2).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. § 592(a)(1).
37. See id. § 591(e)(2) (“Before personally making any other determination under this chapter, the
Attorney General shall determine . . . whether recusal is necessary.”).
38. Id. § 591(e)(1).
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39

reasons for or against recusal. If the Attorney General recuses him- or herself, the next most senior DOJ official who is not also recused under the same
40
standard then performs the Attorney General’s functions under the Act.
The purpose of the preliminary
c.
Preliminary investigation.
investigation is to determine whether there are “reasonable grounds to believe
41
that further investigation is warranted.”
If there are such grounds, an
independent counsel will be appointed to perform that further investigation; if
there are not such grounds, an independent counsel will not be appointed.
Given that the Attorney General already has specific and credible evidence of
a federal crime by a covered person, the independent counsel appointment
provisions usually will come into play.
The scope of the preliminary investigation is constrained by the Act. First,
the Act bars the Attorney General from using several prominent investigative
techniques: The Attorney General may not use a grand jury or issue subpoe42
nas, and may not grant immunity or make plea bargains. Second, the Act
prohibits the Attorney General from “bas[ing] a determination . . . that there
are no reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is warranted[]
upon a determination that [the accused] lacked the state of mind required for
violation of criminal law involved, unless there is clear and convincing evi43
dence” that the accused lacks the necessary mens rea. Third, the Act requires
44
the Attorney General to obey DOJ’s standard criminal investigation policies.
45
Finally, the preliminary investigation may last only ninety days, although the
46
Special Division may grant a sixty-day extension for good cause.
If the Attorney General finds no reasonable grounds to warrant further in47
vestigation, he or she must notify the Special Division. If the Attorney General finds that further investigation is warranted, or the time period elapses
without a contrary filing, then he or she must apply to the Special Division for
the appointment of an independent counsel to commence further investigation
48
on behalf of the government.
d. Triggering of the Act by Congress. The Judiciary Committee of either
chamber of Congress, or a majority of either the majority or the nonmajority
party members on the Committee, may request that the Attorney General

39. See id. § 591(e)(2).
40. See id. § 591(e)(1).
41. Id. § 592(c)(1)(A); cf. id. § 592(a)(1).
42. See id. § 592(a)(2)(A).
43. Id. § 592(a)(2)(B)(ii); cf. id. § 592(a)(2)(B)(i) (forbidding Attorney General from considering
state of mind at threshold inquiry stage).
44. See id. § 592(c)(1)(B) (“[T]he Attorney General shall comply with the written or other established policies of the Department of Justice with respect to the conduct of criminal investigations.”).
45. See id. § 592(a)(1).
46. See id. § 592(a)(3).
47. See id. § 592(b).
48. See id. § 592(c)(1)(A)-(B).
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49

invoke the Act to appoint an independent counsel.
The Act’s triggering
mechanisms then function as they do with any other receipt of information,
with three modifications: (1) when the threshold inquiry is completed (“[n]ot
later than 30 days after the receipt of” the congressional request), the Attorney
General must file a report with the Committee explaining the reasons why a
50
preliminary investigation will or will not commence, (2) if a preliminary
investigation occurs, copies of all papers from that investigation filed with the
51
Special Division also must be given to the Committee, and (3) if the Attorney
General declines to apply for the appointment of an independent counsel after
the preliminary investigation, the Attorney General must file a report to the
Committee “stating the reasons why such application was not made, addressing
52
each matter with respect to which the congressional request was made.” The
Act attempts to protect suspects by declaring that information given to the
Committee under these requirements “shall not be revealed to any third party”
unless the Committee determines that a disclosure “will not . . . prejudice the
53
rights of any individual.”
In practice, the principal significance of this
congressional request procedure has been the generation of many of the
Attorney General’s official position statements on various interpretations of
54
the Act.
e. Other issues at the triggering stage. The Act also contains provisions
addressing several minor issues that may arise at the triggering stage. If the
Attorney General receives new information related to a crime about which he
55
or she already has reported to the Special Division, the process starts anew.
The Act also provides that the Attorney General’s decision to request or not to
request the appointment of an independent counsel by the Special Division
56
“shall not be reviewable in any court.”
3. Appointment of an Independent Counsel.
a. Application by the Attorney General. The process of appointing an
independent counsel begins with the filing of an application by the Attorney
General with the Special Division. The application “shall contain sufficient
information to assist [the Special Division] in selecting an independent counsel
and in defining that independent counsel’s prosecutorial jurisdiction . . . to fully

49. See id. § 592(g)(1).
50. Id. § 592(g)(2).
51. See id. § 592(g)(3).
52. Id.
53. Id. § 592(g)(4).
54. See, e.g., Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General of the United States, to Orrin G. Hatch,
Chairman, United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Apr. 14, 1997), cited in Orrin G. Hatch,
The Independent Counsel Statute and Questions About Its Future, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 145,
151 n.36 (Winter 1999).
55. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(2) (1994).
56. See id. § 592(f).
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investigate and prosecute the subject matter” and related matters. The Act
also provides that, absent the permission of the Special Division, the
application and its contents may not be disclosed to the public by DOJ or by an
58
independent counsel.
b. Special Division appointment and jurisdiction-defining procedures.
The Special Division selects and appoints the independent counsel to
59
investigate the allegations referred by the Attorney General. The Act directs
the Special Division to consider experience, responsibility, cost-efficiency, and
60
promptness in selecting an independent counsel.
The Special Division also defines the scope of the independent counsel’s ju61
risdiction to investigate and prosecute. The scope includes “the subject matter with respect to which the Attorney General has requested the appointment
of the independent counsel, and all matters related to that subject matter,” and
any federal crimes “that may arise out of the investigation or prosecution” of
that subject matter (such as perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evi62
dence, or witness tampering).
If the jurisdiction of an independent counsel needs to be expanded beyond
the original mandate, the Special Division lacks the authority to make such an
extension alone. Instead, the Act provides that an independent counsel’s juris63
diction may be expanded only at the request of the Attorney General. If the
independent counsel uncovers information unrelated to the scope of the original jurisdiction but nonetheless warranting further investigation, the independent counsel may forward this information to the Attorney General, who then
follows a preliminary investigation procedure under the Act; ultimately, the Attorney General will request or decline to request the Special Division to transfer the investigation of this new information to the jurisdiction of an independ64
ent counsel. (The Special Division may expand the jurisdiction of an existing
independent counsel instead of appointing a new independent counsel to han65
dle the new subject matter. ) On the other hand, if the new information found
by the independent counsel is related to the independent counsel’s existing jurisdiction, the further investigation of that related information may be referred
to the independent counsel by the Attorney General or by the Special Division
66
as a matter of course.

57. Id. § 592(d).
58. See id. § 592(e). This subsection also provides exceptions for disclosures to Congress and “as
is deemed necessary for law enforcement purposes.” Id.
59. See id. § 593(b)(1).
60. See id. § 593(b)(2).
61. See id. § 593(b)(1), (3).
62. Id. § 593(b)(3).
63. See id. § 593(c)(1).
64. See id. § 593(c)(2)(A)-(C).
65. See id. § 593(c)(1).
66. See id. § 594(e).
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c. Other issues in independent counsel appointment. The Special Division
has several other powers relating to the appointment of an independent
counsel. The court is permitted to keep the identity and jurisdiction of the
67
independent counsel secret, with certain exceptions, but the court also may
68
allow the public disclosure of any filings before it. The Special Division also
69
fills vacancies in the office of an independent counsel. Finally, the court may
permit the filing of briefs amicus curiae on “significant legal issues” that arise in
70
the pursuit of its statutory duties.
4. The Independent Counsel.
a. Investigative and prosecutorial powers. An independent counsel,
within the jurisdiction defined by the Special Division, has “full power and
independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions
71
and powers of” DOJ and the Attorney General. The Act’s list of powers
includes convening grand juries, granting immunity, prosecuting, litigating, and
appealing in federal court, reviewing evidence and contesting privilege
72
assertions, obtaining security clearances, and other powers. An independent
counsel also may dismiss matters within his or her jurisdiction before
73
prosecution or even without investigation.
In all activities, however, the
independent counsel “shall . . . comply with the written or other established
policies of the Department of Justice respecting enforcement of the criminal
74
laws.” This requirement is waived, however, “to the extent that doing so
75
would be inconsistent with the purposes of [the Act].”
b. Relationship with the Department of Justice and Congress. The
76
independent counsel is “separate from and independent of” DOJ. DOJ must
cease any investigations of matters within the jurisdiction of the independent
77
counsel. The entities are not completely divided, however. The independent
78
counsel may seek DOJ’s assistance in pursuing the investigation, including the
79
detailing of DOJ staff to the independent counsel or consulting with U.S.
67. See id. § 593(b)(4). The independent counsel’s identity and jurisdiction may be made public at
the Attorney General’s request or if the Special Division finds that disclosure “would be in the best
interests of justice,” and must be made public when an indictment or information is filed by the independent counsel. Id.
68. See id. § 593(g).
69. See id. § 593(e).
70. Id. § 593(h).
71. Id. § 594(a). An exception is made, however, for DOJ to retain control over requests to courts
for authorizations for wiretaps and electronic surveillance. See id. (excepting 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1994)).
72. See id. § 594(a)(1)-(10).
73. See id. § 594(g).
74. Id. § 594(f); cf. id. § 594(g) (imposing a similar requirement on decisions to dismiss a matter).
75. Id.
76. Id. § 594(i).
77. See id. § 597(a).
78. See id. § 594(d)(1).
79. See id.
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80

Attorneys.
Likewise, DOJ may refer additional related matters to the
81
independent counsel, and is guaranteed the right to appear as amicus curiae
82
on issues of law raised in any independent counsel court proceeding.
The Act also contains provisions relating to the independent counsel’s relationship with Congress. The relevant committees are given oversight jurisdic83
tion of the independent counsel and of the Attorney General’s use of his pow84
ers under the Act; the independent counsel also must report annually to
85
Congress on his or her activities. Finally, the independent counsel is required
to “advise the House of Representatives of any substantial and credible infor86
mation . . . that may constitute grounds for an impeachment.”
c. Conclusion of the independent counsel’s investigation. When an
independent counsel concludes his or her investigation and prosecution
activities, the office of independent counsel is closed. There is no statutory
limit on the independent counsel’s length of service. The independent
counsel’s office is “terminated” when the independent counsel notifies the
87
Attorney General of his or her completion and files a final report, or when the
Special Division determines that the independent counsel’s investigation has
“been completed or so substantially completed that it would be appropriate for
88
the Department of Justice to complete such investigations and prosecutions.”
An independent counsel may be removed from office involuntarily by ac89
tion taken by the Attorney General personally “and only for good cause.”
The Attorney General must file a report to the Special Division and to Con90
91
gress, and the independent counsel may seek judicial review of the removal.
The independent counsel also may be removed from office involuntarily
92
through impeachment and conviction by Congress.
d. Other issues regarding the independent counsel. The Act provides for
93
94
the independent counsel’s pay and for hiring personnel. The costs incurred
by the independent counsel’s investigation are subject to reporting and

80. See id. § 594(a)(10).
81. See id. § 594(e).
82. See id. § 597(b).
83. See id. § 595(a)(1).
84. See id. § 595(b).
85. See id. § 595(a)(2).
86. Id. § 595(c).
87. See id. § 596(b)(1).
88. Id. § 596(b)(2).
89. Id. § 596(a)(1). The independent counsel also may be removed for several listed incapacities
to perform the office, such as physical or mental disability. See id.
90. See id. § 596(a)(2).
91. See id. § 596(a)(3).
92. See id. § 596(a)(1).
93. See id. § 594(b).
94. See id. § 594(c).
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95

oversight requirements.
When the office of the independent counsel is
terminated, “all records which have been created or received by that office” are
96
delivered to the National Archives.
Finally, the Act includes conflict of
interest requirements: During the independent counsel investigation, neither
the independent counsel nor any of his or her assistants, nor persons associated
with his or her law firm, may represent any person subject to an independent
97
counsel investigation. After the independent counsel’s office is terminated,
the independent counsel and his or her assistants are barred for three years
98
from any representation of their investigation’s subjects and for one year from
99
representation of any person subject to an independent counsel investigation;
persons associated with the independent counsel’s law firm are barred for one
100
year from representing any subject of any independent counsel investigation.
5. Miscellaneous Statutory Provisions. The Act provides some protection
for subjects of independent counsel investigations against whom no charges are
filed. At such person’s request, the Special Division may award to the “subject
of an investigation conducted by an independent counsel . . . if no indictment is
brought against such individual . . . reimbursement for those reasonable
attorneys’ fees incurred by that individual during that investigation which
101
would not have been incurred but for” the independent counsel investigation.
A list of factors for the Special Division to consider when deciding attorneys’
102
fee requests is included. Special Division policy requires that all fee awards
103
be made public.
Not surprisingly, a considerable amount of litigation has
104
proceeded under this provision. In addition, Congress has been troubled by
95. See id. § 594(l) (cost controls); id. § 596(c) (Comptroller General audits).
96. Id. § 594(k).
97. See id. § 594(j)(1).
98. See id. § 594(j)(2)(A).
99. See id. § 594(j)(2)(B).
100. See id. § 594(j)(3).
101. Id. § 593(f)(1).
102. See id. § 593(f)(2)(A)-(D).
103. See Symposium, The Independent Counsel Process: Is It Broken and How Should It Be Fixed?,
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1515, 1543 (1997) (statement of Judge John Butzner, Jr.) (noting that the
Special Division has a “firm rule” that it will not award attorneys’ fees without making such an award
public: “We have requests to do that. We have motions, ‘Please don’t make this request for fees public,’ and we deny those motions.”).
104. It is important to note that many of the cited cases apply the attorneys’ fees provision prior to
the 1994 amendments to § 593(f). For cases discussing whether an individual qualifies as a “subject” of
an independent counsel investigation, see In re North, 120 F.3d 293 (D.C. Cir. 1997); In re North, 94
F.3d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1996); In re Mullins, 91 F.3d 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1996); In re Mullins, 84 F.3d 1439
(D.C. Cir. 1996); In re North, 74 F.3d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1996); In re North, 59 F.3d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1995); In
re North, 57 F.3d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1995); In re North, 56 F.3d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1995); In re North, 53 F.3d
1305 (D.C. Cir. 1995); In re North, 46 F.3d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1995); In re North, 12 F.3d 252 (D.C. Cir.
1994); In re North, 11 F.3d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1993); In re North, 8 F.3d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
For cases holding that costs “would not have been incurred but for” an independent counsel investigation, see In re North, 57 F.3d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1995); In re North, 33 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1994); In re
North, 31 F.3d 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1994); In re North, 30 F.3d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1994); In re Meese, 907 F.2d
1192 (D.C. Cir. 1990); In re Olson, 884 F.2d 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1989); In re Donovan, 877 F.2d 982 (D.C.
Cir. 1989). For examples of early cases holding that costs did not meet the “but for” requirement, see
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whether the attorneys’ fees provision has the proper scope, but significant
105
changes have not been made.
Finally, the Act includes two mundane, yet interesting, procedural provisions. The severability clause aims to protect the architecture of the Act should
106
any given provision be held invalid. The sunset provision ensures future legislative deliberation on the institution of the independent counsel in general
and on the specific elements of the Act in particular by providing that the Act
will expire five years from its enactment, although then-pending matters are
107
preserved. The sunset provision will terminate the current version of the Act
108
on June 30, 1999.
6. Important Issues Not Addressed in the Act. One of the Act’s notable
features is the absence of provisions that would resolve key issues that arise
during independent counsel investigations. Of course, flaws in the Act can be
revealed only through its operation. In large part, many of the modifications
made to the Act in the three rounds of amendments were direct responses to
gaps revealed during the Act’s operation. Other issues, however, were not
resolved by Congress despite the problems created by the Act’s silence. For
example, the Act does not define the character of the relationship between the
independent counsel and the other offices and agencies in the executive branch
109
in a manner that resolves intrabranch assertions of evidentiary privileges.
The Act likewise lacks any provision on the implications of interbranch
110
privilege claims in congressional investigations or impeachment hearings.
The Act also is conspicuously silent on how the independent counsel is to
111
handle sensitive matters with foreign policy or national security implications,
In re Nofziger, 969 F.2d 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1992); In re Nofziger, 956 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1992); In re
Nofziger, 938 F.2d 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1991); In re Nofziger, 925 F.2d 428 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
For cases discussing whether costs were incurred “during” an independent counsel investigation,
see In re Mullins, 87 F.3d 1372 (D.C. Cir. 1996); In re North, 48 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1995); In re North,
37 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 1994); In re Sealed Case, 890 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
For a case holding that fees were not “incurred” by the subject, see In re North, 32 F.3d 609 (D.C.
Cir. 1994).
For cases discussing whether the amount of fees requested was “reasonable,” see In re North, 72
F.3d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1995); In re North, 50 F.3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1995); In re North, 32 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir.
1994); In re Olson, 892 F.2d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
105. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 97-496, at 18-19, 22 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3554-55,
3558 (discussing adoption of attorneys’ fees provision); S. REP. NO. 100-123, at 21 (1987), reprinted in
1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2150, 2170 (proposing changes); H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 100-452, at 30-31 (1987),
reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2185, 2196-97 (discussing 1987 changes); S. REP. NO. 103-101, at 20-21
(1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 748, 765-66 (proposing more changes); H.R. CONF. REP. NO.
103-511, at 13-15 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 792, 796-98 (discussing 1994 changes).
106. See 28 U.S.C. § 598 (1994).
107. See id. § 599.
108. See id. The Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108 Stat.
732, was enacted on June 30, 1994.
109. See infra Part V.
110. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 618-619 (discussing possibility of conflicts over governmental attorney-client privilege during impeachment proceedings).
111. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 707-09 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Act
is unconstitutional in part because it disturbs the President’s ability to supervise the delicate balancing
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or whether classified information should be declassified in order to bring a
112
prosecution. The Act was not amended to address these issues even after the
113
Iran-Contra independent counsel investigation was substantially undermined
by congressional immunity grants and the Attorney General’s refusal to
114
declassify defendants’ information.
III
ANALYSIS OF THE TRIGGERING PROVISIONS
115

The triggering provisions are critical components of the Act. They determine when—or if—the Act will require the appointment of an independent
counsel to handle the government’s investigation and prosecution in a particular case. Despite their importance, they have been developed through uncoordinated piecemeal amendments by Congress rather than the more careful construction required to ensure their effectiveness. When the initial triggering
requirements were found to be troublesome, the Act was modified to correct
the perceived problems. The difficulty, however, was that each new amendment created its own interpretive dilemmas, and that new problems arose with
older, previously unmodified provisions. In the end, it is possible to understand
the current Act’s triggering mechanisms only by understanding the history of
the Act and its practice, and how that history and practice shaped the language
that now governs the triggering of an independent counsel investigation. The
following sections of this Part of the article discuss the significant issues arising
under the triggering provisions.
A. Scope of the Categories of Covered Persons
The most frequently modified element of the Act’s triggering mechanisms is
also one of the most important: which officials are covered by the Act. The
purpose of the Act is to prevent public distrust of government by recognizing
that “actual or perceived conflicts of interest may exist when the Attorney
General is called on to investigate alleged criminal activities by high-level gov116
ernment officials.” It is critical, therefore, to identify which persons and positions are so close to the Attorney General or the President that permitting the

of interests necessary to foreign and national security policy, and citing examples such as an independent counsel who caused a significant foreign policy embarrassment by issuing a subpoena to the Canadian ambassador to the United States).
112. See infra Part IV.C.4 (discussing the Act’s silence regarding the Classified Information Procedures Act).
113. “Iran-Contra” refers to the events surrounding the involvement of the U.S. government with
the Nicaraguan Contras during a prohibition on military aid from October 1984 to October 1986.
During this period, the government covertly directed funds to the Contras that were collected from the
sale of arms to Iran. See 1 LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
FOR IRAN/CONTRA MATTERS 1 (1993).
114. See infra notes 360-370, 404-412 and accompanying text.
115. See supra Part II.B.2.
116. S. REP. NO. 97-496, at 4 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3540.
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Attorney General and DOJ to investigate them would be inappropriate. Defining the scope of this group has proven to be a difficult undertaking.
1. Mandatory Covered Persons. Some officials—the mandatory covered
persons—are automatically included within the Act’s scope. These are officials
for whom the Act creates an irrebuttable presumption that a conflict of interest
would exist were the Attorney General and DOJ to investigate allegations
against them. The Act therefore provides that its procedures are triggered
whenever the Attorney General receives criminal allegations about any such
117
individual. Two principal issues must be decided to identify the officials that
fall within this category: (1) which positions pose this presumed conflict of
interest, and (2) for what period of time persons holding those positions should
be covered.
Certain federal offices always have received mandatory coverage under the
118
Act. These include the President and Vice President, Cabinet-level offi119
120
cers, high-level officials in the Executive Office of the President and in
121
DOJ, and the Director and Deputy Director of the CIA and the IRS Com122
missioner.
The list’s unchanged scope signals Congress’s conclusion that
these positions continue to pose a conflict of interest with Attorney General
and DOJ investigation.
The troublesome issue, however, has been calibrating the appropriate
length of time persons holding these positions should be covered by the Act
(and thus exposed to the possibility that an independent counsel could be appointed to investigate them). The 1978 Act provided coverage during the incumbency of the President under whom the person served, and the incumbency
123
of the next President if of the same party. Congress concluded, however, that
it was “unfair [to] hold[] an individual subject to the standards of a public servant long after he or she leaves office and long after the dangers of conflict of
interest have passed. Equally unfair is the fact that coverage turns on which
124
political party wins the presidential election.”
Based on this determination,
the 1983 amendments limited coverage to the incumbency of the President plus
one year (but not for more than two years after the person left his position), or
to one year after the person left his position if he remained as a holdover in of117. See 28 U.S.C. § 591(a) (1994).
118. See id. § 591(b)(1).
119. See id. § 591(b)(2).
120. See id. § 591(b)(3). In 1983, this category was reduced from those officials at pay level IV and
higher to those at pay level II and higher. See Pub. L. No. 97-409, § 3, 96 Stat. 2039, 2039 (1983). Congress concluded that the 1978 scope had been too broad: “This coverage includes middle-level Executive Branch officials who are often unknown to the public, as well as remote from the Department of
Justice and the President.” S. REP. NO. 97-496, at 6 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3542.
Coverage was reduced from about 120 to about 70 positions. See id. at 7, reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3543.
121. See 28 U.S.C. § 591(b)(4).
122. See id. § 591(b)(5).
123. See Pub. L. No. 95-521, tit. VI, 92 Stat. 1824, 1868 (1978) (1978 version of § 591(b)(5)).
124. S. REP. NO. 97-496, at 10 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3546.
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125

fice more than ninety days into a new presidential administration.
In 1987,
the post-employment coverage was extended to a three-year period; the holdo126
ver provision was unchanged.
Finally, in 1994, the term of coverage was
shortened and greatly simplified: Any person holding one of these covered of127
fices is covered during his service in office plus one year thereafter.
One other category of persons also receives mandatory coverage: certain officials of the President’s national election campaign. The 1978 provision allowed coverage for any officer of the President’s principal national campaign
128
committee, but did not specify a term of coverage.
In 1983, this group was
reduced to the chairman, treasurer, and other officials with national campaign
129
authority, with the campaign manager or director listed as examples.
The
130
term of coverage, which was specified as the incumbency of the President, has
131
remained unchanged.
The 1987 amendments deleted the reference to the
campaign manager or director to avoid the implication that other national
132
campaign officials might not be covered.
The 1994 amendments made no
changes to campaign official coverage. The mandatory coverage of the highest
campaign officials for the President is now a solidly grounded statutory category.
2. Discretionary Covered Persons. The discretionary coverage of the Act is
available for any person if the Attorney General concludes that a DOJ
investigation or prosecution of that person “may result in a personal, financial,
133
or political conflict of interest.” Discretionary coverage was added to the Act
in 1983 to “provide a ‘catch-all’ provision . . . [that] can be used to investigate
private citizens who are close to either the President or the Attorney General
134
as well as officials who are not covered under subsection 591(b).” The 1987
reauthorization law did not make substantial changes. Instead, it simply
clarifie[d] and simplifie[d] language . . . to continue functioning as a “catchall” provision which gives the Attorney General the discretion to use the independent counsel
125. See Pub. L. No. 97-409, § 3, 96 Stat. 2039, 2040 (1983) (1983 version of § 591(b)(6)-(7)).
126. See Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293, 1294 (1987) (amending § 591(b)(6)-(7)); see also H.R.
CONF. REP. NO. 100-452, at 20 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2185, 2186 (rejecting extension
to five years proposed by S. REP. NO. 100-123, at 16 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2150,
2165).
127. Thus, any reference to the incumbency of the President was deleted, as was the holdover provision. The only time reference is to the period the person held his or her office, nothing more. See
Pub. L. No. 103-270, § 4(b), 108 Stat. 732, 736-37 (1994); S. REP. NO. 103-101, at 26 (1993), reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 748, 771; H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 103-511, at 9 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
792, 792.
128. See Pub. L. No. 95-521, tit. VI, 92 Stat. 1824, 1868 (1978) (1978 version of § 591(b)(6)).
129. See Pub. L. No. 97-409, § 3, 96 Stat. 2039, 2040 (1983) (amending § 591(b)(8)).
130. See id.; see also S. REP. NO. 97-496, at 8 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3544
(stating that the conflict of interest for campaign officials ends with the incumbency of the President
the person helped elect).
131. See 28 U.S.C. § 591(b)(6) (1994).
132. See Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293, 1294 (1987) (1987 version of § 591(b)(8)); H.R. CONF.
REP. NO. 100-452, at 20-21 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2185, 2186-87.
133. 28 U.S.C. § 591(c)(1) (1994).
134. S. REP. NO. 97-496, at 9 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3545.
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process for any person not explicitly named in the Act as a covered official. This provision could apply, for example, to members of the President’s family and lower level
campaign and government officials who are perceived to be close to the President.135

This general discretionary authority thus allows the Attorney General to execute the Act more effectively by protecting the Attorney General and DOJ
from conflicts of interest not codified in the Act’s mandatory coverage.
A special category of discretionary coverage for Members of Congress was
added in 1994. The threshold for invoking this coverage is even lower than for
ordinary discretionary coverage. No conflict of interest must be present; instead, the Attorney General may apply the statutory procedures to a Member
136
of Congress if doing so “would be in the public interest.”
Congress understood that the “broader standard enables the Attorney General to consider a
larger range of factors and to exercise greater discretion” when applying the
Act to Members of Congress, but concluded that this broad standard was necessary due to the increased risk of the appearance of an interbranch conflict of
137
interest in such investigations.
3. Conclusions on the Range of Covered Persons. The range of persons
covered by the Act should reflect the Act’s underlying purpose: to have
investigations and prosecutions of persons close to the President or the
Attorney General handled by an independent counsel. Both the number and
type of official positions covered, and the length of time for which coverage is
available, are based upon this purpose. Each amendment to the Act has
attempted to refine the categories and terms of coverage to balance the twin
risks of overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness. The coverage truest to the
Act’s purpose is the pure discretionary coverage now available in § 591(c)—
when a conflict exists, an independent counsel may be appointed.
Nevertheless, to prevent the Attorney General from abusing his discretion by
declining to appoint independent counsels in appropriate cases, Congress has
provided specific categories of mandatory covered persons for whom an
independent counsel appointment cannot be avoided. Whether the current
version of these categories best balances the risks, however, remains an open
question.
B. Invoking the Statute
The procedures for invoking the Act’s application have a history as long
and complicated as the Act itself. Before addressing the current individual
elements, therefore, it is helpful to describe the historical evolution of the Act’s
triggering mechanisms as a whole.

135. S. REP. NO. 100-123, at 16 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2150, 2165.
136. 28 U.S.C. § 591(c)(2) (1994).
137. S. REP. NO. 103-101, at 36 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 748, 781.
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1. History of the Triggering Provisions. The triggering mechanisms in the
138
1978 Act were intended to be clear and easy to apply. The 1978 Act created a
unified procedure in §§ 591 and 592. The statutory triggering process began
when the Attorney General received “specific information” that a covered
139
person may have committed a nonpetty federal criminal offense.
The
Attorney General then conducted a “preliminary investigation” to determine
whether the allegations were “so unsubstantiated that no further investigation
140
or prosecution is warranted.” If further action was warranted, however, then
141
an independent counsel had to be appointed. The House Conference Report
summarized this process: “When the Attorney General receives specific
information that a specified individual may have violated a Federal criminal
law, the Attorney General conducts a preliminary investigation of the matter,
142
which may last for up to 90 days.”
143
The 1983 amendments preserved the structure of the triggering procedures, but modified the language of the Act to better suit the purposes of those
procedures. First, the characterization of the type of information the Attorney
General must receive under § 591 was changed from “specific information” that
a covered person had violated a federal criminal law to “information sufficient
144
to constitute grounds to investigate” whether a violation had occurred. Second, the type of question posed in the § 592 preliminary investigation was altered, from deciding whether the allegations are “so unsubstantiated” that no
further action is warranted, to determining whether there are “no reasonable
145
grounds to believe that further investigation or prosecution is warranted.”
Third, § 592(a) was amended to allow the Attorney General to consider during
the preliminary investigation not only the specificity of the information re146
ceived, but also the credibility of the information and its source.
These
147
changes were adopted in response to specific events, and from a perception
that the threshold for triggering the appointment of an independent counsel
148
had been too low.
The period between the 1983 amendments and the next round of revisions
in 1987 was a time of great controversy over the Act. Many officials in the

138. See Pub. L. No. 95-521, tit. VI, 92 Stat. 1824, 1867-73 (1978).
139. Id., 92 Stat. at 1867 (language appearing in 1978 version of § 591(a)).
140. Id., 92 Stat. at 1868 (language appearing in 1978 version of § 592(b)).
141. The 1978 Act referred to a “special prosecutor.” The term was officially changed to
“independent counsel” throughout the Act in the 1983 amendments. See S. REP. NO. 97-496, at 18
(1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3554.
142. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 95-1756, at 77-78 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4381, 4393-94.
143. Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 (1983).
144. Id. § 4(a)(1), 96 Stat. at 2040 (amending § 591(a)).
145. Id. § 4(b), 96 Stat. at 2040-41 (language in 1983 version of various subsections of § 592).
146. See id. (language added in 1983 to § 592(a)).
147. See infra notes 172-174, 185, 194-200 and accompanying text.
148. See S. REP. NO. 97-496, at 11-14 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3547-50. The
report concluded that “the present standard is too low.” Id. at 11, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3547.
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Reagan Administration believed that the Act was unconstitutional, and did
their best to undermine its operation. This effort created a direct backlash in
Congress. Attorney General Edwin Meese “did more to ensure that the independent counsel would become a permanent part of the political landscape
than any other single individual, with the notable exception of Richard
Nixon. . . . His actions as Attorney General appeared to represent precisely the
150
kind of behaviors that the provisions were designed to counteract.”
In response to Meese’s conduct, Congress’s 1987 amendments “were designed to
rein in the attorney general’s ability to interpret the act contrary to congres151
sional intent.” The 1987 Senate Report listed eight abuses and misinterpretations of the Act by the Reagan DOJ, and described how the amendments to the
152
Act were designed to respond to each abuse.
153
The 1987 amendments altered both the structure and substance of the
statutory triggering mechanisms. First, the recusal provisions, which limit the
Attorney General’s role in cases in which he or she is involved, were added to
154
§i591.
Second, the § 592 preliminary investigation was restricted by addi155
tional express limitations on the Attorney General’s powers at that stage.
Third, the triggering process was divided into two independent stages: the § 591
156
“threshold inquiry” and the § 592 preliminary investigation. In the inquiry
under the new version of § 591, the Attorney General must examine the infor-

149. The Supreme Court ultimately held that the Act is constitutional. See Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654, 659-60 (1988). The majority concluded, inter alia, that because the Attorney General alone
determines when an independent counsel appointment is triggered under the Act, and because a decision not to seek an independent counsel appointment is unreviewable, the President retains sufficient
control over the independent counsel—an executive branch investigation and prosecution officer—to
avoid a violation of the principle of separation of powers. See id. at 695-96. In essence, the Morrison
Court held that the constitutional vesting of “the executive power” in the President does not require
an unlimited power to control investigations of himself. Justice Scalia, alone in dissent, disagreed, arguing that the Act does interfere with the President’s ability to control an officer in the executive
branch. See id. at 705-15 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For Justice Scalia, vesting “the” executive power in
the President gives him complete control of the entire executive branch, even in situations where there
is a conflict of interest or the risk of abuse of power; the Constitution forces us to take those chances,
with the political process as the check. See id. at 710 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
150. HARRIGER, supra note 5, at 82-83. For discussions of the controversies caused by and consequences of Attorney General Meese’s statutory interpretations, see id. at 84-91.
151. Id. at 88.
152. See S. REP. NO. 100-123, at 8-14 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2150, 2157-63 (listing
abuses and misinterpretations: making unauthorized substantive “threshold inquiries” to avoid invoking the statutory preliminary investigation, evading the 90-day deadline, improperly considering the
subject’s possible lack of criminal intent, too stringently interpreting the “reasonable grounds” standard for independent counsel appointment, the failure of the Attorney General to recuse himself in
certain cases, wrongly opposing expansion of certain independent counsels’ jurisdictions, misinterpreting the “good cause” removal standard, and interfering with independent counsels’ independence
by imposing certain DOJ rules on them); id. at 15-25, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2164-74
(describing the amendments’ responses to these abuses).
153. Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293 (1987).
154. See id., 101 Stat. at 1294-95 (adding § 591(e)).
155. See id., 101 Stat. at 1295-96 (modifying language of and adding language to § 592(a)-(c)).
156. See Pub. L. No. 103-270, § 3(j), 108 Stat. 732, 735 (1994) (caption referring to § 591 as the
“threshold inquiry”).
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157

mation received and determine whether to proceed to the § 592 stage.
In
making the initial § 591 determination, the Attorney General may consider
only the specificity and credibility of the information—the “only” was added,
and the specific and credible standard moved from § 592(a) to the new
158
§i591(d). If the information is both specific and credible, the Attorney General notifies the Special Division and undertakes a § 592 preliminary investigation to determine whether there exist reasonable grounds to investigate fur159
ther.
160
Surprisingly, the 1994 amendments did not make any changes to the triggering provisions. This was due in large part to Congress’s conclusion that
since the 1987 amendments, the Attorney General and DOJ had been in
161
“substantial compliance” with the Act. The 1994 Senate Report reviewed the
post-1987 practice under the Act and concluded that the triggering mechanisms
162
were functioning effectively and were no longer being abused.
2. The Threshold Inquiry. The § 591 threshold inquiry was not originally a
separate stage of the statutory triggering procedures. The threshold inquiry
and the § 592 preliminary investigation were bifurcated in the 1987
163
amendments to the Act.
Although these two stages are similar, they now
serve different purposes. Unlike the preliminary investigation (discussed
below), the threshold inquiry is a highly limited review, but it does permit a
matter to be closed without any report to the Special Division.
a. The information received. The § 591 threshold inquiry begins when
the Attorney General “receives information sufficient to constitute grounds to
investigate whether” a covered person may have committed a federal criminal
164
violation. The meaning of this phrase might pose interpretive difficulties. In
reality, however, the history of this phrase makes clear that its meaning is in
fact very simple.
The 1978 version of § 591 (which applied to the original unified triggering
procedure) provided that the statutory procedures would be triggered when the
Attorney General received “specific information” about a federal criminal
violation by a covered person. “The term ‘specific information’ [was] used so
157. See Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293, 1293 (1987) (changing the language of § 591(a) to
make clear that § 591 and § 592 are different inquiries). Instead of §§ 591-592 determining whether an
“investigation” under “this chapter” is needed, as was the case under the previous § 591(a), the 1987
amendments clarified § 591(a) to read that the § 591(a)-(d) inquiry determines whether a “preliminary
investigation . . . under section 592” should proceed.
158. See id., 101 Stat. at 1294 (moving specific and credible provision of the previous § 592(a) to a
new § 591(d), unchanged in substance except for the addition of “only” before the dash).
159. See id., 101 Stat. at 1295-97 (preserving reasonable grounds standard in § 592, despite moving
specific and credible provision into § 591(d)).
160. Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108 Stat. 732 (1994).
161. S. REP. NO. 103-101, at 14 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 748, 758.
162. See id. at 12-14, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 756-59.
163. See supra notes 157-159 and accompanying text.
164. 28 U.S.C. § 591(a) (1994).
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that the provisions of this chapter [would] not apply to a generalized allegation
165
of wrongdoing which contains no specific factual support.” As long as the information received was specific, not general, the Attorney General was required to determine in a preliminary investigation (using the unified §§ 591 and
592 procedure) whether the allegations were nevertheless so unsubstantiated
that no further action was warranted.
Congress concluded in its first review of the Act that this original standard
of review was too low, and in 1983 amended § 592 to authorize the Attorney
General to consider in the initial investigation (under §§ 591 and 592 together)
166
not only the specificity of the allegation, but also the credibility of its source.
This change, of course, meant that the language referring to the receipt of
“specific” information would have to be amended as well, because the information received must not only be specific, but also credible. Congress thus replaced “specific information” with “information sufficient to constitute grounds
to investigate.”
Congress never expressly stated that the new language was merely a proxy
for the new specific and credible standard, although such a conclusion can be
167
inferred from the legislative history. Similarly, when the § 591 threshold inquiry and § 592 preliminary investigation were divided in 1987, Congress never
directly addressed how the division might affect the “information sufficient to
constitute grounds to investigate” standard in § 591. By moving the specific
168
and credible provision into § 591 and by adding the word “only,” however,
Congress made clear that after 1987, “information sufficient to constitute
grounds to investigate” means merely that—and means only that—the Attor169
ney General finds the allegations to be specific and credible. Thus, under the
current Act, the Attorney General’s determination that the information received is specific and credible is necessary and sufficient to meet the § 591
threshold inquiry and to proceed to the § 592 preliminary investigation.
b. The threshold inquiry standard of review. If the information received
by the Attorney General is specific and credible, then a § 592 preliminary
investigation must proceed, including a report to the Special Division at the

165. S. REP. NO. 95-170, at 52 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4268. The report illustrates this concept by noting that the receipt of a letter alleging that a Cabinet member is a “crook,”
but providing no further information or support for that allegation, would constitute nonspecific information. See id.
166. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
167. See S. REP. NO. 97-496, at 11-13 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3547-49
(discussing the addition of credibility, and using the new “information sufficient to constitute grounds”
language in a manner that suggests that it was intended to encompass the old specificity requirement
and the new elements added in 1983).
168. See supra note 158 and accompanying text; infra notes 175-177 and accompanying text.
169. See S. REP. NO. 100-123, at 15 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2150, 2164 (discussing
the newly separated § 591 threshold inquiry in light of “Congress’ intent that the decision to initiate a
preliminary investigation rest on these two factors alone”).
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170

beginning and at the end of that process.
If the information is not specific
and credible, however, the matter may be closed at the § 591 stage, without any
171
report to the Special Division or the public.
The interpretation of the
“specific and credible” standard is thus of great importance.
In adopting the “specific and credible” standard of review in 1983, Congress
reasoned that the previous standard (under the then-unified §§ 591 and 592
procedure) for determining when a preliminary investigation was needed was
set too low:
[T]he present standard is too low by not allowing the Attorney General to consider
the credibility of the person making the allegation in determining whether a preliminary investigation is required. Any allegation, even by a source known by the Department to be unreliable, can trigger a preliminary investigation. . . . [T]his standard
creates unfairness by imposing a stricter application of criminal law on public officials
than that imposed on private citizens. It also invites abuse of the [independent counsel] process by persons who want to harm the reputations of public officials. Finally,
this standard wastes valuable Department of Justice resources by requiring high priority investigations in situations where no one else would be investigated.172

The “specific” requirement preserves the principle that the Act is not triggered
173
by general or unsupported allegations, and the new 1983 “credible” requirement allows the Attorney General to “follow the usual practices of [DOJ] in
determining the reliability of a source,” such as the person’s previous reliabil174
ity.
This standard of review was further clarified in the 1987 amendments. The
specific and credible standard was moved from § 592(a) into a new § 591(d),
and the language was amended so that the Attorney General “shall consider
only—(A) the specificity . . . and (B) credibility” of the information and its
source when deciding under § 591 whether to proceed to a § 592 preliminary
175
investigation. Congress intended this change to clarify the very limited scope
176
of the newly separated § 591 threshold inquiry:
“This limitation applies, of
course, only to that early stage of the case in which the Attorney General is deciding whether to initiate a preliminary investigation of the matter; it does not
apply to the preliminary investigation itself, in which the Attorney General
177
may consider additional factors.” Therefore, a matter can be disposed of un170. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(1), (b)-(c) (1994) (requiring Attorney General to report to Special Division both upon initiating a § 592 preliminary investigation and at its conclusion whether he or she
seeks or declines to seek appointment of an independent counsel).
171. See id. § 591(d) (stating that Attorney General “shall close the matter” if information is not
specific and credible, without any reporting requirement; and stating that the Attorney General
“shall . . . commence” a § 592 preliminary investigation if information is specific and credible, or if no
determination can be made within allotted time).
172. S. REP. NO. 97-496, at 11-12 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3547-48.
173. See id. at 12, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3548
174. Id.
175. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
176. See S. REP. NO. 100-123, at 15 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2150, 2164 (stating that
amendment “adds the word ‘only’ to the current standard for deciding whether to conduct a preliminary investigation, to emphasize Congress’ intent that the decision to initiate a preliminary investigation rest on these two factors alone”).
177. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 100-452, at 21 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2185, 2187.
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der § 591 as not specific or credible, but a disposition on any other basis requires a § 592 preliminary investigation and the accompanying reporting requirements.
c. Length of time. When the separate § 591 threshold inquiry was
created in 1987, the Act imposed a limitation of fifteen days on this stage of the
178
triggering procedures.
At the request of Attorney General Janet Reno,
Congress extended this period to thirty days in the 1994 amendments, “to give
the Attorney General additional time to determine whether a preliminary
179
investigation is warranted under the law.”
Nevertheless, the Act imposes a
very short time limitation on the threshold inquiry, severely limiting the
Attorney General’s ability to dismiss matters without a preliminary
180
investigation.
3. The Preliminary Investigation. The § 592 preliminary investigation is
perhaps the most controversial segment of the Act’s triggering mechanisms.
The preliminary investigation requirements attempt to strike a balance
between, on the one hand, allowing the Attorney General sufficient authority
to dismiss matters that are not worthy of a federal criminal investigation, and,
on the other hand, constraining the Attorney General’s role merely to
screening cases for their investigative worthiness and not their substantive
merits. The history of the preliminary investigation’s practice and statutory
amendment indicate that the right balance remains elusive.
a. The preliminary investigation standard of review. The language used
to describe the method and standard of review applied by the Attorney
General at the § 592 preliminary investigation stage has changed, but its
underlying purpose has remained the same: “A ‘preliminary investigation’ is
the type of initial investigation which is conducted to determine whether a case
warrants further investigation . . . to weed out frivolous cases . . . . [If] a more
complete investigation is required, such as the subpoenaing of documents, the
preliminary investigation stage has been completed,” and the investigation is
181
turned over to an independent counsel appointed by the Special Division.
178. See Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293, 1294 (1987) (1987 version of § 591(d)).
179. S. REP. NO. 103-101, at 26 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 748, 771.
180. One of the chief congressional criticisms of Attorney General Meese’s interpretation of the
Act was his procedure of undertaking what he called “threshold inquiries.” These often involved
“elaborate factual and legal analyses,” yet Meese asserted that they did not trigger a statutory preliminary investigation and the accompanying reporting requirement. See S. REP. NO. 100-123, at 9 (1987),
reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2150, 2158. It was to abolish this practice that the 1987 amendments
established the statutory § 591 threshold inquiry, at which only specificity and credibility may be considered; to consider any other factor, the Attorney General must begin a statutory § 592 preliminary
investigation. See id. at 15, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2164.
181. S. REP. NO. 95-170, at 53-54 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4269-70; see also S.
REP. NO. 97-496, at 14 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3550 (“As soon as it becomes apparent that a matter justifies further investigation, the purpose of a preliminary investigation has been
completed, and the matter should be referred immediately to the court for the appointment of a special prosecutor.”).
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The preliminary investigation serves only a screening function: to eliminate
182
groundless cases, but not to close matters that deserve a further look.
The 1978 version of the Act described the preliminary investigation standard as a determination of whether the allegations were so unsubstantiated that
183
no more investigation or prosecution was warranted. The preliminary investigation allowed the Attorney General “to weed out the totally unsubstantiated
allegations,” but “as soon as there is any indication whatsoever that the allegations . . . have any potential chance of substantiation,” the 1978 version re184
quired that an independent counsel be appointed. (This language and intent
is very similar to that currently defining a § 591 threshold inquiry.)
The 1983 amendments modified the Attorney General’s determination
from whether the allegations are (1) so unsubstantiated (2) that no further investigation or prosecution is warranted, to whether there are (1) reasonable
185
grounds (2) to believe that further investigation or prosecution is warranted.
This change achieved two purposes. First, it shifted the focus of the preliminary investigation away from exclusively the information contained in the allegations and whether it could be substantiated, to any “reasonable grounds” that
might or might not influence whether further investigation is warranted. Second, by acknowledging that the question is whether the Attorney General
“believes” there are grounds for further investigation at this early stage, the
change recognized the role of the Attorney General’s subjective judgment in
the preliminary investigation process.
The 1987 amendments to the Act reinforced these changes. First, the bifurcation of the § 591 threshold inquiry and the § 592 preliminary investigation
186
and the accompanying alterations in the text, emphasized that the threshold
inquiry was an extremely limited review of the allegations alone, while the preliminary investigation could include other factors bearing on the merit of further investigation. Second, the amendments included numerous express limitations on the Attorney General’s authority during a preliminary investigation.
These limits, on their face and by implication, acknowledged that the preliminary investigation can range beyond the mere allegations themselves. Third, a
significant change was made to the language of § 592—limiting the determination to whether “further investigation” was warranted, and deleting the refer-

182. Attorney General Meese was accused by Congress of thwarting this principle by not merely
screening cases for whether an independent counsel appointment is appropriate, but by dismissing
cases on the merits during a preliminary or even pre-preliminary investigation. See supra note 180; see
also S. REP. NO. 100-123, at 6-8, 15 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2150, 2155-57, 2164.
183. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
184. S. REP. NO. 95-170, at 54 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4270.
185. Congress adopted these two changes in response to specific events and to problems with the
previous language. See S. REP. NO. 97-496, at 12 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3548
(discussing how the addition of credibility to specificity analysis would influence reasonable grounds
determination); id. at 14-15, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3550-51 (discussing role of established
DOJ policies in reasonable grounds determination).
186. See supra notes 157-159 and accompanying text.
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187

ences to “or prosecution” —that clarified Congress’s intent that “a decision to
proceed or not to proceed under the Act must rest on a judgment about the
need for further ‘investigation’ rather than on the ultimate prospects for con188
viction.”
The sum of these changes to the preliminary investigation standard—
whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is
warranted—is a relatively clear principle. Once the Attorney General has
found the allegations to be specific and credible under § 591, a § 592 preliminary investigation begins. During the preliminary investigation, the Attorney
General may conclude that the allegations alone are sufficient to warrant further investigation, may thus immediately find § 592 reasonable grounds to do
such further investigation, and may apply to the Special Division for the appointment of an independent counsel. The Attorney General need not do this,
however. Instead, at the § 592 preliminary investigation stage, the Attorney
General also may consider any other factors bearing on the warrant of further
investigation (within the statutory constraints on the Attorney General’s
authority at this stage). If these other factors reinforce the need for further investigation, or muddy the matter and the time restriction runs out, then the Attorney General is obligated to find that reasonable grounds exist and to request
189
the appointment of an independent counsel.
If, on the other hand, these
other factors counsel against any further investigation, the Attorney General
need merely report the factual basis for that conclusion to the Special Division,
and the matter will be closed without the appointment of an independent coun190
sel.
Attempts to argue that the § 592 reasonable grounds standard requires
191
some higher level of proof have been rejected.
b. Limitations on the preliminary investigation review. The screening
purpose of the preliminary investigation can be successful only if the scope of
the Attorney General’s investigation at this stage is restricted. A broadranging substantive investigation would undermine the Act by undertaking
tasks that were intended to be performed by the independent counsel. On the
other hand, too many restrictions on the Attorney General’s authority would
187. See Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293, 1295-97 (1987) (making this change throughout § 592).
188. S. REP. NO. 100-123, at 18-19 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2150, 2167-68. Congress
was directly responding to and rejecting the “reasonable prospect of conviction” interpretation of the
§i592 standard asserted by Attorney General Meese in several potential independent counsel cases.
See id. at 11, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2160.
189. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1) (1994).
190. See id. § 592(b).
191. Attorney General Meese asserted that the “reasonable grounds” standard should be interpreted to require that, before requesting the appointment of an independent counsel, the Attorney
General must find a level of information closer to probable cause or even a preponderance of the evidence. See In re Meese, 907 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The Special Division has consistently rejected
this argument: Because the preliminary investigation serves a screening function, and because the Attorney General’s appointment determination is not reviewable, the reasonable grounds standard must
be low, allowing the Attorney General to request an independent counsel appointment as he or she
sees fit. See In re Herman, 144 F.3d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (rejecting argument that reasonable grounds
standard should be given a more stringent interpretation).
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make the preliminary investigation too similar to the threshold inquiry, and
could lead to the unwarranted appointments of independent counsels. As with
the preliminary investigation standard of review, Congress has imposed several
restrictions on the Attorney General’s authority in an effort to strike the
appropriate balance between these two principles. For example, the 1978 Act
dictated that the Attorney General “shall have no authority to convene grand
192
juries, plea bargain, grant immunity, or issue subpoenas.”
These limits
proved to be insufficient, however, particularly in light of the misuse of the Act
193
by the Reagan Administration. The subsequent amendments to the Act each
sought to refine the preliminary investigation balance.
i. Department of Justice policies. The first significant change to the
restrictions was intended to correct the Act’s overinclusiveness—where an
independent counsel would be appointed even if the criminal violation alleged
was an offense for which federal investigations or prosecutions were rare or
even nonexistent. This problem first arose in the cases of Carter advisors
Hamilton Jordan and Timothy Kraft. Information was received that each man
194
had been seen using cocaine at the Studio 54 disco in New York City.
Despite the fact that such allegations would be “generally ignored by United
States attorneys when made against ordinary citizens,” independent counsels
were appointed to investigate both men; no charges were ever filed in either
195
case.
196
Congress reacted to the Jordan and Kraft cases by allowing the Attorney
General to consider “written or other established policies of the Department of
197
Justice” relating to the enforcement of criminal laws, thereby reducing the
198
previous “hair trigger” standard.
Congress acknowledged that executive
branch prosecutorial discretion—“in those clear cases in which there is an es199
tablished, demonstrable policy not to prosecute” —has some role to play even
in the preliminary investigation stage. If the Attorney General bases his decision not to seek the appointment of an independent counsel upon such a nonprosecution policy,
[i]n his report to the [Special Division], the Attorney General must substantiate this
practice with case law, opinions of the U.S. Attorney for the district in which the violation was alleged to have occurred, written prosecutorial guidelines, or other evidence that no prosecution would be brought. . . . Any case in which there is no clear

192. 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(2)(A) (1994).
193. See generally supra notes 150-152, 180, 182, 188 and accompanying text.
194. See HARRIGER, supra note 5, at 75.
195. Id.
196. See S. REP. NO. 97-496, at 14-15 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3550-51
(discussing the two cases as impetus for including DOJ policies provision).
197. 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1) (1994).
198. HARRIGER, supra note 5, at 75 (quoting former Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti’s description of the standard).
199. S. REP. NO. 97-496, at 15 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3551. The relevant
policies to be considered are those particular to the crime alleged. A general DOJ policy not to prosecute weak cases may not be relied upon.
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policy against prosecution or any arguably exceptional circumstances are present
should be sent to a special prosecutor.200

The DOJ policies provision was amended in 1987, however, when Congress
determined that the Reagan Administration had been abusing the provision by
misinterpreting its scope: By considering the concept of DOJ policies on the
“enforcement of criminal laws” in a certain way, Attorney General Meese
transformed “reasonable grounds to believe further investigation or prosecution is warranted” into whether a “reasonable prospect of conviction” ex201
isted.
This interpretation undermined the preliminary investigation’s
screening role by allowing the Attorney General, rather than the independent
counsel, to make determinations on the chances for success in a particular case.
Therefore, Congress corrected the language of the restriction to read DOJ
202
policies “with respect to the conduct of criminal investigations” to foreclose a
similar interpretation in the future.
The DOJ policies provision allows the Attorney General to dismiss a matter at the preliminary investigation stage in cases where the alleged violation is
one which is ordinarily not investigated or prosecuted. In addition, because the
DOJ policies provision remains part of the § 592 preliminary investigation and
not the § 591 threshold inquiry, the Attorney General must report to the Special Division each time an independent counsel appointment is rejected because the existence of a nonprosecution or other DOJ policy provides the basis
203
for the “no reasonable grounds” finding. This reporting requirement creates
a check against future abuse of the DOJ policies provision by the Attorney
General.
ii. Criminal state of mind. In 1987, Congress further limited the
Attorney General’s authority by entirely prohibiting consideration during the
204
§i591 threshold inquiry of whether the accused person “lacked the state of
205
mind required for the violation of criminal law.”
In addition, Congress
amended the Act to permit the Attorney General to base a § 592 preliminary
investigation finding of “no reasonable grounds” to support the appointment of
an independent counsel upon a determination of a lack of mens rea only if
206
“there is clear and convincing evidence.”
Congress intended the bar against the use of mens rea evidence in the preliminary investigation to be very high, because Congress believed that Attorney
General Meese had relied too frequently on such grounds when declining to
207
seek independent counsel appointments. Congress reasoned that “[s]tates of

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 592(b) (1994).
S. REP. NO. 100-123, at 19 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2150, 2168.
28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
Id. § 592(b).
See id. § 592(a)(2)(B)(i).
Id. § 592(a)(2)(B) (originally adopted as part of § 592(a)(1)).
Id. § 592(a)(2)(B)(ii).
See S. REP. NO. 100-123, at 18 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2150, 2167.
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mind are inherently difficult to prove,” require a fuller investigation than the
Attorney General is permitted during a preliminary investigation, and demand
“subjective judgments” outside the Attorney General’s limited role in the
208
statutory process. Congress thus concluded that
[i]t is theoretically possible that the Attorney General would have a case in which the
evidence disproving criminal intent is so compelling that it justifies closing the entire
matter. . . . However, in the more common situation where there is conflicting or inconclusive evidence on the subject’s state of mind, the provision prohibits the Attorney General from closing the case solely because he or she has evaluated the evidence
and found the evidence against intent more persuasive or the evidence establishing intent insufficiently strong.209

If the Attorney General does rely on state of mind evidence to justify closing a
§ 592 preliminary investigation, the Special Division reporting requirement ensures outside oversight of that justification.
The 1994 reauthorization debates included a Senate proposal to lessen this
210
bar on state of mind evidence during a preliminary investigation.
The full
Congress rejected the proposal, however, and retained the strict prohibition;
Congress concluded that because state of mind considerations had been abused
previously, it was best to preserve the strict prohibition to prevent future
211
problems.
212

iii. Other limitations. The 1987 amendments modified § 592 in other
ways to restrict and monitor the Attorney General during the preliminary
213
investigation. The language of § 592(a) was tightened to make clear that the
ninety-day time limit is mandatory, except if the Attorney General requests
and is granted a sixty-day extension by the Special Division. A modification in
§ 592(c) also clarified that the receipt of additional information about a matter
previously closed after a preliminary investigation without an independent
counsel appointment compels the beginning of a new preliminary investigation
to address the new information. In addition, § 592(a) was amended to require
the Attorney General to report to the Special Division when each preliminary
investigation is commenced. Finally, § 592(g) was added to address preliminary
214
investigations begun by the Attorney General at the request of Congress.
c. Length of time. Unlike most elements of the § 592 preliminary
215
investigation, the ninety-day time limitation has remained unchanged.
The
only modification to the time restriction was added by the 1983 amendments:
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See S. REP. NO. 103-101, at 34 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 748, 779.
211. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 103-511, at 11 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 792, 794.
212. This paragraph summarizes the changes made to § 592 by Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293,
1295-97 (1987).
213. These amendments were primarily a reaction to the abuses of the Act by Attorney General
Meese. See supra notes 150-152, 193 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text (describing congressional request procedures).
215. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(1) (1994).
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The Attorney General may receive up to a sixty-day extension from the Special
216
Division upon a showing of good cause. Congress made clear, however, that
this restriction should be the exception, not the rule.
In making his application, the Attorney General should specifically state the grounds
upon which he requests an extension. [Congress] intends that the court will grant
these extensions only in cases where the Attorney General has specifically shown that
a limited extension may enable him to resolve the preliminary investigation without a
special prosecutor.217

Most preliminary investigations easily should conclude within ninety days;
given the preliminary investigation’s limited screening function, this result is
entirely appropriate.
4. Recusal of the Attorney General. One of the most important
amendments to the triggering procedures is the recusal provision of § 591(e).
218
Included in the 1987 amendments, this rule requires the Attorney General to
determine whether his or her recusal is required “[b]efore personally making
219
any other determination under [the Act].”
The result of this determination
must be reported to the Special Division, including the Attorney General’s
220
reasons.
Congress inserted the recusal provision because it believed that Attorney
General Meese had abused the Act by improperly failing to recuse himself
from the (then-unified §§ 591 and 592) preliminary investigations of several
221
cases with the potential for independent counsel appointments.
To correct
this problem in the future, Congress made its intent very clear. The recusal
provision “requires the Attorney General to consider recusal in every independent counsel case. . . . The recusal decision must be made prior to the Attorney General’s making any other determination required by the Act,” such as
whether the threshold inquiry dictates the need for a preliminary investigation,
or whether the preliminary investigation demonstrates the need for an inde222
pendent counsel appointment. Recusal is required in any case where the Attorney General “participated in the underlying facts or had the type of relationship with a person in the case which creates an appearance of or an actual
conflict of interest. It deliberately rejects the suggestion that the Attorney
223
General employ any type of presumption against recusal.”
Finally, the re216. See id. § 592(a)(3).
217. S. REP. NO. 97-496, at 13 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3549.
218. The text of § 591(e) was reorganized and slightly rewritten in the 1994 amendments, but with
no change in the substantive meaning. Compare Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293, 1294-95 (1987)
(original version), with Pub. L. No. 103-270, § 3(k), 108 Stat. 732, 735-36 (1994) (modified version).
219. 28 U.S.C. § 591(e)(2) (1994).
220. See id.
221. See S. REP. NO. 100-123, at 11 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2150, 2160 (“There are
several independent counsel cases in which the Attorney General’s failure to recuse himself is extremely troubling.”); see also id. at 11-12, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2160-61 (discussing the
troublesome cases).
222. Id. at 16-17, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2165-66.
223. Id. at 16, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2165.
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quirement of a report to the Special Division on the Attorney General’s recusal
determination “applies whether the Attorney General ultimately decides in favor of or against recusal. Its purpose is to enable other persons to better understand the standards and reasoning used by the Attorneys General in reaching a
224
recusal decision.”
The recusal provision of § 591(e) is intended to be a significant check on the
Attorney General’s ability to contravene the Act by remaining involved in
cases in which he or she is interested. Although the Act provides no sanction
or remedy for an improper recusal determination, the reporting requirement is
presumably intended as a political and public relations check on the Attorney
General’s discretion.
C. Conclusion: The Triggering Mechanisms
The current version of the Act’s triggering mechanisms is the result of the
controversial history of the Act itself. Congress has struggled to achieve a stable balance between opposing forces, hoping neither to initiate unnecessary independent counsel investigations nor to allow the statutory scheme to be undermined by the executive branch. The number and nature of the Act’s
covered persons has expanded and contracted as Congress sought to find the
appropriate range of individuals for whom only independent counsels, and not
Attorneys General and DOJ, should undertake investigations. The threshold
inquiry and preliminary investigation were divided, creating a structure designed to check the Attorney General’s discretion in the triggering procedures:
A matter may be closed by the Attorney General in silence only on the ground
that the allegations are not specific and credible; closing a matter without appointing an independent counsel on any other ground requires a preliminary
investigation and reports to the Special Division. Furthermore, Congress has
erected a series of limitations on the § 592 preliminary investigation, from the
early prohibitions including barring the use of grand juries or plea bargaining to
recent additions such as requiring a clearly established nonprosecution policy
or clear and convincing evidence of the lack of mens rea. Finally, the Act requires the Attorney General to consider and file a report on recusal in every
case. Each of these provisions and procedures is dedicated to achieving the
Act’s central function: triggering an independent counsel investigation only
when one is needed. Despite the attempts at refinement over twenty years, accomplishing this central purpose of the Act remains elusive.

224. Id. at 17, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2166 (emphasis added). But cf. 28 U.S.C.
§i591(e)(2) (1994) (“The Attorney General shall set forth this determination in writing, identify the
facts considered by the Attorney General, and set forth the reasons for the recusal.” (emphasis
added)).
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IV
RELATIONSHIPS CREATED AND ALTERED BY THE OPERATION OF THE ACT
The independent counsel statute has created and altered many complex relationships within and among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of
the federal government. This part of the article examines the relationships between the independent counsel and other relevant actors in the political system:
the public, the “Special Division” court that oversees independent counsel investigations, the Department of Justice and the Attorney General, and Congress.
A. The Relationship Between the Act and Private Citizens
Private citizens repeatedly have sought to use the courts to compel the Attorney General to undertake a preliminary investigation under the Act or to
force the Attorney General to appoint an independent counsel after having undertaken a preliminary investigation. In rejecting these claims, the courts have
expounded upon the function of the independent counsel and that office’s role
in the criminal justice system.
1. Private Citizens Cannot Compel the Attorney General to Conduct a
Preliminary Investigation. A trilogy of federal court of appeals cases has held
that private citizens may not use the federal courts to compel the Attorney
225
General to undertake a preliminary investigation. First, in Nathan v. Smith,
the plaintiffs, who were survivors of an attack by the Ku Klux Klan and the
226
American Nazi Party,
alleged that, after having received information
regarding these events, the Attorney General wrongly failed to appoint an
227
independent counsel. The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court’s order that
the Attorney General conduct a preliminary investigation under § 592, but did
so in a fourteen-word per curiam opinion. Individual judges offered little
guidance in much longer concurring opinions. Judge Davis would have reached
the merits of the case and then held that the plaintiffs had presented the
Attorney General with nothing other than “conclusory generalizations” and
“suspicions”—not enough to require the Attorney General to undertake a
228
preliminary investigation. Judge Bork would have held that the court lacked
jurisdiction to hear the case and found that the Act created no private right of

225. 737 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
226. See id. at 1070-71 (Davis, J., concurring).
227. See id. at 1071 (Davis, J., concurring). The plaintiffs claimed that they had supplied the Attorney General with information that individuals covered under the Act had violated federal criminal law
and that he had failed to conduct a preliminary investigation. See id. The Attorney General maintained that he did not seek appointment because he believed that the allegations did not concern persons covered under the Act. See id. The Attorney General instead referred the matter to DOJ’s Civil
Rights Division. See id.
228. Id. at 1076-77 (Davis, J., concurring).
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action to compel the Attorney General to undertake a preliminary
229
investigation.
Within days of deciding Nathan, however, the D.C. Circuit sitting en banc
reached the same conclusion but supplied a rationale for its holding. In
230
Banzhaf v. Smith, the plaintiffs had presented information to the Attorney
General indicating that the Reagan Administration might have committed
231
crimes during the 1980 presidential campaign.
When, ninety days after receiving the information, the Attorney General had not decided whether to seek
the appointment of an independent counsel, the plaintiffs sued to compel him
232
to do so. In reversing the decision of the district court ordering the Attorney
General to conduct a preliminary investigation, the court noted that Congress
explicitly had intended to preclude private citizens from using the courts to
challenge the Attorney General’s decision not to investigate or seek the ap233
pointment of an independent counsel. The court stated that such private actions were unnecessary because congressional oversight provides an effective
234
enforcement mechanism.
235
Finally, the Ninth Circuit reached the same result in Dellums v. Smith. In
Dellums, the plaintiffs sought to force Attorney General William French Smith
236
to conduct a preliminary investigation.
The court below found that the Act

229. See id. at 1077 (Bork, J., concurring).
230. 737 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (per curiam).
231. See id. at 1168; see also John F. Banzhaf III, Upset at Reno’s Decision? Take Her to Court,
FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Dec. 12, 1997, at 7. Banzhaf had petitioned Attorney General William
French Smith to investigate “Debategate”—the unauthorized removal of materials from the Carter
White House to Reagan campaign headquarters during the 1980 presidential campaign. When Smith
refused to act on the information, Banzhaf brought the case to court. Banzhaf argues that the holding
in the Court of Appeals was limited to “private parties” or “members of the public” who sought review
of the Attorney General’s decision not to appoint an independent counsel: Since Members of Congress are explicitly authorized to petition the Attorney General to appoint an independent counsel under § 592(g), Republicans on the Judiciary Committee might have been able to obtain judicial review
of Attorney General Janet Reno’s decision in late 1997 not to appoint an independent counsel to investigate Democratic fund-raising irregularities. See Banzhaf, supra. Banzhaf maintains that
[a] statute designed to prevent abuses that occur when the Justice Department refuses to investigate criminal wrongdoing by high administration officials and that sets precise standards
and timetables for the appointment of an independent counsel if very low standards of evidence are met is reduced to a nullity if an attorney general’s refusal to comply is immune
from any review.
Id.
232. See Banzhaf, 737 F.2d at 1168; see also supra Part III.B.3.c (discussing the 90-day time limitation of the preliminary investigation).
233. See Banzhaf, 737 F.2d at 1168. The court noted that two bills that did not pass during the debate of the Act would have allowed for review by private parties. See id. at 1170 (citing H.R. 11476,
94th Cong. (1976), and S. 495, 94th Cong. (1976)).
234. See id. at 1169.
235. 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986).
236. See id. at 818. The plaintiffs were Ronald Dellums (a Member of Congress) and two others
who, in January 1983, had sent a detailed letter about United States involvement in Nicaragua to Attorney General Smith. See id. at 819. This letter asked the Attorney General to conduct a preliminary
investigation under the Act to determine whether certain executive officials, including President Reagan, Secretary of Defense Alexander Haig, Secretary of State George Schultz, and others in the Administration had committed criminal offenses in connection with the Nicaraguan campaign. See id.
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imposed mandatory duties on the Attorney General and issued injunctions or237
dering the Attorney General to comply with the provisions of the Act. However, while the Act does impose mandatory duties on the Attorney General,
the Ninth Circuit held that private citizens could not challenge in federal court
238
the failure of the Attorney General to discharge those duties. The Ninth Circuit held that the legislative history of the Act, when examined in the context of
the entire statutory scheme, manifests an intent to preclude review by private
239
citizens. The court dismissed the lower courts’ argument that such a holding
would render the Act a nullity, and it noted that, at the time of the Act’s enactment, Congress envisioned that oversight by members of the congressional
240
judiciary committees would ensure that the Attorney General obeys the law.
Although the undisputed purpose of the Act is to foster public trust and
confidence in government—a trust that is called into question when high-level
governmental officials investigate themselves—the courts in Banzhaf and Dellums found that Congress, not the public, is the proper check against the Attor241
ney General’s noncompliance with the Act. During the 1987 reenactment of
the Act, Congress resolved the issue once and for all by codifying the holdings
of Dellums and Banzhaf by adding a provision that expressly limits the authority of the federal courts to overrule a decision by the Attorney General to ref242
use to conduct a preliminary investigation in a particular case.

237. See id. at 818. The district court in Dellums had held that the Act would be rendered meaningless and its purpose defeated if a court could not order the Attorney General to conduct an investigation upon the request of a credible person supplying specific information of criminal wrongdoing.
See Dellums v. Smith, 573 F. Supp. 1489, 1493 (N.D. Cal. 1983), rev’d, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986). In
so holding, the court believed the purpose of the Act was to deny the Attorney General the power to
refuse to make at least a preliminary investigation upon the receipt of reasonably specific information
from credible sources alleging the violation of federal criminal law by members of the executive
branch. See id.
238. See Dellums, 797 F.2d at 819. Furthermore, the statute made no provision for advising complainants of the outcome of an investigation. See id. at 822.
239. See id. at 823.
240. Dellums consolidated three district court cases on appeal. See id.; see also infra Part IV.D.1
(discussing congressional oversight as an enforcement mechanism).
241. The same result was reached in Beauchamp v. Meese, 657 F. Supp. 1263 (N.D. Ill. 1987), a colorful case in which the plaintiff sued to compel the Attorney General to undertake a preliminary investigation of Judge Sporkin, a federal district judge, for perjury, and the Attorney General and the U.S.
Attorney, for conspiracy to obstruct justice in failing to investigate Judge Sporkin. See id. at 1263. The
plaintiff claimed that excessive bail had been set for his detention for a misdemeanor; Judge Sporkin
denied that he had any knowledge of the plaintiff. See id. The court granted the Attorney General’s
motion to dismiss, stating that Congress specifically considered proposals that would allow for the private enforcement of the Act, but these proposals had died in the face of arguments that the powers
given the congressional judiciary committees provided an adequate check on the Attorney General’s
discretion and that allowing for public enforcement would lead to misuse and greater public cynicism
directed at government officials. See id. at 1264-65 (citing Nathan v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1069, 1080-81
(D.C. Cir. 1984)).
242. See S. REP. NO. 100-123, at 15 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2150, 2164. The provision reads: “The Attorney General’s determination under this chapter to apply to the division of the
court for the appointment of an independent counsel shall not be reviewable in any court.” 28 U.S.C.
§a592(f) (1994).
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2. Private Citizens Cannot Compel the Special Division to Appoint an
Independent Counsel. In addition to trying to compel the Attorney General to
undertake a preliminary investigation, private citizens have sought to compel
the Special Division to appoint an independent counsel. Although § 592(f)
states that the courts may not compel the Attorney General to conduct a
preliminary investigation or undertake a preliminary investigation, the
provision is silent as to suits by citizens against the Special Division itself.
Despite this silence, the courts consistently have rejected these claims,
stating that the Act “does not . . . confer standing on private citizens to sue the
243
special division to compel it to appoint independent counsels” and that the
Special Division is without jurisdiction to act where the Attorney General has
244
not applied for the appointment of an independent counsel. Furthermore, no
court—not just the Special Division—has jurisdiction to appoint an independent counsel at the request of a private citizen because the Act states specifically
245
that only the Attorney General possesses this authority. In essence, the Act
“does not provide an open door for private citizens to compel the investigation
of alleged violations of federal law by direct application to the Special Division
246
to appoint independent counsel for that purpose.”
247
In In re INSLAW, for example, a government contractor applied to the
Special Division seeking the appointment of an independent counsel to investigate alleged misconduct in a contract dispute between the contractor and
248
DOJ. The court held that it had no jurisdiction in the matter because the Attorney General had not applied for the appointment of an independent coun249
250
sel. Similarly, in In re Visser, the plaintiff requested the Special Division to
243. In re Kaminski, 960 F.2d 1062, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (per curiam). The petitioner in Kaminski
sued the Special Division pro se, attempting to force it to receive evidence of misconduct by federal
judges under the theory that 28 U.S.C. § 49 gives the Special Division unqualified authority to appoint
independent counsels. See id. at 1062-63.
244. See id. at 1063; cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (stating that “the Executive
Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case”); Linda
R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of the
prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.”).
For further discussion of the relationship between the Special Division and the independent counsel with respect to jurisdictional issues, see infra Part IV.B.2.
245. See Kaminski, 960 F.2d at 1064-65.
246. Id. at 1064; cf. Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 619 (“[I]n American jurisprudence . . . a private citizen
lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or non-prosecution of another.”).
247. 885 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
248. See INSLAW, 885 F.2d at 880. The plaintiff had supplied the information to James C. McKay,
the independent counsel charged with investigating Attorney General Meese, but McKay determined
that the request for an investigation based on these materials exceeded his jurisdiction and he referred
the matter to the Attorney General. See id. at 880-82. DOJ reviewed the material and the allegations,
but determined that they were insufficient to warrant a preliminary investigation under § 591(d) and
thus closed the matter. See id. at 881.
249. See id. at 880. The court reaffirmed the rationale of the Dellums and Banzhaf courts and held
that private citizens lacked standing under the Act, even where the allegations concerned were conceded to be “specific and credible.” See id. at 882 (citing Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817, 822 (9th Cir.
1986)). The INSLAW court prudently pointed out that the fact that “the courts are specifically prevented from reviewing the Attorney General’s decision not to seek appointment” under the statute
helped the Supreme Court in Morrison to uphold the Act as constitutional. Id. at 883.
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appoint an independent counsel to investigate the alleged misconduct of numerous state and federal officials regarding a misdemeanor charge filed against
251
him.
The court held that a plaintiff has no standing to petition the Special
Division in the name of the Attorney General and that the court is without jurisdiction to appoint an independent counsel in the absence of an application
252
by the Attorney General.
B. The Relationships Between the Act and the Special Division
As noted above, the Act establishes a division of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for the purpose of appointing in253
dependent counsels. The Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court
designates and assigns three circuit court judges to the Special Division for re254
newable two-year terms. The Act requires that one of the three judges be a
judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and stipulates that no two of the three judges may be named to the Special
255
Division from a particular court. The Act further states that the judges of the
Special Division are ineligible to participate in any matter relating to an inde256
pendent counsel they have appointed.
Although the relationship between the independent counsel and the Special
Division is a significant one, due to constitutional concerns, this relationship is
257
limited and circumscribed. Once the Special Division has appointed an independent counsel and defined his or her prosecutorial jurisdiction, it has no

Furthermore, the INSLAW court held that, under § 593(c)(2), the forwarding of material by an
employee of an independent counsel to DOJ’s Public Integrity Section “for such action, if any, that
your office may wish to take” did not constitute a formal submission by the independent counsel to the
Attorney General under the Act, or even to the Public Integrity Section. Id. (emphasis added).
250. 968 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
251. See id. at 1320.
252. See id. at 1322-23.
253. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 593(a) (1994); see also In re A Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, 39 F.3d 374, 378 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“While nominally a division of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit . . . , the Special Division has no functional relationship to the Court of Appeals. The Division keeps its own records and establishes its own procedures.”); Niles L. Godes & Ty
E. Howard, Independent Counsel Investigations, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 875, 881-84 (1998) (describing
provisions of the Act that establish and define the function of Special Division).
254. Priority in assignment to the Special Division is to be made to retired circuit judges and retired
justices. See S. REP. NO. 95-170, at 36 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4252. Furthermore, “[b]y giving priority to senior retired circuit court judges and senior retired justices, the members of the special division will not be sitting on matters involving the Department of Justice on a dayto-day basis.” Id. at 78, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4294. Interestingly, Congress gave another
rationale for utilizing senior judges on the Special Division: Since the Special Division would be dealing with sensitive matters of great concern to the present Administration, “[a]s retired judges their
ambitions would have been largely achieved and their activities would be less likely to involve them in
any conflict situation.” Id.
255. See 28 U.S.C. § 49 (1994).
256. See id. § 49(f).
257. “The Special Division has no authority to take any action or undertake any duties that are not
specifically authorized by the Act.” Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 684 (1988).
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258

power to supervise or control his or her activities: “The Independent Counsel does not operate under our supervision and his acts . . . do not bear our ae259
gis.”
1. The Appointment and Selection of Independent Counsels by the Special
Division. On receiving the application for the appointment of an independent
counsel from the Attorney General, the Special Division selects the
independent counsel for that investigation and defines his or her prosecutorial
260
jurisdiction.
The Act states that the independent counsel is to be a person
“who has appropriate experience and who will conduct the investigation and
261
any prosecution in a prompt, responsible, and cost-effective manner.”
Furthermore, the individual selected must have the ability to devote the
262
necessary time to complete an investigation and cannot simultaneously hold
258. See id. at 695. The fact that the independent counsel is under the control—although perhaps
the “control” is nominal and formal at best—of the executive branch was key to the Morrison Court
upholding the Act’s constitutionality. See id. at 684 (“The gradual expansion of the authority of the
Special Division might in another context be a bureaucratic success story, but it would be one that
would have serious constitutional ramifications.”). A forerunner of Morrison stated that none of the
limited powers of the Special Division under the Act impermissibly involved it in the criminal investigation conducted by an independent counsel. See In re Sealed Case, 666 F. Supp. 231, 236 (D. Colo.
1987).
In any event, the Special Division takes its lack of supervisory power seriously: “We get complaints about independent counsel, and we have to explain that we have no supervisory authority and
we cannot, without violating the Constitution, exercise supervisory authority, as the Supreme Court
has held.” See Symposium, supra note 103, at 1542 (statement of Judge John Butzner, Jr.).
259. In re North, 16 F.3d 1234, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also In re Sealed Case, 665 F. Supp. 56, 59
(D.D.C. 1987) (“Although the Special Division appoints independent counsels and defines their jurisdiction, it plays no role in their investigations and performs no acts with regard to any prosecutions
that may result from these investigations.”).
260. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 592(c), 593(b)(1) (1994). The Morrison Court held that there was no
“inherent incongruity about a court having the power to appoint prosecutorial officers.” Morrison, 487
U.S. at 676. When Congress passed the Act, it was concerned about conflicts of interest that could
arise when the executive branch was called on to investigate its own high-ranking officers. See id. at
677. If the Court were to remove the authority to appoint an independent counsel from the executive
branch, the next most logical place to vest it would be the judicial branch. See id.
The appointment power vested in the Special Division is limited because it extends only to the
power to appoint the independent counsel and not his or her team. See Julie O’Sullivan, The Independent Counsel Statute: Bad Law, Bad Policy, 33 AM. CRIM. L REV. 463, 481 (1996). O’Sullivan
notes that whom the independent counsel chooses to assist him or her in the investigation is, or should
be, an important part of the decision that the Special Division makes in appointing an independent
counsel. See id.
261. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(2) (1994). Some light on the selection process of independent counsels was
shed at the 67th Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit:
We maintain a talent book, but it is, by no means, exclusive, that contains the names and brief
biographies of a large number of attorneys around the country whom we consider as possibilities for independent counsel. Those names can come to us from anywhere—first, from Judge
Butzner’s institutional memory or our own official institutional memory where we’ve accumulated names in prior instances.
See Symposium, supra note 103, at 1537 (statement of Judge David Sentelle).
262. The Act is silent as to whether the independent counsel may work part-time on the matter that
he or she is charged to investigate. The legislative history to the 1978 Act states that “[t]here is no requirement that service as a special prosecutor be a full time position.” S. REP. NO. 95-170, at 75
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4291. In 1987, Congress rejected a proposal that would
have required the independent counsel to work full-time on the matter he or she was charged to inves-
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263

any other federal office.
Yet the Act is silent about whether or to what
extent the Special Division may solicit or consider the views of persons other
than its own members. According to current case law, judges on the Special
Division may engage in ex parte communications at a time when the Special
264
Division is considering the appointment of an independent counsel.

tigate and prosecute, feeling that such a restriction might deter the best and brightest lawyers from undertaking service as an independent counsel. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 100-452, at 26-27 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2185, 2192-93. But see O’Sullivan, supra note 260, at 481-82 (criticizing
the rationale of the House Conference Report and arguing that “[w]ere the statute’s coverage confined to cases in which the DOJ genuinely may appear to be conflicted—for example, where the subject is the President or Attorney General—it is difficult to believe that the Special Division could not
find outstanding candidates willing to undertake full-time appointment”).
In offering an additional rationale for not requiring that the independent counsel serve full time,
Congress stated that
the independent counsels should conduct their activities expeditiously and should complete
their cases without delay. At the same time . . . criminal litigation inevitably entails delays
and periods in which counsel will not have sufficient work to attend to the case on a full time
basis. . . . [T]he statute should require independent counsels to devote as much time to their
cases as is necessary to move the cases expeditiously to completion.
H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 100-452, at 26, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2192.
263. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(2) (1994). Such a requirement comports with the purpose of the Act:
“The entire purpose of appointing a temporary special prosecutor is to get someone who is independent, both in reality and appearance, from the President and the Attorney General.” S. REP. NO. 95170, at 65-66 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4281-82.
264. See In re A Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, 39 F.3d 374, 381 (D.C. Cir. 1994). According to a newspaper report, Judge Sentelle had met with North Carolina Republican Senators Jesse
Helms and Lauch Faircloth while the Attorney General’s application for an independent counsel was
pending; the Special Division soon thereafter appointed Ken Starr as independent counsel in the
Whitewater investigation. See id. at 377. Notably, the court did not decide whether a member of the
Special Division was subject to disciplinary proceedings in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals because
the judge against whom disciplinary proceedings were sought did not contest the disciplinary jurisdiction of the circuit. See id. at 378. But see Peter M. Ryan, Comment, Counsels, Councils, and Lunch:
Preventing Abuse of the Power to Appoint Independent Counsels, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2537, 2552 (1996)
(arguing that although two members of the Special Division are not from the D.C. Circuit, Judge Sentelle was and therefore should be subject to disciplinary proceedings in his home circuit). Ryan maintains that under the view taken by the D.C. Circuit, the only way to prevent the abuse of the appointment power by judges on the Special Division is to amend the Act so as to restrict their discretion. See
Ryan, supra, at 2555. He suggests, in the alternative, that the Judicial Conduct Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 331332, 372, 604 (1994), should apply to members of the Special Division, despite the fact that the Special
Division exercises Article II, not Article III, power in the appointment of independent counsels. See
Ryan, supra, at 2543.
However, the rationale for the result reached by the D.C. Circuit—a result that would seriously
compromise the integrity of the tribunal were it serving in a judicial capacity—is precisely because,
when appointing an independent counsel, the Special Division draws its authority not from Article III
of the Constitution (which establishes and defines the judicial branch) but rather from the Appointments Clause of Article II: “Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as
they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2; see also In re Sealed Case, 665 F. Supp. 56, 58 (D.D.C. 1987) (discussing the Special
Division’s appointment of independent counsels as being the exercise of Article II, not Article III,
power). There are no constitutional or ethical precepts that prohibit Presidents, judges, or heads of
departments from consulting with others in exercising their Article II power. See Judicial Misconduct
or Disability, 39 F.3d at 375. See generally O’Sullivan, supra note 260, at 473 (describing the meetings
between Judge Sentelle and the senators prior to the appointment of Ken Starr and the resulting court
case, and discussing its impact on the vitality of the independent counsel statute); Nick Bravin, Note, Is
Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law? The Court’s New Appointments Clause Jurisprudence, 98 COLUM.
L. REV. 1103, 1126-27 (1998) (same); Ryan, supra, at 2537-39 (1996) (same). Arguably, the exercise of
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2. Defining the Independent Counsel’s Jurisdiction. The office of
265
independent counsel is of limited jurisdiction.
Once the Special Division
appoints an independent counsel, the Act states that the Special Division “shall
266
define that independent counsel’s prosecutorial jurisdiction.”
This
jurisdiction includes the “authority to investigate and prosecute Federal crimes
267
. . . that may arise out of the investigation or prosecution of the matter.” The
Special Division is also required to define the independent counsel’s
prosecutorial jurisdiction so that the independent counsel has “adequate
authority to fully investigate and prosecute the subject matter with respect to
which the Attorney General has requested the appointment of the independent
268
counsel, and all matters related to that subject matter.”
The Supreme Court has held that
Congress may [not] give the Division unlimited discretion to determine the independent counsel’s jurisdiction. In order for the Division’s definition of the counsel’s jurisdiction to be truly “incidental” to its power to appoint, the jurisdiction that the court
decides upon must be demonstrably related to the factual circumstances that gave rise
to the Attorney General’s investigation and request for the appointment of the independent counsel in the particular case.269

Nevertheless, the broad statutory grant of power to the Special Division to determine the prosecutorial jurisdiction enables the Special Division to vest a
great deal of authority in the independent counsel. This comports with the
purpose of the Act in ensuring that high-level executive branch officials do not
have the ability to investigate themselves or those to whom they are beholden.

the Appointments power by the Special Division should not differ in form or function from that of any
member of the executive branch eligible to exercise such power.
265. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 672. This fact aided the Morrison Court in determining that the independent counsel was an inferior officer and thus that the Act was constitutional. See id.; see also
Sealed Case, 665 F. Supp. at 59 n.2 (stating that independent counsel has no authority outside the jurisdiction established by the Special Division). Indeed, Congress commented in passing the Act in 1978
that “[t]he prosecutorial jurisdiction of the special prosecutor is one of the most important devices for
the control of the special prosecutor and the accountability of such a special prosecutor.” S. REP. NO.
95-170, at 56 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4272.
266. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(1) (1994). The Morrison Court held that it was not outside the Special Division’s Appointments Clause powers to define the independent counsel’s jurisdiction. See Morrison,
487 U.S. at 679.
267. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(3) (1994).
268. Id. The Special Division does, despite Morrison’s limitations, have some discretion in determining the prosecutorial jurisdiction of the independent counsel. The Act does not require the Special
Division “to adopt verbatim the recommendations of the Attorney General in defining independent
counsel’s jurisdiction.” United States v. North, 708 F. Supp. 387, 388 (D.D.C. 1988). The court in
North emphasized that Morrison gave the Special Division “leeway to grant the Independent Counsel
jurisdiction that was demonstrably related to that proposed by the Attorney General.” Id. In North,
the defendant had sought to have the indictment against him dismissed, arguing that the independent
counsel lacked prosecutorial jurisdiction because the charges fell outside the area authorized by the
Attorney General in his request to the Special Division for the appointment of an independent counsel. See id. at 387-88.
269. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 679. To meet the “related to” test, there need only be a showing of a
reasonable causal or logical connection between two occurrences. See United States v. Secord, 725 F.
Supp. 563, 567 (D.D.C. 1989). However, Morrison held that the relationship must be demonstrable,
see Morrison, 487 U.S. at 679, meaning that it must be something that is evident without “great leaps of
logic.” See Secord, 725 F. Supp. at 567.
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Finally, the Special Division’s responsibility in defining the prosecutorial juris270
diction of an independent counsel is a continuing one. That is, even if the Attorney General does not request that related matters be assigned to an existing
independent counsel, the Special Division has the authority to do so under
271
§a593(b).
On initial inspection, the jurisdictional provisions of the Act might not appear to create any significant problems. Congress thought it had succinctly
summarized the functioning of these jurisdictional provisions during the Act’s
1994 reenactment:
[W]hen an independent counsel is confronted with new information about a criminal
allegation involving a covered individual, depending upon the extent to which the
matter may or may not fall within the independent counsel’s original grant of jurisdiction, he or she must follow one of two procedures. For related matters, he or she
must apply to the special court or ask the Attorney General for a referral of such matter pursuant to the jurisdiction originally set by the special court (or the Attorney
General may refer such matter to the independent counsel on the Attorney General’s
own initiative). For matters outside the scope of the independent counsel’s jurisdiction, he or she must forward the information to the Attorney General for the conduct
of a preliminary investigation which could result in the expansion of that independent
counsel’s jurisdiction or the appointment of a new independent counsel. 272

Distinguishing between “expansion” and “referral” jurisdiction—determining
the meaning of “matters outside the scope of the independent counsel’s jurisdiction” or “related matters”—may be drawing a distinction without a difference and has led to much litigation and criticism from numerous commenta273
tors.
a. Expansion of the independent counsel’s jurisdiction. During the course
of an investigation, an independent counsel may seek the expansion of his or
her prosecutorial jurisdiction to include matters that are outside the scope of
274
the initial grant of jurisdiction. To have his or her prosecutorial jurisdiction
expanded, the independent counsel must first submit the new information to
the Attorney General, who, upon its receipt, must conduct a preliminary
275
investigation.
If the Attorney General determines that an independent
counsel investigation of the matter is necessary, the Special Division could

270. See S. REP. NO. 95-170, at 65 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4281.
271. See id.
272. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 100-452, at 29 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2185, 2195.
273. See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 103, at 1530-31, 1534 (statements of William Barr and Jamie
Gorelick).
274. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(c) (1994). The Morrison Court held that, just as the power to define the
independent counsel’s jurisdiction is incidental to the Special Division’s power to appoint the independent counsel, so too is the power of the Special Division to expand the jurisdiction of the independent counsel upon request of the Attorney General. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 679 n.17.
275. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(c)(2) (1994). This preliminary investigation is the same as that conducted
under § 592, except that it may last a maximum of 30 days. See id. § 593(c)(2)(A); cf. supra Part
III.B.3 (discussing the preliminary investigation).
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expand the existing independent counsel’s jurisdiction or could appoint a new
276
independent counsel.
In determining the need for expanded jurisdiction, the Attorney General is
277
to give “great weight” to the recommendations of the independent counsel.
If, after the preliminary investigation, the Attorney General finds no reasonable grounds for further investigation, he or she shall notify the Special Division, which, under those circumstances, lacks the power to expand the inde278
pendent counsel’s jurisdiction.
However, if the Attorney General finds
reasonable grounds for further investigation, or if the Attorney General fails to
notify the Special Division of the results of the preliminary investigation within
thirty days, then the Act directs the Special Division to expand the prosecuto279
rial jurisdiction of the independent counsel to include the new matters. Most
importantly, the Special Division may not expand the jurisdiction of the inde280
pendent counsel if the Attorney General refuses to request the expansion.
b. The referral of other matters to an independent counsel. Unlike
expansion jurisdiction, referral jurisdiction involves the interpretation—but not
281
the outward expansion—of the independent counsel’s original jurisdiction.
Because “interpretation” and “expansion” are not cleanly defined or mutually
exclusive categories, much debate has centered on the proper handling by the
Special Division of requests for changes in the independent counsel’s
282
jurisdiction.
Most of the focus of the courts and commentators involves
referral jurisdiction.
276. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(c)(1) (1994).
277. See id. § 593(c)(2); see also Russell M. Soloway, Note, The Tale of the Omnipotent Prosecutor:
How Recent Events Expose Flaws in the Supreme Court’s Analysis of the Independent Counsel Clause
of the Ethics in Government Act, 17 REV. LITIG. 611, 628 (1998) (“Both the IC and the courts have
loosely interpreted broad initial grants of jurisdiction. Additionally, in a politically charged atmosphere, it has proven unrealistic for the Attorney General to deny a request for expansion of jurisdiction of the IC.”).
278. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(c)(2)(B) (1994).
279. See id. § 593(c)(2)(C).
280. See In re Sealed Case, 665 F. Supp. 56, 60 n.4 (D.D.C. 1987). The 1987 amendments changed
the provisions in the Act relating to the expansion of an independent counsel’s prosecutorial jurisdiction: Independent counsels became required to present all requests for expansions of their jurisdiction
to the Attorney General. See S. REP. NO. 100-123, at 24 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2150,
2173.
By lodging final decisionmaking authority with the Attorney General, but also requiring the
Attorney General to give “great weight” to the recommendations of the sitting independent
counsel, the [Act] establishes a process by which a request for expanded jurisdiction is handled not only within the constraints of the Constitution, but also with assurance that the independent counsel is given a meaningful role in the decisionmaking process.
Id. The issue of requests for the expansion of jurisdiction was much on the mind of Congress in 1987
because of the refusal of Attorney General Meese to request an independent counsel in the Environmental Protection Agency case to investigate Edward Schmults and Carol Dinkins, despite the Public
Integrity Section’s recommendation to do so. See id. at 12, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2161.
281. See In re Espy, 80 F.3d 501, 506 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Godes & Howard, supra note
253, at 885.
282. Contemplating the issue of referral jurisdiction, the Senate Report noted in enacting the original Act, “there will have to be coordination between the special prosecutor and the Attorney General
to sort out the jurisdiction of the special prosecutor as it relates to the ongoing investigations of the
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During the course of an investigation, the independent counsel may have
matters related to the investigation referred to him or her by DOJ or another
entity, or the independent counsel may request that the Attorney General or
283
the Special Division refer matters related to his or her jurisdiction. The independent counsel may accept a referral if it is related to his or her prosecutorial
jurisdiction, but the subject matter of the referral jurisdiction need not meet the
same standard of relatedness to the factual circumstances as does the subject
284
matter of the original prosecutorial jurisdiction.
Referral jurisdiction depends on the procedural and factual nexus between the independent counsel’s
285
original prosecutorial jurisdiction and the matter that is to be referred.
Before the 1994 revision of the Act, if the new matter was related to the independent counsel’s prosecutorial jurisdiction, he or she was required to ask
the Attorney General or the Special Division to refer it to him or her for286
mally.
However, if the new matter was related to the subject matter of the
Attorney General’s original request for appointment, the independent counsel
287
could proceed on his or her own.
In January 1987, Independent Counsel
Morrison asked the Attorney General pursuant to § 594(e) to refer to her as
288
“related matters” several allegations. When the Attorney General refused to
refer the matters, the Independent Counsel asked the Special Division to order
289
that the matters be referred to her.
Although the Supreme Court held that
the Attorney General’s decision whether to seek an independent counsel is unreviewable under § 592(b)(1), it found that the Special Division’s original grant
of jurisdiction was broad enough to encompass the inquiry into whether the
290
subject of the investigation had conspired with others to commit a crime.

Department of Justice.” S. REP. NO. 95-170, at 69 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4285.
Furthermore, Congress noted that “[t]he other side of this necessary cooperation will take place under
subsection 597(a) which permits the special prosecutor to agree in writing that certain portions of the
investigations assigned to him by the division of the court continue to be conducted by the Department
of Justice.” See id.
283. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(e) (1994). Section 594(e) gives an independent counsel the choice between asking the Attorney General or the Special Division for referral of a related matter and further
states that the Attorney General or the Special Division may refer such matter to the independent
counsel. See id. To challenge the statutory authority of the Special Division to grant an order of referral for the prosecution of an individual not a subject of the original grant of jurisdiction to the independent counsel, the individual must identify some act of the Special Division that is not authorized by
the Act. See United States v. Wade, 83 F.3d 196, 198 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
284. See Espy, 80 F.3d at 508.
285. See United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313, 1321 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 76 (1996).
286. See United States v. Secord, 725 F. Supp. 563, 566 (D.D.C. 1989).
287. See id.
288. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 667 (1988).
289. See id. at 668.
290. The Special Division had ordered that the independent counsel “‘shall have jurisdiction to investigate any other allegation of evidence of violation of any Federal criminal law by Theodore Olson
developed during investigations, by the Independent Counsel, referred to above, and connected with
or arising out of that investigation, and Independent Counsel shall have jurisdiction to prosecute for
any such violation.’” Id. at 667 (quoting Order, Div. No. 86-1 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 23, 1986)). “As to the
Division’s alleged ‘reinterpretation’ of its original grant of jurisdiction, the power to ‘reinterpret’ or
clarify the original grant may be seen as incidental to the court’s referral power.” Id. at 685 n.22.
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291

In deciding this same issue, the Special Division had noted that the provisions of §§ 594(e) and 592(b)(1) must be read together. It also noted that it
would be “highly unreasonable” to interpret the Act as requiring the Attorney
General or empowering the Special Division to refer a matter to the independent counsel when the Attorney General had determined that there were “no
reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation or prosecution is war292
ranted.” The Supreme Court held, however, that § 594(e) does not give the
Special Division the authority to refer allegations to the independent counsel
when the Attorney General has determined specifically under § 592(b)(1) that
293
those allegations should not be pursued.
More recently, the Eighth Circuit added to the debate and confusion when
294
it handed down United States v. Tucker.
By holding that a grant of referral
295
jurisdiction is nonreviewable, the Eighth Circuit effectively extended the
reach of the independent counsel’s prosecutorial jurisdiction, allowing that ju296
risdiction to reach private citizens.
In reaching this conclusion, the court
made a broad comparison between referral jurisdiction and prosecutorial dis291. In re Olson, 818 F.2d 34 (1987) (per curiam).
292. Id. at 47. The Attorney General had determined twice that there were no reasonable grounds
to believe that further investigation or prosecution was warranted. See id.
The case arose when Independent Counsel Morrison, investigating allegations that Olson perjured
himself during a congressional inquiry into the Superfund toxic waste program, requested that the Attorney General refer to her the allegations in a congressional report against two other individuals,
claiming under § 594(e) that the allegations were “related matters” to her investigation of Olson. See
id. at 37. The Attorney General refused to grant Morrison the authority to investigate the others,
stating that he had already determined there were no reasonable grounds for further investigation. See
id. at 38. The Independent Counsel thereupon applied to the Special Division for referral of the allegations. See id.
293. See id. at 47. The court nevertheless held that the independent counsel had the authority to
investigate allegations that Olson was engaged in an unlawful conspiracy with others. See id. Although the independent counsel thus would be permitted to investigate the actions of others, her jurisdiction permitted her only to prosecute Olson. See id. at 48.
294. 78 F.3d 1313 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 76 (1996).
295. See id. at 1316. The Tucker court held that even if such a grant were reviewable, there was no
abuse of discretion by the Attorney General because “the subject matter of the referral jurisdiction in
this case was ‘related’ to the Independent Counsel’s original prosecutorial jurisdiction . . . .” Id. at
1322; see also United States v. Wade, 83 F.3d 196, 198 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (stating that the
court lacked jurisdiction to review Wade’s argument that his prosecution is not related to the Special
Division’s original grant of authority to the independent counsel).
296. See Tucker, 78 F.3d at 1322. For recent commentary on Tucker arguing that such an extension
of the independent counsel’s referral jurisdiction and reach of its powers subverts the original purpose
of the Act and is unfair to the subject of the investigation, see Hanly A. Ingram, Note, United States v.
Tucker: Should Independent Counsels Investigate and Prosecute Ordinary Citizens?, 86 KY. L.J. 741
(1997). See also Recent Case: Statutory Interpretation—Ethics in Government Act—Eighth Circuit
Holds Attorney General’s Referral of Matters to Independent Counsel to Be Nonreviewable, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 793 (1997); Soloway, supra note 277, at 629 (“This decision essentially eviscerated the Morrison ‘demonstrably related’ test by eliminating the requirement that the expansion of jurisdiction be
related to the IC’s original grant. Instead, it created an expansive jurisdiction for the IC, through referral jurisdiction and a broad reading of the original grant.”).
In Independent Counsel Starr’s latest expansion of jurisdiction, he began to investigate the allegations involving the President and Monica Lewinsky even before applying for an extension from the Attorney General and the Special Division. See id. at 631-32 (citing news media sources). As this Symposium goes to print, this expansion of jurisdiction is the subject of a possible investigation by DOJ.
See infra text accompanying note 421.
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cretion, stating that “prosecutorial decisions of the nature here in question—
who should be prosecuted and for what alleged crimes—have long been com297
mitted to the discretion of the prosecutor.”
The result of Tucker was the explicit recognition that both the Attorney
General and an independent counsel are allowed broad discretion in dealing
with matters of referral jurisdiction. Significantly, the Eighth Circuit did not
apply the “demonstrably related” standard that the Supreme Court provided in
Morrison. Rather, the court fashioned its own “procedural and factual link”
definition of “relatedness,” stating that the “demonstrably related” standard
applies only when defining an independent counsel’s prosecutorial jurisdiction
298
in the first instance.
In the end, the court found that Tucker’s case was
299
“related” to the Whitewater scandal.
300
The same analysis was applied when Independent Counsel Donald Smaltz
submitted an application for the referral of a related matter and DOJ opposed
the application because it felt that § 594(e) must be read to require the concurrence of the Attorney General before the Special Division could refer matters
301
to the independent counsel.
The Special Division held that the plain language of § 594(e) did not suggest that the Attorney General was required to
concur in the referral of a matter to the independent counsel before the Special
302
Division could grant an application for referral. The court distinguished the

297. Tucker, 78 F.3d at 1317.
298. See id. at 1320. But, § 594(e) allows the Attorney General to refer a matter to the independent
counsel without the approval of the Special Division. Given that the Act states that only the Special
Division may define an independent counsel’s prosecutorial jurisdiction, the only grant of jurisdiction
that can apply to a referred matter is the original grant. Section 593(c) provides for the expansion of
an independent counsel’s original jurisdiction. The Court in Morrison stated that only § 593(c)—not §
594(e) referral jurisdiction—can be used to expand the Special Division’s original grant of prosecutorial jurisdiction. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 680 n.18. Since a matter referred under § 594(e) may not
expand jurisdiction, it must fall under the original grant and, therefore, must be “demonstrably related
to the factual circumstances that gave rise to the Attorney General’s . . . request” for the appointment
of an independent counsel. See id. at 679.
299. See Tucker, 78 F.3d at 1320. “[R]elatedness for purposes of referral under § 594(e) depends
upon the procedural and factual link between the OIC’s original prosecutorial jurisdiction and the matter being referred.” Id. at 1321; see also In re Espy, 80 F.3d 501, 507-08 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam)
(adopting this definition of “relatedness”). The Espy court held that the matter was sufficiently related to permit referral where Independent Counsel Smaltz maintained that the referral matter directly overlapped his current jurisdiction
in terms of persons involved, witnesses, patterns of conduct, and applicable law, and that the
factual basis of the referral matter arose directly from his investigation of whether Secretary
Espy violated any federal criminal law relating in any way to the acceptance of gifts by him
from organizations or individuals with business pending before the Department of Agriculture.
Id. at 508.
300. Independent Counsel Donald C. Smaltz was charged with investigating whether Secretary of
Agriculture Mike Espy violated federal criminal law by accepting gifts from organizations or individuals involved in business with the Department of Agriculture. See id. at 502-03.
301. See id. at 504. DOJ also argued that the new matter was not sufficiently related to the independent counsel’s current prosecutorial jurisdiction. See id.
302. See id. at 505. The court held that the use of the disjunctive “or” in the statute made it plain
that Congress intended for alternative, independent mechanisms through which a matter could be re-
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referral of a matter from the expansion of the independent counsel’s jurisdiction and stated that, in referring a related matter, the court is interpreting—but
303
not expanding—the independent counsel’s original prosecutorial jurisdiction.
Thus, the issues of expansion and referral jurisdiction are complicated and
unresolved. As the Act currently stands, there is no clear line or rule for distinguishing referral from expansion jurisdiction. The issue is an important one:
To have a matter referred to him or her, an independent counsel can choose to
go to either the Special Division or the Attorney General. But to have his or
her jurisdiction expanded to include a matter outside that jurisdiction, an independent counsel must seek authorization from the Attorney General. Whether
the courts or Congress can clarify this distinction and thus minimize the litigation over this issue in the future remains to be seen.
3. The Termination of the Independent Counsel by the Special Division. The
304
office of independent counsel is limited in tenure. The Act provides that
[t]he [special] division of the court, either on its own motion or upon the request of
the Attorney General, may terminate an office of independent counsel at any time, on
the ground that the investigation of all matters within the prosecutorial jurisdiction of
such independent counsel . . . have been completed or so substantially completed that
it would be appropriate for the Department of Justice to complete such investigations
and prosecutions. . . . If the Attorney General has not made a request under this
paragraph, the division of the court shall determine on its own motion whether termination is appropriate . . . no later than two years after the appointment of an independent counsel, at the end of the succeeding 2-year period, and thereafter at the end
of each succeeding 1-year period.305
ferred to the independent counsel or by which the independent counsel could seek the referral of a
matter related to his or her original prosecutorial jurisdiction. See id.
The court noted that the previous version of § 594(e) stated that the independent counsel “may ask
the Attorney General or the division of the court to refer matters related to the independent counsel’s
jurisdiction.” Id. at 506 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 594(e) (1982)). Congress amended this sentence by adding “and the Attorney General or the division of the Court, as the case may be, may refer such matters.” Id. at 506 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 594(e) (1994)). The amendment clarified that to obtain expanded jurisdiction over unrelated matters not covered by the original grant of prosecutorial
jurisdiction, the independent counsel must follow the procedures and requirements of § 593(c)(2), discussed infra Part IV.B.2.a, and submit the information to the Attorney General who then is charged
with conducting a preliminary investigation. See id. However, matters that are related to the independent counsel’s prosecutorial jurisdiction are governed by § 594(e), where the independent counsel
may either ask the Attorney General or the Special Division for a referral. See id. For criticism of this
distinction, see O’Sullivan, supra note 260, at 486-88 (stating that a matter appears to be “‘related’
simply when it comes to the IC’s attention during the course of his investigation and involves similar
witnesses, alleged patterns of conduct and applicable law”).
303. See Espy, 80 F.3d at 507.
304. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 672 (1987). This fact aided the Morrison Court in determining that the independent counsel was an inferior officer and thus enabling it to uphold the constitutionality of the Act. See id.
305. 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2) (1994). The provision calling for the evaluation by the Special Division
was added in 1994. See Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108
Stat. 732.
The purpose of this provision is to ensure that the special court inquires on a periodic basis,
with respect to each independent counsel, as to whether that independent counsel’s work is
complete. It is not intended to establish deadlines for the completion of this work. Nor is it
intended to provide the special court with new termination authority that did not exist at the
time the law was reviewed by the Supreme Court in Morrison v. Olson. . . . The sole purpose
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These termination provisions played a significant role in the decision upholding the constitutionality of the Act. In Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme
Court found that the Special Division’s power to terminate the independent
counsel was not an encroachment on either the executive power or the prosecutorial discretion of the independent counsel:
The termination provisions of the Act do not give the Special Division anything approaching the power to remove the counsel while an investigation or court proceeding
is still underway—this power is vested solely in the Attorney General. . . . So construed, the Special Division’s power to terminate does not pose a sufficient threat of
judicial intrusion into matters that are more properly within the Executive’s authority
to require that the Act be invalidated as inconsistent with Article III.306

Furthermore, in emphasizing the limited powers of the Special Division, the
Morrison Court wrote that
the Special Division has no authority to take any action or undertake any duties that
are not specifically authorized by the Act. The gradual expansion of the authority of
the Special Division might in another context be a bureaucratic success story, but it
would be one that would have serious constitutional ramifications. 307

The Morrison Court also noted in defining the narrow nature of the Act’s
termination provisions that
“termination” may only occur when the duties of the counsel are truly “completed” or
“so substantially completed” that there remains no need for any continuing action by
the independent counsel. . . . [Termination] is basically a device for removing from
the public payroll an independent counsel who has served his or her purpose, but is
unwilling to acknowledge the fact.308

In spite of the significance of the Act’s termination provisions, issues involving those provisions have been litigated only rarely since Morrison. And
where the termination provisions were at issue in court, it was in a limited context that did not implicate any constitutional issues. In the termination of Independent Counsel Walsh’s office, the Special Division had to determine
whether, with only Walsh’s final report remaining to be completed, the condi309
tions for termination as outlined by § 596(b)(2) had been met. Instead of issuing an order of termination, the Special Division issued an order limiting the
scope of Walsh’s official activities to duties that related to the task of filing the
310
final report required by § 594(h)(2).
This restriction did not permit Walsh

of this new provision is to ensure that the special court exercises its Constitutionally-defined
authority on a periodic basis.
H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 103-511, at 23 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 792, 806.
306. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 682-83.
307. Id. at 684.
308. Id. at 682-83.
309. See In re Oliver L. North, 10 F.3d 831, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (stating “‘that the investigation of all matters within the prosecutorial jurisdiction of [the] Independent Counsel . . . and any
resulting prosecutions, have been completed or so substantially completed, that it would be appropriate for the Department of Justice to complete’ them” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2))).
310. See id. at 834; see also infra Part IV.D.1 (discussing congressional oversight and the final report).
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the authority to amend the report or add comments in response to comments
311
filed by those mentioned in the report.
The termination provisions of the Act were challenged again in United
312
States v. McDougal. In that case, the defendant argued that the 1994 amendment to § 596(b)(2), which required the Special Division to determine periodi313
cally whether termination was warranted, granted the Special Division more
power than is constitutionally permissible under Morrison, in that the new provision “‘compromises the independence of the judiciary and exceeds the limits
314
of article III.’”
The defendant argued that § 596(b)(2) effectively gave the
Special Division the power to participate in the investigations of independent
counsels.
The McDougal court held that the sentence added to § 596(b)(2) by the
1994 amendments did not confer any additional powers on the Special Division
because the 1987 revisions already had conferred the power to terminate the
315
independent counsel. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that
the 1994 revision simply authorizes the Special Division to check at specified intervals
without making any changes in the scope of that power and in the prerequisites to its
exercise. The Government argues persuasively that, “the new sentence speaks of
‘termination . . . under this paragraph,’ referring back to the unchanged language of
the 1987 Act.” In the 1994 Act as in the 1987 one, “‘the termination provisions . . . do
not give the Special Division anything approaching the power to remove the counsel
while an investigation or court proceeding is still under way.’”316

311. See In re North, 10 F.3d at 834. The dissent noted that the independent counsel should have
the opportunity to respond, and that by denying him this opportunity,
this court is construing the statute as permitting it to exercise supervision and control over the
Independent Counsel in performance of his duty to report “fully and completely” his activities pursuant to § 594(h)(1)(B). This court’s assumption of power is contrary to the Supreme
Court’s construction of the statute in Morrison. Prohibiting the Independent Counsel from
responding raises a serious constitutional issue under the separation of powers doctrine.
Id. at 837 (Butzner, J., dissenting). Judge Butzner further pointed out that “[t]he statute does not give
this court authority to terminate the Independent Counsel’s office piecemeal by picking and choosing
what duties regarding his report the Independent Counsel shall perform or by ordering how he shall
perform them.” Id. But see S. REP. NO. 95-170, at 75 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216,
4291 (“[T]he fact that there is a relatively small amount of work left to be accomplished should not be
the motivating factor for terminating an office of special prosecutor. The motivating factor should be
the nature of the responsibilities which remain to be carried out by that office.”).
Walsh also had asked the Special Division for the authority to respond to further inquiries from the
court regarding the report, a possibility that the Court’s order did not foreclose. See In re North, 10
F.3d at 834.
312. 906 F. Supp. 494 (E.D. Ark. 1995).
313. See S. REP. NO. 103-101, at 33 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 748, 778. The purpose of
the added provision was to ensure that there was some mechanism for determining whether the independent counsel had completed his or her work, independent of the Attorney General’s authority to
trigger such an inquiry under the section.
314. McDougal, 906 F. Supp. at 496 (quoting an unidentified source).
315. See id. at 497. McDougal also held that § 594(l)(2), which provides for administrative services
to be provided to the independent counsel by the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, does not materially and significantly implicate the separation of powers doctrine. See id.
at 498.
316. Id. at 497 (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 682 (1988)).
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Thus, because of constitutional concerns, courts have limited the scope of
these provisions. Termination, although largely an administrative role for the
court, plays a central role in the relationship between the Special Division and
the independent counsel.
C. The Relationships Between the Independent Counsel and the Department
of Justice
1. “All investigative and prosecutorial functions of the Department of Justice
and the Attorney General.” Section 594 of the Act vests the independent
counsel with broad authority to investigate and prosecute those matters that
fall within his or her jurisdiction. According to the Act, the independent
counsel has “full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative
and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of Justice, the
Attorney General, and any other officer or employees of the Department of
317
Justice.”
Section 594 transfers to the independent counsel powers that
318
ordinarily belong to both the Attorney General and DOJ. However, the Act
also leaves specified powers firmly within the control of DOJ and the Attorney
319
General.
For example, in its broad grant of litigation authority to the
320
independent counsel, the statute permits the Attorney General and the
Solicitor General to appear as amici curiae to any court as to issues raised in
321
any case brought by an independent counsel.
Furthermore, only the
322
Attorney General may remove an independent counsel from office, and the

317. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (1994). The independent counsel is empowered to (1) conduct grand jury
and other investigative proceedings; (2) engage in the litigation of other related criminal or civil matters; (3) appeal court decisions; (4) review all documentary evidence available from any source; (5)
determine whether to contest the assertion of any testimonial privilege; (6) receive appropriate national security clearances and, where necessary, contest in court any claim of privilege or attempt to
withhold evidence on grounds of national security; (7) make applications for grants of immunity to any
witnesses, or for warrants, subpoenas, or other court orders; (8) inspect, obtain, or use tax returns; (9)
initiate and conduct prosecutions and frame and sign indictments and file informations; and (10) consult with the U.S. Attorney for the district in which any violation of law with respect to which the independent counsel is appointed was alleged to have occurred. See id. § 594(a)(1)-(10); see also Godes &
Howard, supra note 253, at 884-87 (describing the provisions of the Act that delineate the investigatory powers of the independent counsel).
318. See S. REP. NO. 95-170, at 67 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4283 (“This catchall phrase and this entire subsection [§ 594] should be interpreted to give the special prosecutor any
and all independent power and authority which is needed to conscientiously conduct an investigation
which is in reality and in appearance independent from any control or supervision by the Department
of Justice.”). For recent scholarship discussing the relationship between the independent counsel and
DOJ, see John Q. Barrett, All or Nothing, or Maybe Cooperation: Attorney General Power, Conduct,
and Judgment in Relation to the Work of an Independent Counsel, 49 MERCER L. REV. 519 (1998).
319. See generally Barrett, supra note 318, at 528-29 (discussing the reservation of powers to the
Attorney General and DOJ).
320. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(1)-(3), (9) (1994).
321. See id. § 597(b).
322. See id. § 596(a)(1). The independent counsel also may be removed from office by impeachment and conviction by Congress. See id. The removal provisions of the Act are discussed infra Part
IV.C.5.
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Attorney General retains decisionmaking power regarding issues of electronic
323
surveillance and wiretaps.
Several other powers remain somewhat open to question. The Act does not
address DOJ’s traditional power to provide legal advice and even legal repre324
sentation to entities and officials in the executive branch.
Additionally, Attorneys General have insisted that they retain the power to decide whether and
how the authority and the personnel of the Office of the Solicitor General will
325
be deployed in appellate litigation involving an independent counsel. Finally,
there is a serious question regarding the independent counsel’s ability to stand
in the place of the Attorney General with respect to the declassification of in326
formation needed in a criminal trial.
2. Cooperation Between the Independent Counsel and DOJ. Once an
independent counsel’s jurisdiction has been defined, the Attorney General and
DOJ are required to cease investigations and proceedings regarding the
327
matters covered by that jurisdiction. The only exceptions to this requirement
are circumstances when the independent counsel has requested assistance from
DOJ or has stated in writing that DOJ may continue investigations or
328
proceedings on its own. Nevertheless, the Act expressly permits certain types
of cooperation and consultation between the independent counsel and DOJ.
Section 594(a)(10) of the Act authorizes the independent counsel to consult
329
U.S. Attorneys for assistance. Most importantly, perhaps, § 594(d) states that

323. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (1994) (stating that the Attorney General retains control and discretion
over those matters requiring her personal action under 18 U.S.C. § 2516).
324. See Barrett, supra note 318, at 531-35. Barrett argues that DOJ has not ceased to give legal
advice and even legal representation to executive branch departments and personnel when independent counsels have been appointed to investigate persons alleged to have committed criminal misconduct. See id. at 532-33. These actions, however, on their face appear to be neither investigative nor
prosecutorial and therefore not inconsistent with the directives of the Act. See id. at 534.
325. See id. at 538-41. Barrett points out that although the Act directs DOJ to provide whatever
personnel and assistance an independent counsel may request, no independent counsel has sought to
exercise this power in the form of requesting that the Solicitor General actually argue or support the
independent counsel’s position. See id. at 538. Independent counsels, however, have asked for litigation assistance from the Solicitor General, but Attorneys General have not always granted these requests. See id. Barrett maintains that the Act, by authorizing the Attorney General and the Solicitor
General to file amicus briefs, may undercut the independent counsel’s litigation prospects and his or
her broader credibility with the courts and the public. See id. at 539-40.
326. See infra Part IV.C.4 (discussing the operation of the independent counsel Act in connection
with the Classified Information Procedures Act).
327. See 28 U.S.C. § 597(a) (1994). The purpose of § 597(a) is to prevent investigation by DOJ that
would duplicate and possibly impede the work of the independent counsel. See United States v. Briscoe, 798 F. Supp. 28, 33 (D.D.C. 1992) (citing In re Sealed Case, 829 F.2d 50, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
328. See 28 U.S.C. § 597(a) (1994). The Act does not address, however, whether DOJ may continue to exercise its traditional, noninvestigative and nonprosecutorial functions proximate to an independent counsel investigation, such as providing legal advice and representation to components and
employees of the executive branch.
329. See id. § 594(a)(10). “This recommendation will further ensure that public officials are afforded the same application of law as would be a private citizen, whenever this is possible.” S. REP.
NO. 97-496, at 17 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3553.
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an independent counsel may request assistance from DOJ necessary to carry
330
out his or her mandate and that DOJ shall provide such assistance.
In passing the Act, Congress recognized that “there will have to be a certain
amount of coordination and cooperation between a special prosecutor and the
Department of Justice so that the lines of jurisdiction between the Department
and the special prosecutor are clear and adequately encompass any peripheral
331
matters related to the special prosecutor’s jurisdiction.”
One area of cooperation that the courts have found acceptable is joint
332
prosecutions.
One such instance of cooperation and assistance between the
independent counsel and DOJ occurred during Independent Counsel Walsh’s
investigation of Iran-Contra. Walsh empanelled a grand jury under his authority under § 594(a)(1), but Lt. Col. Oliver North, subpoenaed to testify before
the grand jury, then filed a complaint claiming that the independent counsel
provisions of the Act are unconstitutional and sought to enjoin the grand jury
333
proceedings. In response to this constitutional challenge, the Attorney General promulgated a regulation that established the “Office of the Independent
Counsel: Iran/Contra,” appointed Walsh to that office, and delegated to that
office the authority identical to that provided to an independent counsel under
334
the Act and jurisdiction identical to that outlined by the Special Division.
North claimed that the creation of the office violated the Appointments Clause
of the Constitution, but the court disagreed and held that the Attorney General
330. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(d)(1) (1994). The Act states that the type of assistance includes access to
records or other materials and the use of resources and personnel. See id.
This provision enables independent counsels to use, for example the laboratory resources and
investigative agents of the FBI as well as other physical resources in the Justice Department.
It also enables them, standing in the shoes of the Attorney General, to request assistance
from other investigative agencies such as the Internal Revenue Service, Secret Service, Inspectors General and Customs Service, which routinely assist the Department of Justice with
its criminal investigations.
S. REP. NO. 100-123, at 22-23 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2150, 2171-72. Apparently, in
several instances during the Reagan Administration, DOJ and other agencies requested reimbursement from the independent counsel for the provision of these services. See id. at 23, reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2172. This is bizarre, because costs incurred by the Office of the Independent Counsel come out of DOJ’s budget, see 28 U.S.C. § 594(d)(2) (1994); the purpose of the requests apparently
was to distort the record of expenses of the independent counsel’s investigation.
In enacting § 594(d), Congress stated:
While being dependent on the Department of Justice for resources and personnel could potentially influence the independence of a special prosecutor, the Committee feels that the experience in the recent past of the Department of Justice providing adequate resources for the
Watergate Special Prosecution Force, and the fact that a special prosecutor can at any time
inform the Congress of any problems he is having getting adequate resources from the Department of Justice, will ensure that a special prosecutor will get the resources and personnel
he needs to perform his duties.
S. REP. NO. 95-170, at 68 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4284.
331. Id. at 76, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4292.
332. See Briscoe, 798 F. Supp. at 34. In Briscoe, the independent counsel and the U.S. Attorney for
the District of Columbia sought the consolidation of United States v. Briscoe, Wilson, and Steier, a
criminal case initiated by the independent counsel and United States v. Briscoe and Steier, brought by
the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida. See id. at 30.
333. See In re Sealed Case, 829 F.2d 50, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
334. See id.
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possessed both constitutional and statutory authority to create the Office of the
335
Independent Counsel: Iran/Contra.
336
In United States v. Briscoe, the defendants argued that consolidation of
indictments issued by an independent counsel and a U.S. Attorney would violate the purpose and terms of the Act because it would undermine the inde337
pendence of the independent counsel.
In rejecting this argument, the court
held that cooperation at the initiative of the independent counsel does not vio338
late the purpose of the Act, which is to prevent interference by DOJ. Defendants further contended that consolidation violated § 597(a) of the Act, which
requires DOJ to suspend any investigation into a matter within an independent
339
counsel’s mandate.
The court held that a joint prosecution of both indictments is comparable to the parallel appointment that was at issue in the IranContra investigation in that it required the independent counsel and DOJ to
cooperate, but would not subject the independent counsel to the supervision or
340
control of DOJ.
3. The Independent Counsel’s Compliance with Written or Other Established
Policies of DOJ to the Extent the Policies Are Not Inconsistent with the Act.
Although the independent counsel conducts his or her investigation outside
DOJ, there nevertheless remains a relationship between his or her activities
341
and DOJ policies: The Act states that an independent counsel must comply
with “the written or other established policies” of DOJ “except to the extent
342
343
that to do so would be inconsistent[ ] with the purposes of [the Act].”

335. See id. at 59. The court also held that the tenure provision of the Act—that the independent
counsel was removable for “good cause, physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other condition
that substantially impairs the performance” of his or her duties—was not ripe for review. See id. at 6062. The court noted that the Attorney General’s regulation gave Walsh a parallel source of authority
for his grand jury investigation and thus North could not claim to suffer harm from the removal provisions of the Act unless there was a certain action Walsh would not undertake if he relied solely upon
the regulation for his source of power. See id. at 61.
336. 798 F. Supp. 28 (D.D.C. 1992).
337. See id. at 33.
338. See id. The court also held, in a footnote, that the defendants had standing under the Act to
object to a violation of the autonomy of the independent counsel. See id. at 33 n.13 (citing Sealed Case,
829 F.2d at 55-56 (reaching the merits of an objection similar to that of the defendants, albeit without
specifically addressing the standing issue)).
339. See id. at 33.
340. See id. at 34.
341. For recent commentary on the relationship between the independent counsel and DOJ policies
and procedures, see generally Barrett, supra note 318, at 527-28; Godes & Howard, supra note 253, at
885-86. See also HARRIGER, supra note 5, at 141-46 (discussing relationship with DOJ generally).
342. The 1982 amendments provided that the special prosecutor would be required to follow DOJ
policies “except where not possible”; under the law enacted in 1978, the independent counsel had to
follow DOJ policies “to the extent the special prosecutor deems appropriate.” S. REP. NO. 97-496, at
16 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3552; see also Katy J. Harriger, The History of the Independent Counsel Provisions: How the Past Informs the Current Debate, 49 MERCER L. REV. 489, 508
(1998) (outlining the history and substance of the 1982 amendments to the Act). “The intent of this
change is to create a presumption that the special prosecutor will follow prosecutorial guidelines unless
extenuating circumstances exist.” S. REP. NO. 97-496, at 16 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3552. “If he does deviate from established practices of the Department, the special prosecutor should
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Because knowledge of DOJ policies is a prerequisite for compliance with
them, the statute directs the independent counsel to consult with DOJ regard344
ing its criminal law enforcement policies.
Furthermore, an independent
counsel must consult and comply with DOJ’s procedures and policies regarding
345
346
the handling and use of classified information and expenses.
For example, Congress stated in the 1987 reenactment of the Act that, in issuing subpoenas, an independent counsel “stands in the place of the Attorney
General and should follow relevant Department of Justice policies and prac347
tices.” In 1996, Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr issued a grand jury subpoena for the full transcript and videotape of an interview given by Susan
348
McDougal to ABC journalist Diane Sawyer. ABC moved to quash the subpoena on the ground, inter alia, that the Independent Counsel did not follow
DOJ guidelines regarding the issuance of subpoenas to the media (which re-

thoroughly explain his reasons for doing so in his report to the court at the conclusion of his investigation.” Id.
The 1994 reenactment of the Act changed the language from “except where not possible” to
“except where inconsistent with the purposes” of the Act. The Senate Report noted that “[t]he Committee intends independent counsels to follow established Justice Department policies on criminal law
enforcement to the maximum extent possible to ensure that persons subjected to an independent counsel investigation are not subjected to a more rigorous application of the criminal law than other citizens.” S. REP. NO. 103-101, at 32 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 748, 777.
343. 28 U.S.C. § 594(f)(1) (1994). “By obligating independent counsels to comply with the Department’s policies on law enforcement, however, the policies are not intended to be transformed into
mandatory directives; they are intended to retain their character as important guidelines which should
be followed unless an unexpected situation or other good reason justifies making an exception.” S.
REP. NO. 100-123, at 24 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2150, 2173. “[T]he provision is not intended to provide the Department of Justice with a legal basis for assuming control over the prosecution strategy of independent counsels in order to enforce compliance with the Department’s policies.”
Id. at 24-25, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2173-74. Thus, although it might not violate the letter of
the law, DOJ’s attempt to manipulate the independent counsel by enacting rules specifically designed
to control the particular investigation would certainly violate the Act’s spirit. The independent counsel’s remedy would be noncompliance with the questionable rule; the Attorney General could respond
only by exercising the power of removal.
Furthermore, Congress stated in enacting the Act that “[t]his section should be interpreted more as
a goal than as a command.” S. REP. NO. 95-170, at 69 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216,
4285. “Rather than to provide procedures whereby the special prosecutor could get the permission
from the Attorney General or the court not to follow such Departmental policies, it was the decision of
the Committee that the best procedure was to leave the decision of when such written policies of the
Department of Justice are to be followed in the discretion of the special prosecutor.” Id. “The special
prosecutor’s decision as to whether it is practicable to comply with the written policies . . . should include such factors as his perception of the fundamental fairness and justice, his perception of what is
required to conscientiously conduct the investigation and prosecution assigned to him . . . and other
relevant factors.” Id.
The question whether an independent counsel who is charged with investigating the President violates the Act by declining to follow the DOJ policy against indicting a sitting President has never been
decided nor (at the time of this writing) has it arisen. See Symposium, supra note 103, at 1597.
344. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(f)(1) (1994).
345. See id. § 594(f)(2). This is discussed more fully infra Part IV.C.4.
346. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(l)(1)(C) (1994).
347. S. REP. NO. 100-123, at 22 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2150, 2171.
348. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Am. Broadcasting Cos., 947 F. Supp. 1314, 1316-17 (E.D. Ark.
1996).
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quire the approval of the Attorney General for all subpoenas to the media).
The court held that the plain language of § 594(f) made it clear that, while the
Independent Counsel must comply with DOJ guidelines, he is not bound to
follow them where doing so would be inconsistent with the purpose of the
Act—as would be the case by requiring an independent counsel to seek the At350
torney General’s approval.
On the other hand, an independent counsel’s actions would be inconsistent
with the Act’s purposes where the independent counsel refuses to obey a
clearly established DOJ policy not to prosecute for the stated offense or on the
asserted legal theory. Congress clearly expressed its intent that in these cir351
cumstances—as in the Jordan and Kraft cocaine cases —the Act should not be
352
invoked to trigger the appointment of an independent counsel.
4. The Classified Information Procedures Act. The Classified Information
353
Procedures Act (“CIPA”) makes the Attorney General responsible for
deciding whether classified information will be declassified for use at a criminal
354
trial.
CIPA was enacted in 1980 to prevent criminal defendants from
349. See id. at 1317. The DOJ guidelines at issue stated that “no subpoena may be issued to a
member of the news media . . . without the express authorization of the Attorney General.” Id. at
1321 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(e)).
350. See id. at 1321-22. The court cited the legislative history of the Act in holding that to require
the independent counsel to obtain the express authorization of the Attorney General for the issuance
of the subpoena would be contrary to the purpose of the Act:
[T]he committee does not intend that independent counsels comply with Department policies
which would undermine their independence or hinder their mission. For example, where a
Department policy requires the Attorney General’s approval of a particular prosecution
strategy, an independent counsel may waive compliance as inconsistent with the statute’s goal
of creating an “independent” office.
Id. at 1322 n.9 (quoting S. REP. NO. 103-101, at 32 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 748, 777).
351. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
352. See David Johnston, Reno Ends Inquiry into Fund-Raising by Vice President, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
25, 1998, at A1. Attorney General Reno concluded at the end of her preliminary investigation of allegations of criminal wrongdoing by Vice President Al Gore in fund-raising for the 1996 campaign that
the evidence was too weak to support a prosecution of Gore for lying. She stated that there is “‘only
weak circumstantial evidence of the Vice President’s knowledge—his presence at a meeting where the
subject was briefly discussed—which I do not believe provides reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation of this matter is warranted.’” Id. (quoting Report from Attorney General Reno to
Special Division).
353. 18 U.S.C. app. III §§ 1-16 (1994). CIPA contains three basic provisions: (1) pretrial notice by
the defendant that he or she intends to use classified information; (2) control of the admissibility of the
classified information, including in camera proceedings; and (3) interlocutory appeal by the government of adverse rulings. See Sandra D. Jordan, Classified Information and Conflicts in Independent
Counsel Prosecutions: Balancing the Scales of Justice After Iran-Contra, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1651, 1658
(1991); see also Ronald K. Noble, The Independent Counsel Versus the Attorney General in a Classified
Information Procedures Act-Independent Counsel Statute Case, 33 B.C. L. REV. 539, 550-56 (1992)
(describing CIPA’s statutory provisions). To resolve the conflict between CIPA and the Act, Noble
argues for the creation of an Office of Independent Special Arbiter for classified information that
would issue advisory opinions on whether the release of the classified information would threaten national security. See Noble, supra, at 544.
354. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1105 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that Congress enacted CIPA to confront the problem of a criminal defendant who “threatens to reveal classified information during the course of his trial in the hope of forcing the government to drop the criminal charge
against him”).
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escaping prosecution by threatening to disclose classified information. CIPA
permits the trial judge to rule on questions of admissibility before the
355
introduction of the evidence in open court. Neither CIPA nor the Act makes
356
a reference to the other, and the Act provides no mechanism to challenge
classification decisions made by executive branch members. The interaction
between the Act and CIPA provides yet another opportunity for a complex and
conflicting relationship to develop between the independent counsel and DOJ
and the Attorney General.
Although the Act does not address CIPA explicitly, it does seem, implicitly,
to reallocate the Attorney General’s traditional powers over classified information by providing that independent counsels are entitled to receive
“appropriate national security clearances” in obtaining any testimony and re357
viewing any documents. Furthermore, the statute states that the independent
counsel may go to court to enforce his or her legal rights to obtain information
where someone attempts, by general withholding or by claiming a national security privilege, to keep the independent counsel from obtaining classified in358
formation.
Finally, according to the Act, the independent counsel becomes
the representative of the government and stands in DOJ’s shoes for all prosecutions within its jurisdiction, the role of DOJ being limited to providing assistance, making amicus curiae presentations, and handling electronic surveil359
lance. Arguably, in the absence of an express provision to the contrary, the
Attorney General’s powers under CIPA should transfer to the independent
counsel upon the commencement of an independent counsel investigation.
This is the issue that the Iran-Contra investigation grappled with but never resolved: Can an independent counsel exercise the powers of the Attorney General under CIPA?

355. See Jordan, supra note 353, at 1652-53. CIPA does not necessarily protect the defendant, but
only the classified information. See id. at 1684.
356. See United States v. Fernandez, 887 F.2d 465, 465 (4th Cir. 1989). Fernandez held that the Act
grants the independent counsel sole authority to exercise the right to appeal, under § 7 of CIPA, the
trial court’s rulings rejecting the substitution of versions of classified materials to be used at trial. See
id. at 465-66; see also Noble, supra note 353, at 561-63 (discussing Fernandez). Section 7(a) of CIPA
authorizes the United States to take an interlocutory appeal from an adverse district court order concerning the disclosure of classified information. See 18 U.S.C. app. III § 7(a) (1994).
Fernandez was a former CIA service officer who was indicted on two counts of giving false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and two counts of obstructing proceedings in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1505 in connection with the Iran-Contra investigation. See Fernandez, 887 F.2d at 467.
357. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(6) (1994).
358. See id. Justice Scalia noted this power of the independent counsel in his dissent in Morrison:
Another preeminently political decision is whether getting a conviction in a particular case is
worth the disclosure of national security information that would be necessary. The Justice
Department and our intelligence agencies are often in disagreement on this point, and the
Justice Department does not always win. The present Act even goes so far as specifically to
take the resolution of that dispute away from the President and give it to the independent
counsel.
487 U.S. 654, 708 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
359. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (1994); see also supra Part IV.C.1 (discussing the roles of the independent counsel, DOJ, and the Attorney General).
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The Iran-Contra investigation was a minefield of classified information. In
December 1986, the Attorney General applied to the Special Division seeking
the appointment of an independent counsel with jurisdiction to investigate
whether Lt. Col. Oliver North and others violated federal criminal law in the
360
Iran-Contra affair. To prove the crimes alleged, Independent Counsel Walsh
needed to use in open court classified information that otherwise might never
361
have been made public. In ordinary criminal investigations and prosecutions
that involve classified information, the Attorney General has the legal authority to balance law enforcement interests in making a particular criminal case
362
against a more generalized concern for national security considerations. Although the Act authorized Walsh to contest national security claims, it provided him with no explicit power to declassify this information so that his investigation could proceed.
Section 594(a) transfers all prosecutorial and investigative authority from
the Attorney General to the independent counsel in “all” matters within his or
363
her jurisdiction. In United States v. Fernandez, the Fourth Circuit noted that
when an independent counsel is acting as prosecutor, the Attorney General
need not balance the threat of public disclosure of classified information
against the threat of ending the prosecution because the Act removes the pos364
sibility that the Attorney General’s actions might end the prosecution.
Where the independent counsel is bringing the prosecution, the Attorney General’s only responsibility under CIPA is the protection of classified informa365
tion. Although § 596(a)(6) concerns national security and classified informa366
tion, the Fernandez court held that it was inapplicable to this case. The court
held that the Attorney General did not resist a request for classified information, but rather attempted to exercise the independent counsel’s prosecutorial
367
authority.

360. See In re Sealed Case, 829 F.2d 50, 51-52 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The Special Division granted Independent Counsel Walsh jurisdiction beyond that requested by the Attorney General. See id. at 52.
361. For a discussion of the relationship between independent counsel and DOJ regarding the use
of classified information, see Barrett, supra note 318, at 535-37; Jordan, supra note 353. Jordan’s article should be the starting point for researching the issues involving CIPA and classified information as
it relates to the powers and function of the independent counsel. Jordan wrote prior to the expiration
of the Act in 1992, and she advocated for congressional action to harmonize CIPA and the Act. See
Jordan, supra note 353, at 1654.
362. Because DOJ has the power to conduct this balancing test even when the independent counsel
is prosecuting a case, the role of the independent counsel’s office with respect to classified information
is very limited because the decisions regarding classification are made within DOJ and outside the control of the independent counsel. See id. at 1656.
363. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (1994).
364. 887 F.2d 465, 470 (4th Cir. 1989).
365. See id.
366. See id. at 471 n.6. The court stated that § 596(a)(6) concerns the situation where the executive
branch might seek to withhold from the independent counsel evidence that is relevant to the prosecution on grounds of national security. See id. The Act gives the independent counsel the power to apply
for the required security clearances and to contest in court any claims of executive privilege. See 28
U.S.C. § 594(a)(6) (1994).
367. See Fernandez, 887 F.2d at 471 n.6.
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In the prosecution of Oliver North, the Attorney General refused to declassify information that the independent counsel had informed him was necessary
368
to the prosecution. Attorney General Thornburgh asserted ultimate control
over the use of the classified information by filing affidavits based on the power
he had under CIPA and ordered that specified items of classified information
not be used at trial. When the information necessary to conduct the trial was
not declassified, Walsh was left with no options, and the court dismissed the
369
counts against North.
Independent Counsel Walsh never argued that the
power of the Attorney General under CIPA to declassify information had been
370
transferred to him.
The issue raised by Iran-Contra was whether any high-level official ever
could be prosecuted successfully when national security issues are intimately
371
tied up with alleged criminal conduct. CIPA involves the duties and respon368. See William Michael Treanor, Independent Counsel and Vigorous Investigation and Prosecution, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 157-58 (Winter 1998) (describing power of the executive
branch to control effectively the investigation of an independent counsel by refusing to declassify information required by the independent counsel). The charges against North were conspiracy to defraud the United States by providing covert support for the Contras and that the Iran-Contra diversion
was a theft of government funds. See id. at 158.
369. In the Oliver North trial, the two lead counts of the indictment were dismissed. See
LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FIREWALL: THE IRAN-CONTRA CONSPIRACY AND COVER-UP 180 (1997). In
the case of CIA officer Joseph Fernandez, the court dismissed the entire indictment. See United States
v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148, 149 (4th Cir. 1990).
Walsh has recently stated that
I never asked Congress to consider giving [the classified information power] to an independent counsel because I did not think a transient should be making decisions about national security where he has no deep background in that area. And it seems to me that there are areas
where the interpretation of the law should be in the hands of those who are permanently
stewards of it, rather than in a transient.
Symposium, A Roundtable Discussion on the Independent Counsel Statute, 49 MERCER L. REV. 453,
483 (1998).
However, there are significant problems with vesting this decisionmaking power in the Attorney
General, DOJ, or indeed, with any official or department that is part of the executive branch. If the
goal of the Act is independence from these executive branch actors, placing in their hands such decisionmaking power which fundamentally impacts the outcome of an investigation or prosecution can
subvert this goal.
370. See Treanor, supra note 368, at 160. Treanor suspects that, had Walsh maintained that he had
the power to declassify information under CIPA, Walsh would have lost because a court would have
been unlikely to find that the power of classification—one attaching to the executive branch—would
have passed to the independent counsel under the Act. See id. Since the independent counsel’s position is to investigate federal crimes and prosecute the guilty, the independent counsel would be an inappropriate person to balance the competing interests of national security and law enforcement. See
id.
371. See id. at 1672. It should be noted, however, that simply giving the independent counsel the
power under CIPA to exercise all of the power of the Attorney General would implicate the constitutionality of the Act. The Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. Olson, upholding the constitutionality of the Act, was predicated on the finding of the Court that the independent counsel was an inferior
executive officer. See 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988) (stating that “the independent counsel is an inferior
officer under the Appointments Clause, with limited jurisdiction and tenure and lacking policymaking
or significant administrative authority”). Whether the Court would reach the same determination
where an independent counsel was charged with a policymaking role involving the declassification of
sensitive national security information is questionable. A total transfer to the independent counsel of
the power to declassify national security information would likely raise significant separation of powers concerns.
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sibilities of the “United States,” so it is unclear which entity—the Attorney
General or the independent counsel—fulfills that role where an independent
372
counsel has been appointed.
Ultimately, the question is still an open one.
Because of the unique nature and purpose of the Act—a mechanism that provides for the investigation and prosecution of high-level governmental officials—undoubtedly a future independent counsel or special prosecutor will face
the problem of using classified information at trial.
5. Removal of the Independent Counsel. The Act provides that the
independent counsel “may be removed from office, other than by impeachment
and conviction, only by the personal action of the Attorney General and only
for good cause, physical or mental disability . . . , or any other condition that
373
substantially impairs the performance of such independent counsel’s duties.”
Any such removal by the Attorney General must be accompanied by a report
374
to the Special Division and Congress explaining the action.
Finally, the
independent counsel may demand judicial review of the removal of the
375
independent counsel by the Attorney General.
The Supreme Court has
upheld this judicial review provision:
[A]s with the provision of the Act conferring the appointment authority of the independent counsel on the special court, the congressional determination to limit the removal power of the Attorney General was essential, in the view of Congress, to establish the necessary independence of the office. We do not think that this limitation
as it presently stands sufficiently deprives the President of control over the independent counsel to interfere impermissibly with his constitutional obligation to ensure the
faithful execution of the laws.376
372. See Jordan, supra note 353, at 1666.
373. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (1994). The standard of removal was changed in 1982 from
“extraordinary impropriety” to “good cause.” It was felt that this change would enhance the constitutionality of the statute. See S. REP. NO. 97-496, at 17 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537,
3553.
The issue of “good cause” removal surfaced again in the 1987 reenactment of the statute. Congress
was concerned with DOJ’s position in the Reagan White House that a President could fire an independent counsel for good cause where the independent counsel refused to obey a presidential order to
grant immunity to the target of the investigation. See S. REP. NO. 100-123, at 12 (1987), reprinted in
1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2150, 2161. “This interpretation of the statute completely misconstrues Congressional intent, which is to prevent the President’s firing an independent counsel unless he or she engages
in some type of misconduct . . . [such as] ‘taking a bribe or committing an impropriety.’” Id. at 12-13,
reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2161-62 (quoting Lloyd Cutler, former counselor to President Carter).
374. See 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(2) (1994).
375. See id. § 596(a)(3). “[T]he division of the court is given the authority to review the removal of
the special prosecutor to see if any of the statutory causes did exist. If such cause [sic] did not exist,
and the removed special prosecutor so requests, the court may reinstate such a special prosecutor.” S.
REP. NO. 95-170, at 73-74 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4289-90.
We see no constitutional problem in the fact that the Act provides for judicial review of the
removal decision [under § 596(a)(3)]. The purpose of such review is to ensure that an independent counsel is removed only in accordance with the will of Congress as expressed in the
Act. The possibility of judicial review does not inject the Judicial Branch into the removal
decision, nor does it, by itself, put any additional burden on the President’s exercise of executive authority.
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 693 n.33.
376. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 692-93.
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D. The Relationship Between the Independent Counsel and Congress
Members of Congress can request that the Attorney General apply for the
377
appointment of an independent counsel. Congress’s role is otherwise limited
to overseeing the activities of the independent counsel or the Attorney General
378
under the Act, and to ordinary executive branch oversight, hearings, or the
impeachment process.
1. Congressional Oversight. General oversight of the independent counsel
379
is vested in congressional oversight committees.
The Act requires the
independent counsel to submit annual reports to Congress on his or her
activities and requires the independent counsel to cooperate with congressional
380
oversight jurisdiction. In renewing the Act in 1994, Congress added many of
the congressional oversight provisions to make the independent counsel more
381
accountable. These new provisions included rules on controlling the costs of

377. See 28 U.S.C. § 592(g) (1994); see also supra Part II.B.2.d (discussing the triggering of the Act
by Members of Congress).
378. This oversight includes the receipt of reports and other information from the independent
counsel and the conduct of audits of the independent counsel’s expenditures. See 28 U.S.C. § 595(b)
(1994) (requiring the Attorney General to supply certain information to Congress about the receipt of
information, the preliminary investigation, and whether the Attorney General determined, as the result of a preliminary investigation, that further investigation was not required); see also S. REP. NO.
100-123, at 29 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2150, 2178 (“The purpose of these provisions is
to enable congressional committees with oversight responsibilities to keep better track of actions taken
by the Attorney General to implement the Act.”). The Attorney General must also submit a report to
the Judiciary Committees of Senate and House of Representatives justifying the removal of an independent counsel. See 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(2) (1994). Congress has exclusive oversight of the Attorney
General’s compliance with the provisions of the Act. See Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817, 823 (9th Cir.
1986); cf. supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the inability of private citizens to compel the Attorney General
to conduct a preliminary investigation).
The involvement of Congress in oversight of the independent counsel is perfectly constitutional:
These are “functions that we have recognized generally as being incidental to the legislative function
of Congress”; therefore the congressional role outlined by the Act does not infringe upon the separation of powers. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 694.
379. See 28 U.S.C. § 595(a)(1) (1994). Oversight is currently vested with the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary and the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. One commentator has argued that Congress has refused to use the power of the purse to control the conduct of independent counsel investigations. See O’Sullivan, supra note 260, at 496. Although the usage of
resources must be reported to Congress by the independent counsel under the Act, there is no explicit
constraint placed on spending by the independent counsel, nor is the independent counsel barred from
earning outside income, a bar which, if in place, might militate against the independent counsel dragging out an investigation past the point of fruitfulness. See infra Part IV.D.2 (discussing the auditing
provisions of the Act).
380. See 28 U.S.C. § 595(a) (1994).
381. See, e.g., id. § 594(l) (imposing cost controls); id. § 594(f) (clarifying the responsibility of independent counsels to comply with DOJ policies); id. § 594(h)(3) (increasing public access to independent counsel reports); see also S. REP. NO. 103-101, at 27-30, 32-34 (1993), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 748, 771-75, 777-79 (discussing the intent and purpose of the amendments that increase
the accountability of the independent counsel); Harriger, supra note 342, at 513-14 (discussing the history and substance of the 1994 amendments to the Act). For an argument that the congressional oversight and reporting provisions are weak control mechanisms on the independent counsel, see James P.
Fleissner, The Future of the Independent Counsel Statute: Confronting the Dilemma of Allocating the
Power of Prosecutorial Discretion, 49 MERCER L. REV. 427, 435 (1998).
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investigations, audits of independent counsel expense records, annual
384
reports from the independent counsel to Congress, compliance with DOJ
385
policies and procedures regarding the handling of classified documents, and a
periodic review by the appointing court to determine whether the investigation
386
should be continued or terminated.
The sunset provision directing that the Act lapse five years from its effective date is another mechanism for congressional oversight. This provision was
designed to ensure that Congress took affirmative legislative action informed
387
by debate to assess the function and further the effectiveness of the Act.
Perhaps the most contentious oversight mechanism, however, is the independent counsel’s final report filed with Congress at the conclusion of each in388
vestigation.
Although the Act places no limit on the duration of the independent counsel, upon termination of his or her office, the independent counsel
must file a report with the Special Division “setting forth fully and completely a
description of the work of the independent counsel, including the disposition of
389
all cases brought.”
382. 28 U.S.C. § 594(l) (1994).
383. See id. § 596(c)(1).
384. See id. § 595(a)(2).
385. See id. § 594(f).
386. See id. § 596(b)(2).
387. See S. REP. NO. 95-170, at 77 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4293:
Five years is a reasonable period to permit the provisions of [the Act] to operate and then to
review those provisions to see if too many or too few special prosecutors have been appointed, to determine whether there is a need for a revision of the standards defining when a
conflict of interest exists, or to determine if there is a need to revise the method of appointment, the method of removal, or any other significant portion of this chapter.
388. Some commentators have argued that the Act’s broad reporting requirements have fueled partisan political fires. See, e.g., Soloway, supra note 277, at 638. Soloway argues that, even though the
1994 amendments to the Act removed the requirement that the independent counsel state his or her
reasons for not prosecuting a case, the independent counsel can still place his or her conclusions in the
public forum, thus affecting the political atmosphere. See id. Likely, though, no amount of amendment to the Act can control the personal and professional judgment of how a prosecutor—whether he
or she is an independent counsel—interacts with the media and the public. See also Symposium, supra
note 103, at 1558 (statement of Larry Thompson) (“I think that perhaps the filing of this report and the
writing of the report actually serve to not only make the investigation go longer, but perhaps serve to
overly politicize the investigation.”); see id. at 1560 (statement of Robert Fiske, Jr.) (“[T]here is an interrelationship . . . between a report requirement and the complaints from so many parts of the media
and the public about the length and expense of the investigation.”). But see id. at 1558 (statement of
Judge Lawrence Walsh) (“Although there is congressional oversight of the independent counsel, it is
very difficult to make that effective, and I think that to make congressional oversight effective, they
need a report.”). There are, perhaps, a number of ways that the final report could be improved upon.
See, e.g., id. at 1556 (statement of Jacob Stein) (“[I]f a report should be written—and there are many
good reasons there shouldn’t be a report—perhaps it should be confined to who you employed, what
their backgrounds were to show that you had quality people, and some indication why the investigation
took the time it did.”).
389. 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(1)(B) (1994). Not only does an independent counsel operate with an unlimited time frame, but also with an unlimited budget. The Act provides that DOJ must pay for “all
costs relating to the establishment and operation” of an independent counsel investigation and prosecution. Id. § 594(d)(2).
The final report requirement of the Act is a key means of ensuring the accountability of the independent counsel. At least so says Congress. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 95-170, at 70 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4286 (“This mandatory final report is considered by the Committee to be
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The center of the controversy over final reports was Independent Counsel
Walsh’s final report in the Iran-Contra investigation. At the time Walsh submitted his report, the Act required the independent counsel to explain “the
reasons for not prosecuting any matter within the prosecutorial jurisdiction of
390
such independent counsel which was not prosecuted.” The release of Walsh’s
report to the public was contested, and the Special Division allowed for the release of the report, noting that the Independent Counsel’s argument for its re391
lease hinged on the legislative mandate.
The court nevertheless found the
report to be “rife with accusations of guilt of criminal conduct against persons
never indicted or convicted. . . . Unfortunately for movants, and perhaps for
the tradition of fairness, the statute . . . require[s] that the Independent Counsel
392
file a report.”
As a result of Walsh’s report, the 1994 reauthorization of the Act deleted
the requirement that the independent counsel include in the final report the
“reasons for not prosecuting any matter within the prosecutorial jurisdiction of
393
such independent counsel.”
“By eliminating the requirement to explain
every decision not to indict, the [Act] does not prohibit such explanations, but
instead gives each independent counsel the discretion to provide such an expla394
nation when he or she determines it would be in the public interest.”
One
very important to ensure the accountability of a special prosecutor.”); id. (“This final report will provide a detailed document to permit the evaluation of the performance of a special prosecutor at an appropriate time.”); id. (“This report must be in sufficient detail to allow a determination of whether the
special prosecutor’s investigation was thoroughly and fairly completed.”); S. REP. NO. 103-101, at 33
(1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 748, 778 (“These periodic reporting requirements will provide
Congress with regular information to assist in its oversight responsibilities.”). However, because such
an accounting would be made after the fact, it is of questionable use in controlling the ongoing abuses
of the independent counsel.
390. 28 U.S.C. § 595(b)(2) (1982).
391. See In re North, 16 F.3d 1234, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In releasing the report, the court was
guided by the standards set forth in a 1987 Senate Report: (1) whether the subjects of the investigation
have already been disclosed to the public; (2) whether the subjects did not object to the filings being
released to the public; (3) whether the filings contain information that is already publicly known; and
(4) whether the filings consist of legal or factual rulings in a case that should be publicly available to
understand the court’s rules and precedents or to follow developments in a particular manner. See id.
at 1240 (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-123 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2150).
As far as the third factor noted above is concerned, the court commented:
[S]ome might suggest that a future Independent Counsel wishing to ensure the release of his
report would go on television and make comments accusing the subjects of his report of
crimes so that the Court could later find that the contents of the report were already public.
As this Court has no supervisory power, there would be little we could do about it. As the
Independent Counsel is virtually without supervision, there would be little anyone could do
about it. This danger may be inherent in the nature of the Independent Counsel.
Id. at 1241.
392. Id. at 1238.
393. In explaining the decision to eliminate this requirement, Congress reported:
Other federal prosecutors do not normally provide public explanations of decisions not to indict and, in deviating from this norm, independent counsels must exercise restraint. The
power to damage reputations in the final report is significant[;] . . . the final report requirement is not intended in any way to authorize independent counsels to make public findings or
conclusions that violate normal standards of due process, privacy or simple fairness.
H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 103-511, at 19 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 792, 802.
394. 140 Cong. Rec. S6,374 (daily ed. May 25, 1994) (remarks of Sen. Levin).
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Senator has stated that, in explaining a decision not to indict, the independent
counsel should consider “whether the individual was central to the independent
counsel’s jurisdictional mandate, whether the explanation would exonerate an
innocent individual, and whether an explanation would violate normal stan395
dards of due process, privacy or simply fairness.”
Finally, the Act states that “[t]he division of the court shall make such orders as are appropriate to protect the rights of any individual named in such
396
[final] reports.” “In determining what statements, reports or information to
make public, the special prosecutor will, of course, be bound by the canons of
ethics of the legal profession and the basic principles of our criminal justice sys397
tem.” “In considering whether to release court filings, it is intended that the
court balance the right of the subjects of investigations to be shielded from
publicity about unfounded or unfair allegations with the right of the public to
398
inquire about prosecutions under [the] Act.”
2. Auditing. The Act requires that the independent counsel “conduct all
399
activities with due regard to expense.”
By allowing this discretionary
standard, although Congress provided the independent counsel with the broad
flexibility and independence to investigate and prosecute, it required the
independent counsel to submit an annual report on his or her activities,
including the financial expenditures. Congress intended that a balance exist
between controlling costs and safeguarding the integrity of our government.
Congress reasoned that “[t]he audit provision will provide needed
accountability for the funds actually spent by independent counsels and will
395. Id. (remarks of Sen. Levin). Senator Levin stated that the Conference Report further cautioned against “conclusory statements that an individual is guilty of criminal misconduct . . . .” Id.
396. 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(2) (1994). This authority of the Special Division provides a check against
what would otherwise be the unbridled discretion of the independent counsel in filing the final report.
See In re Sealed Motion, 880 F.2d 1367, 1370 (1989) (per curiam). The court in Sealed Motion held
that because the right to secrecy in a grand jury proceeding belongs to the witness, “a grand jury witness named in an independent counsel’s report is entitled to a transcript of his own testimony absent a
clear showing by the government that other interests outweigh the witness’ right to such transcript.”
Id. at 1370-71. In reaching this holding, the court relied on Morrison, which compared the Special Division’s functions under the Act to functions that federal judges undertake in other contexts, such as
deciding whether to allow the disclosure of matters occurring before a grand jury. See id. at 1374
(citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 681 (1988)).
In another § 594(h)(2) case, the Special Division granted the emergency motion of the Society of
Professional Journalists and others to unseal all sealed motions and papers pertaining to the release of
Independent Counsel Walsh’s final report, holding that the disclosure was in the public interest. See In
re North, 21 F.3d 434, 434-35 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
397. S. REP. NO. 95-170, at 70 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4286.
398. S. REP. NO. 100-123, at 21 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2150, 2170.
399. 28 U.S.C. § 594(l)(1)(A)(i) (1994).
Exercising “due regard for expense” means that an independent counsel must not conduct an
investigation or prosecution on the premise that “price is no object” or that costs are irrelevant when making decisions in the case. Independent counsels, like all other federal employees, must take care that federal funds are spent wisely and without extravagance or waste.
S. REP. NO. 100-123, at 28 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2150, 2177. “In deciding whether to
incur a particular expense and, if so, how much to pay for the underlying item, independent counsels
should be guided by the rules and practices of other federal agencies.” Id.
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deter the authorization of inappropriate or excessive expenditures. It will also
provide accurate information as to whether additional fiscal controls are
400
needed for independent counsel proceedings.” Furthermore, throughout the
course of the investigation, the independent counsel is required to submit
reports every six months to the Special Division identifying and explaining all
401
expenses related to the investigation. The Special Division, at its discretion,
402
may disclose the contents of these reports to Congress or the public.
Although it is recognized that certain information will need to be kept
confidential, the Act states that “information adequate to justify the
expenditures that the office of independent counsel has made” should be
403
provided in the expense report.
3. Parallel Congressional Investigations. The Act has failed to address a
fundamental problem brought to light by the Iran-Contra scandal: What
happens to the independent counsel’s role if Congress initiates a simultaneous
404
inquiry regarding the same subject as the independent counsel investigation?
Even though Independent Counsel Walsh warned Congress that his
investigation could be tainted if key figures in the investigation were given
immunity and were compelled to testify, Congress conferred immunity on
Oliver North, who freely testified regarding obstruction of justice and other
405
crimes he committed in connection with Iran-Contra.

400. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 100-452, at 38 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2185, 2204.
401. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(1) (1994). “The purpose of the status reports is to provide a general
cost accounting and a mechanism for planning future expenditures.” H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 100-452, at
33, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2199.
402. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(h)(2) (1994).
403. Id. § 595(a)(2).
404. Congress launched its own investigation of Iran-Contra in 1987. This section draws heavily on
the analysis laid out in Peter W. Rodino, Jr., The Case for the Independent Counsel Statute, 19 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 5, 19-21, 27-31 (1994). Professor Rodino was the Chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee from 1973 to 1989.
Congress apparently avoided this problem in the Monica Lewinsky scandal. After the scandal
broke in January 1998, House Judiciary Chairman Henry Hyde said, “It’s in the bosom of the independent counsel. He has the resources, the personnel, the deposition authority, access to the grand
jury, immunity power. Let him do his job. And then when he does that, we will do ours.” Face the
Nation (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 25, 1998). Whatever the reason for the congressional inaction,
the perils of Iran-Contra have been avoided: Congress took no action in “Monicagate” until after Independent Counsel Starr delivered his report to Congress on September 9, 1998. See infra Part IV.D.4
(discussing the relationship between the independent counsel and the impeachment process).
During the Clinton Administration, there have been independent counsel investigations involving
Secretary Cisneros, Secretary Brown, and Secretary Espy, but there have not been major parallel congressional investigations with respect to any of these investigations. See Symposium, supra note 103, at
1570.
The issue was raised—and not resolved—in Watergate as well. More recently, Congress conducted
hearings into Whitewater despite Independent Counsel Robert Fiske’s warning that there might be
interference with his charge if such hearings were precipitously held. See Rodino, supra, at 28.
405. See id. at 19. The courts subsequently ruled that Walsh’s prosecutions were tainted by the
compelled testimony; those who were most culpable in Iran-Contra were left unpunished. See United
States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. North, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir.
1990).
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A congressional investigation informs Congress how best to develop legislation, monitor the implementation of legislation and public policy, and disclose
406
to the public how its government is functioning.
It is a political reality that
members of the opposite political party in Congress will want to hold a hearing
407
whenever a potentially scandalous event occurs involving the President. Yet
a congressional investigation that runs parallel to an independent counsel investigation presents a tension between Congress’s need to oversee the activities
of the government and the independent counsel’s role of ferreting out and
prosecuting criminal wrongdoing.
Congressman Henry Hyde described this tension in the context of the IranContra investigation:
Judge Walsh catches a lot of criticism because of the length of the investigation, but
his problem was complicated by our investigation. I remember Judge Walsh coming
up and pleading with us to defer this and defer that, but we were hell-bent—and I say
“we”—the Democrats wanted to move into the public arena because they were going
to nail Ronald Reagan and this was an opportunity too good to be missed. . . . They
were willing to give immunity to anybody if it would lead to the top gun.408

However, attempting to control congressional parallel investigations
through legislation may be a violation of the separation of powers, and very little else can be done about these conflicting goals other than letting the political
409
system work out the tension:
Under the law, Congress has the ultimate word, and it should be that way. Congress
should make the decision as to whether it should grant immunity or not, and they are
really the supreme governing agency in our government. And if they conclude that
for political reasons—high-level political reasons—it is important to tell the public,
the prosecutor should be subordinated.410

Even without giving anyone immunity, a parallel congressional investigation still can interfere with the investigation of an independent counsel by, for
406. See Symposium, supra note 103, at 1565 (statement of Judge Charles Haden II).
Congress performs a kind of watchdog function over the Executive Branch of our government. Congress holds hearings to explore issues of public policy about how we govern ourselves. Congress uncovers and exposes and publicizes misuse of government power, abuse of
government power. Congress frequently targets particular individuals in the Executive
Branch to expose misfeasance, with the result that those individuals resign or are, in some
manner, run out of office . . . .
Id. at 1568 (statement of John Nields, Jr.).
407. Rodino argues that Congress should remember its legislative purpose when setting up and
conducting investigations that parallel investigations by independent counsels. See Rodino, supra note
404, at 28-29. Congressional oversight proceedings are intended to determine whether existing legislation is functioning correctly—Congress is not well equipped to conduct criminal investigations, which is
the function of the independent counsel and the courts. See id. at 29. Rodino argues that Congress
might legislate regarding the relationship between an independent counsel investigation and a parallel
congressional inquiry. See id. at 31. Political realities probably cannot be changed through any alteration of the Act, however, and the attempt to do so might raise serious separation of powers problems.
408. Symposium, supra note 103, at 1580.
409. See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 369, at 481 (statement of Judge Bell) (“I do not know that
there is anything that you can do about that under our system.”). Of course, the independent counsel
always has the power to resign if he or she feels that the investigation is being significantly compromised by congressional action. See id. (statement of Mr. Cutler).
410. Symposium, supra note 103, at 1562 (statement of Judge Lawrence Walsh).
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example, locking a witness into a story under oath that later turns out not to be
411
true.
At least for now, the Iran-Contra experience seems to have made it
clear to Congress that it cannot expect to grant immunity to key witnesses and
at the same time expect the independent counsel to conduct a successful inves412
tigation and prosecution.
4. The Impeachment Process. The Act requires that an independent
counsel advise the House of Representatives of any “substantial and credible”
413
information that may constitute grounds for impeachment.
This provision
came into play for the first time in 1998 when Independent Counsel Kenneth
Starr delivered his report to Congress detailing eleven possible grounds for the
414
impeachment of President Clinton.
Starr stated that “[i]t is not the role of
this Office to determine whether the President’s actions warrant impeachment
by the House and removal by the Senate; those judgments are, of course,
415
constitutionally entrusted to the legislative branch.” Starr continued, drawing
from the mandate in the Act,
[t]his Office is authorized . . . to conduct criminal investigations and to seek criminal
prosecutions for matters within its jurisdiction. . . . In carrying out its investigation,
however, this Office also has a statutory duty to disclose to Congress information that
“may constitute grounds for an impeachment,” a task that inevitably requires judgment about the seriousness of the acts revealed by the evidence.416

Finally, Starr concluded,
[f]rom the outset, it was our strong desire to complete all phases of the investigation
before deciding whether to submit to Congress information—if any—that may constitute grounds for an impeachment. But events and the statutory command of Section
595(c) have dictated otherwise. As the investigation into the President’s actions with
respect to Ms. Lewinsky and the Jones litigation progressed, it became apparent that
there was a significant body of substantial and credible information that met the Section 595(c) threshold. As that phase of the investigation neared completion, it also
became apparent that a delay of this Referral until the evidence from all phases of the
investigation had been evaluated would be unwise. Although Section 595(c) does not
specify when information must be submitted, its text strongly suggests that information of this type belongs in the hands of Congress as soon as the Independent Counsel
determines that the information is reliable and substantially complete. 417

411. See id. (statement of Robert Fiske, Jr.).
412. See, e.g., Symposium, supra note 369, at 481-82 (statement of Judge Lawrence Walsh) (stating
that since Iran-Contra, Congress has not conducted parallel investigations with the same fervor and
has been much more careful about granting immunity to witnesses).
413. 28 U.S.C. § 595(c) (1994); see also Ruth Marcus, Impeachment Provision in Counsel Law
Could Become Crucial, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1998 at A8 (discussing operation of § 595(c)). In 1974,
Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski followed a course similar to that chosen by Starr. The Watergate
grand jury named President Nixon as an unindicted co-conspirator and referred its report to the House
Judiciary Committee, which approved three articles of impeachment against Nixon shortly before his
resignation. See id.
414. See STARR REPORT, supra note 21. See generally Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Interaction Between
Impeachment and the Independent Counsel Statute, 86 GEO. L.J. 2193 (1998).
415. Id. at 27 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6).
416. Id. (citation omitted).
417. Id. at 33.
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Congress did, in fact, undertake impeachment proceedings against President Clinton. Clinton was impeached by the House of Representatives on De418
419
cember 19, 1998, but was acquitted by the Senate on February 12, 1999.
Critical to these proceedings was the evidence compiled and report submitted
by Starr. Undoubtedly, the relationship between Starr and Congress in the
Clinton impeachment proceedings will color the future of the Act and the operation of future special prosecutors.
A further ramification of the impeachment proceedings against Clinton and
Starr’s involvement in them is the possible investigation of an independent
counsel by DOJ. On the eve of the Senate’s acquittal of Clinton in February
1999, it was reported that Attorney General Reno was considering whether to
appoint a special investigative prosecutor to examine charges of possible mis420
conduct by Starr. As this issue goes to print, the outlines of such an investigation are still taking form: DOJ has told Starr that it plans to open an inquiry
into his operation, including his handling of Ms. Lewinsky at the outset of the
inquiry and whether Starr failed to disclose possible conflicts of interest in
January 1998 when he asked Attorney General Reno to expand his jurisdiction
421
to investigate the Lewinsky matter.
The obstacle to the inquiry is the conflict between Starr and Reno over how
it will be conducted: The Attorney General wants to ensure that she retains
her authority to discipline independent counsels; Starr maintains that no investigation should undercut his independence from DOJ. The question of whether
an Attorney General has the authority to investigate an independent counsel is
unresolved: There is no language in the Act relating to how an independent
counsel would be investigated. Although the Attorney General has the power
to remove an independent counsel under the Act, it is unclear whether this removal power also gives her the inherent power to investigate the independent
counsel. The resolution of these questions will certainly impact the future of

418. See Alison Mitchell, Clinton Impeached, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1998, § 1, at 1. The House voted
on four charges brought against Clinton. The House approved a charge of perjury for misleading a
federal grand jury about the nature of his relationship with Monica Lewinsky by a vote of 228 to 206,
and a charge of obstruction of justice by a vote of 221 to 212. See id. The House rejected two charges:
perjury in the Paula Jones sexual harassment suit and abuse of power stemming from Clinton’s answers to 81 questions put to him in interrogatories by the House Judiciary Committee, by votes of 229
to 205 and 285 to 148, respectively. See id. A simple majority was needed to pass each charge. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
419. See Alison Mitchell, Clinton Acquitted Decisively, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1999, at A1. The Senate rejected the perjury count by a 55 to 45 vote and the obstruction of justice count by a vote of 50 to
50. See id. A two-thirds majority would have been necessary to convict. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl.
6.
420. See U.S. Inquiry on Starr Is Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1999, at A17; see also David Johnston &
Don Van Natta Jr., Reno Considering Separate Counsel for Starr Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1999, at
A1.
421. See David Johnston, Starr Puts up His Defense While Faulting Counsel Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
15, 1999, at A28. Starr, testifying before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, which is considering changes in the Act, told the Committee that the Act was flawed and that it did not provide the
public with a sense that investigations were nonpartisan. See id.
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the Act and the operation of future independent counsels and Attorneys General.
E. Use of Grand Jury Materials
An independent counsel investigation is bound by Federal Rule of Criminal
422
Procedure Rule 6(e) and its bonds of secrecy for grand jury materials.
The
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure state that “an attorney for the government . . . shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury, except as
423
otherwise provided for in these rules.” A recent development in litigation involving the independent counsel has been the allegations of the wrongful use of
secret federal grand jury testimony and materials by Independent Counsel
Kenneth Starr and his office during the investigation of the Lewinsky matter.
In September 1998, the District Court for the District of Columbia ordered
that the Office of the Independent Counsel and its individual members show
cause why they should not be held in contempt for violating Rule 6(e) for disclosures contained in twenty-four news reports found by the court to contain
424
prima facie violations of Rule 6(e). The various news reports, examined individually in detail by the court, relied on sources who were within or agents of
the Office of the Independent Counsel and who revealed the strategy and direction of the independent counsel investigation, the targets of the grand jury
investigation, the details of immunity negotiations with a potential grand jury
425
target, and the contents of documents that were presented to the grand jury.
The court denied Starr’s request that it reconsider the ruling on the ground that
fifteen of the twenty-four news accounts did not violate grand jury secrecy
426
rules.
The secrecy that attaches to grand jury proceedings also implicates the independent counsel’s reports required by the Act. The Federal Rules of Crimi422. See In re North, 16 F.3d 1234, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
423. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). The language of Rule 6(e) expressly binds attorneys for the government; the independent counsel is unquestionably a government attorney. See North, 16 F.3d at
1242 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)).
424. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Misc. No. 98-228, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17290, at *34
(D.D.C. Sept. 24, 1998). This Order was issued after the district court already had once visited the issue, in June 1998. The district court had held that the news reports at issue established a prima facie
violation of Rule 6(e)(2) and thus ordered a show cause hearing and established a set of procedures for
the hearing. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, hearing the independent counsel’s petition for a writ of mandamus, reversed the district court. See In re Sealed Case, 151 F.3d 1059
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam). It was in this posture that the case returned to Chief Judge Norma
Johnson; she appointed a Special Master, John W. Kern III, and established the procedures by which
the show cause hearing would be conducted. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17290, at *34-*38. Although Judge Johnson issued the Order on September 24, it was not unsealed
and made public until October 30. See Neil A. Lewis, Judge Cites Possible Improper Leaks by Starr
Office, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1998, at A9.
425. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17290, at *12-*32 (detailing the contents of the 24 news reports at issue and indicating what information therein established prima facie
violations of Rule 6(e)).
426. See Neil A. Lewis, Starr Finds Nothing Wrong with Revealing Details of Talks, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 7, 1999, at A26. Starr argued that eight of the news accounts involved negotiations between his
office and Lewinsky’s attorney at the time, William Ginsburg. See id.
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nal Procedure, however, make room for the inclusion of material in these reports, the release of which would otherwise violate the rule. The Rules state
that “[d]isclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matter occurring before
the grand jury may also be made . . . when so directed by a court preliminarily
427
to or in connection with a judicial proceeding.” Although the compilation of
the independent counsel’s final report is not itself a judicial proceeding, the decision to release the report is made by the Special Division, which must decide
which portions are appropriate for release and what orders are appropriate for
428
the protection of individuals named in it. Thus, any conflict between the reporting requirements of the Act and the rule of grand jury secrecy is avoided.
F. Conclusion: Relationships Created and Altered by the Operation of the
Act
There are many complex relationships between an independent counsel and
other actors in the political system: the public, the Special Division of the Court
that oversees independent counsel investigations, the Attorney General and
the Department of Justice, and Congress. Even if the Act expires in 1999 and is
never reenacted, the case law the Act generated will remain on the books. The
legal issues raised by the Act’s interaction with other actors in the political system will persist no matter what the statutory language, or whether there is a
statute at all. Future independent counsels or special prosecutors, under a renewed Act or otherwise, will have contentious relationships with DOJ, Congress, the courts, and others. Even an investigation conducted by DOJ personnel faces many of these same issues, the resolution of which will be informed by
precedent generated by the operation of the Act. Politicians and investigators
alike would be well served to learn from the legal principles and problems the
Act exposed.

427. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C). “While Congress is silent on this exact subject, the nearest provision in the statute supports the view that the Independent Counsel is covered by Rule 6(e).” See
North, 16 F.3d at 1244 (citing § 594(k)(1), which states that “the independent counsel shall clearly
identify which of these records are subject to Rule 6(e)”). The Special Division has the power to rule
on motions concerning the disclosure of grand jury material in matters involving an independent counsel. See In re Sealed Motion, 880 F.2d 1367, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
428. The court held that such decisions constituted a “judicial proceeding” because the acts were
taken in an adversarial proceeding involving a genuine case or controversy. See In re North, 16 F.3d
1234, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The court was very cautious to narrow the scope of its ruling: “We do not
intend to formulate a rule that once a leak of Rule 6(e) material has occurred, government attorneys
are free to ignore the pre-existing bond of secrecy.” Id. at 1245. The court continued, “We do not
hold that the Independent Counsel is outside the coverage of Rule 6(e), we do hold that Rule 6(e)
does not prevent release of the present Report.” Id.
[T]he Independent Counsel as an attorney for the United States is covered by the strictures of
Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. . . . [W]e deny the motions that the
Report be withheld on the basis of Rule 6(e), not because Rule 6(e) is ineffective against the
Independent Counsel, but because in this case, the secrecy to be protected by Rule 6(e) no
longer exists.
Id.
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V
THE PROBLEM WITH PRIVILEGES
A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is
but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever
govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm
themselves with the power which knowledge gives.429

An open and transparent government is critical to a democratic political
system. The people must know what goes on in government to be able to judge
the behavior and accomplishments of elected officials and to hold these officials accountable for their actions. The use of evidentiary privileges in the
criminal justice system undermines the accountability of government officials;
excepting an individual from prosecution or from providing testimony not only
deprives accused persons of a fair trial, but also prevents the general public
from learning the truth about the internal workings of government. The accountability of the federal executive branch is particularly vulnerable when
evidentiary privileges restrict or even prohibit the disclosure of information in
furtherance of the President’s constitutional responsibility to “take Care that
430
the Laws be faithfully executed.” An inherent conflict exists between fulfilling that duty by prosecuting those who violate the law and invoking evidentiary
privileges to prevent the disclosure of information in the course of prosecution.
Evidentiary privileges have long been an integral part of the criminal justice
system. The attorney-client privilege, for example, has been recognized as one
431
of the oldest privileges for confidential communications in the common law.
In addition, federal courts have been given the authority to recognize claims of
privilege by Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which provides that
[e]xcept as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.

Although the Supreme Court has never established a precise test for the recognition of evidentiary privileges, it has indicated the factors courts should con432
sider in making a decision.
In investigations of wrongdoing, the invocation of privilege is problematic
when potential witnesses can delay the investigation by providing various reasons why they should not answer questions or provide requested information.
429. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON
103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
430. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
431. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
432. Federal and state precedent are given considerable weight, as is the existence of a public good
requiring the court to ignore the established principle of taking every reasonable step to find the truth.
The public good must be shown “with a high degree of clarity and certainty.” In re Sealed Case, 148
F.3d 1073, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also In re Bruce R. Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony), 158 F.3d
1263 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Office of President v. Office of Independent Counsel, 119 S. Ct.
466 (1998).
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This problem is especially severe when one branch of government is investigating its own members. Prior to the independent counsel statute, investigations aimed at activities within the executive branch were undertaken either by
Congress or DOJ, itself a component of the executive branch. These investigations necessarily resulted in disputes either between the two elected branches
of government, Congress and the President, or between two components of the
executive branch, DOJ and the person within the executive branch claiming an
evidentiary privilege.
433
United States v. Nixon makes clear that resolving such a dispute inevitably
involves weighing competing interests, namely those of the party seeking disclosure against those of the party desiring confidentiality. Historically, when
disputes arose within the federal government, the opposing branches would
employ a system of accommodation through which they would try to negotiate
434
a compromise.
According to former Assistant Attorney General William
Barr, the Constitution’s framers expected a spirit of dynamic compromise be435
tween the branches to result in an effective and efficient government.
This
process of compromise depends not only upon the competing needs for confidentiality and disclosure of information, but also upon each branch’s considera436
tion of the political viability of any given course of action.
Rather than
pressing for a decision that would absolutely define the “legitimate interest” of
one of the branches, the parties would often negotiate, reaching a mutually ac437
ceptable solution given the political context and circumstances.
In the case of intra-executive branch disagreement, the President, after balancing the competing interests, makes the ultimate decision as the sole person
constitutionally charged with the responsibility for law enforcement and for
whatever other governmental interests are implicated by the situation. Even if
the President himself is involved in the intra-executive dispute, the opposing
parties must reach an informal resolution in a manner than can best accommo438
date the conflicting interests. As with congressional-executive disputes, these

433. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
434. See William P. Barr, Congressional Requests for Confidential Executive Branch Information,
13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 153, 157-61 (1989); see also Memorandum from President Reagan for the
Heads of Executive Agencies on Procedures Governing Responses to Congressional Requests for Information (Nov. 4, 1982), reprinted in H.R. REP. NO. 99-435, at 1106 (1985).
435. See Barr, supra note 434, at 158 (quoting United States v. AT&T, 567 F.2d 121, 127, 130 (D.C.
Cir. 1977)).
436. See id. at 159.
437. See Speech by Former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh at the Duke University School
of Law (Sept. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Thornburgh speech].
438. See Matthew Cooper Weiner, Note, In the Wake of Whitewater: Executive Privilege and the Institutionalized Conflict Element of Separation of Powers, 12 J.L. & POL. 775 (1996). After the Watergate scandal, the public generally perceived the executive privilege as a tool used by government officials to conceal important facts in order to deceive the public. Elected officials were then reluctant to
invoke the executive privilege, and Presidents were reluctant to withhold too much information from
both Congress and the public. The approaches that Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush took with respect
to congressional requests for information show a genuine desire to accommodate congressional requests whenever possible. Although both Ford and Carter orally committed to an open presidency,
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specific accommodations are likely to vary according to context and circumstance. The parties lack an interest in attempting to articulate any bright-line
standard for resolving the dispute for fear of lessening their future negotiating
439
power.
The independent counsel statute creates a third scenario within which
privilege disputes can occur: a dispute between the independent counsel and
440
others in the executive branch. The independent counsel changes both DOJ’s
role and the dynamic of the negotiations over the release of privileged information. Because DOJ does not conduct the investigations when an independent
counsel is involved, it no longer has a strong interest in protecting the integrity
of the investigation by reaching a compromise between assertions of privilege
and the need for evidence. As the government’s lawyer, DOJ’s sole responsibility in this situation is to protect the confidentiality of material the executive
branch believes to be privileged.
Unlike DOJ prosecutors involved with privilege disputes between or within
the elected branches of government, the independent counsel has no political
accountability to the electorate either directly or indirectly, nor is he or she
charged with responsibility for any other governmental interests besides conducting the investigation, which is defined by a specific and limited jurisdic441
tion. For these reasons, the independent counsel has very different incentives
and priorities for settling disputes over privilege than either the President or
Congress. In determining what information should be privileged and what
should be disclosed, for example, the independent counsel may value competing interests differently than would the political branches in an analogous situation, with consequences that affect any negotiated settlements. The incentives
to avoid bright-line distinctions concerning the scope and applicability of the
privileges are also different. While the elected branches have shied away from
establishing bright-line rules, the independent counsel has no interest in
avoiding a judicial resolution if it will expedite exploration of every possible
442
avenue of factual inquiry or serve as an explanation for any inability to do so.
Due to the limited jurisdiction of the investigation, the independent counsel has
no incentive to consider the consequences a bright-line legal rule may have on
future investigations or claims of privilege.
The remaining sections of Part V of the article examine crucial privilege issues that have arisen in the context of independent counsel investigations.
These issues remain unresolved because the statute does not address the scope
or the applicability of evidentiary privileges and because the Supreme Court
has yet to consider how these privileges apply during an independent counsel
neither formally rejected the privilege, recognizing that in some circumstances the executive branch
would have to preserve a degree of confidentiality in its communications. See id.
439. See id.
440. See Telephone Interview with Brenden V. Sullivan, Jr., Partner, Williams & Connolly (Oct. 16,
1998) (notes on file with authors).
441. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(b) (1994).
442. See Thornburgh speech, supra note 437.
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investigation, if at all. The discussion begins with executive privilege—in particular, a Supreme Court decision analyzing the privilege, United States v.
Nixon, itself a product of a confrontation between an independent counsel-like
investigator and the President. The next section explores issues that arise when
the attorney-client privilege is asserted on behalf of a government attorney
during an independent counsel investigation. The final section discusses the
newly asserted protective function privilege claimed by the United States Secret Service.
A. Executive Privilege
1. History of the Executive Privilege. The executive privilege
exempts the executive from disclosure requirements applicable to the ordinary citizen
or organization where such exemption is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities involved in maintaining governmental operations, and
extends not only to military and diplomatic secrets but also to documents integral to
an appropriate exercise of the executive’s domestic decisional and policy making
functions.443

Although a formal executive privilege, also known as the presidential communications privilege, was not recognized by the courts until United States v.
Nixon in 1974, Presidents have claimed the right to withhold information from
both Congress and the public since the country’s founding. The executive
privilege protecting presidential communications is not contained in the text of
the Constitution, but it is “inextricably rooted in the separation of powers un444
der the Constitution,” a framework established to prevent government tyranny. The three branches of government perform independent functions and
have independent responsibilities within a larger interdependent framework, a
separation which prevents any one branch from accumulating too much
445
power. Each branch must assert its own authority to prevent encroachment
from the other branches. The nature of the President’s enumerated powers and
his unique role as the sole representative of the executive branch requires some
degree of secrecy and dispatch if he is to have the power and flexibility to act in
446
what he perceives to be the country’s best interests.
Under the Constitution, the President alone is vested with the executive
447
power. He serves as the “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
448
United States, and of the Militia of the several States.” He has the power to
make treaties, appoint ambassadors, public ministers, Supreme Court justices,
and all other officers of the United States with the advice and consent of the

443. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 569-70 (6th ed. 1990) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1988)).
444. In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Nixon v. United States, 418 U.S.
683, 708 (1974)).
445. See Weiner, supra note 438, at 784-85.
446. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 392 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
447. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
448. Id.
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449

Senate, and he can recommend legislation to Congress for those measures
450
that “he shall judge necessary and expedient.” In exercising these responsibilities, the President is faced with complicated and sensitive decisions which
only he can make. If he is to have the expert advice he needs to make informed
decisions, he must be able to rely on “candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh
451
opinions” from his inner circle of advisers and assistants. These advisers, in
turn, are effective because of this assumption of confidentiality: “Human experience teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may
452
well temper candor with a concern for appearances.” Therefore, the public,
as the beneficiary of executive branch policies and agreements that result from
having a well-informed President, has a strong interest in guaranteeing the confidentiality of executive communications.
Although the public benefits from the confidentiality of presidential decisionmaking, it also benefits from the constitutional checks and balances that
prevent any one branch from expanding its powers beyond the Constitution’s
scope or from putting the activities of its members above the law. Therefore,
the value of confidential executive conversations must be balanced against the
powers and interests of the other branches and the general public. For example, the constitutional power of Congress to impeach and convict the Presi453
dent requires the President to provide information upon a specific showing of
454
need that he otherwise would like to keep confidential and privileged.
Throughout history, Presidents have claimed the right to withhold information the confidentiality of which they considered vital to the performance of a
presidential constitutional responsibility. For example, when faced with a congressional request for executive branch documents, George Washington first
insisted that he had the privilege to withhold them in order to establish a
precedent for future generations; later, he agreed to turn over the requested in455
formation to Congress. Similarly, during the negotiations of the Jay Treaty of

449. See id. § 2, cl. 2.
450. Id. § 3.
451. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974).
452. Id. at 705.
453. The House has the constitutional power to impeach the President, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2,
cl. 5, and the Senate has the power to convict, see id. § 3, cl. 6.
454. See Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C.
Cir. 1974). The court held that conversations discussing the alleged crimes in Watergate were privileged even though they were outside the realm of official presidential duties. The committee did not
demonstrate “an appropriate showing of public need,” which turns “not on the nature of the presidential conduct that the subpoenaed material might reveal, but, instead . . . on whether the subpoenaed
evidence is demonstrably critical to the responsible fulfillment of the committee’s functions.” Id. at
730-31. For further support of the idea that the President is not above the law, see Clinton v. Jones,
117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997) (allowing a private civil suit against the President to commence, but instructing
that deference was owed to the President’s unique constitutional position, and simultaneously not suggesting that the presumption of privilege for the President’s communications was weakened).
455. See Weiner, supra note 438, at 793. Washington was asked to provide Congress with information concerning General Arthur St. Clair’s failed military expedition against Native Americans. Although he turned the information over because he felt disclosure would not hurt the public interest,
Washington asserted that the President had the right to withhold the information. See id.
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1795, Washington reasserted his privilege by refusing to supply information
about the treaty negotiations to the House of Representatives when he felt
456
doing so would be detrimental to the nation’s interest.
Consistent with this early precedent, the nineteenth-century executive
branch traditionally withheld information concerning military, foreign, and sensitive domestic affairs, and, due to the nature of the information, the nine457
teenth-century Congress generally accepted the legitimacy of those decisions.
In the early twentieth century, however, Presidents began to withhold a
broader range of information and the practice of withholding such information
became less accepted. Theodore Roosevelt, for example, withheld documents
concerning the behavior of a company accused of violating the Sherman Anti458
trust Act. Franklin Roosevelt refused to give Congress FBI investigative files
459
and ordered the FBI to ignore congressional subpoenas.
Eisenhower dramatically expanded the scope of the executive privilege, invoking it between
thirty and forty times, and Kennedy used the privilege to protect his military
supervisor from testifying about the Bay of Pigs invasion and to prevent con460
gressional oversight of foreign policy. Nixon, however, was the first President
to invoke the executive privilege in a criminal investigation. It is notable that
an independent counsel-like prosecutor, operating independently of the President and DOJ, was the instigator of the subpoena that culminated in United
States v. Nixon.
461

Named an
2. The Nature of Executive Privilege: United States v. Nixon.
unindicted co-conspirator by the special prosecutor during a criminal
investigation, President Nixon refused to comply with a third-party subpoena
duces tecum requiring the production of certain tape recordings and documents
462
that related to his conversations with aides and advisers. Nixon claimed that
an absolute executive privilege protected the confidentiality of his
463
conversations.
He also argued that the structure of American government
and the doctrine of separation of powers insulated the President and the
464
executive branch from a judicial subpoena in a criminal investigation.

456. See id. at 794. For a general history of executive branch privilege claims, see History of Refusals by Executive Branch Officials to Provide Information Demanded by Congress: Part I—Presidential
Invocations of Executive Privilege Vis-à-Vis Congress, 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 751 (1982).
457. See Weiner, supra note 438, at 795.
458. See id.
459. See id.
460. See id. at 796-97.
461. Although the Supreme Court had never formally recognized executive privilege before Nixon,
Chief Justice Marshall hinted in Marbury v. Madison that the courts might recognize such a privilege:
He suggested that a court’s intrusion “‘into the secrets of the cabinet’ would give the appearance of
‘intermeddl[ing] with the prerogatives of the executive.’” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
170 (1803). Marshall, however, did not “definitively decide whether . . . the privilege existed” or what
form it might take. In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
462. See HARRIGER, supra note 5, at 42.
463. See Nixon v. United States, 418 U.S. 683, 688 (1974).
464. See id. at 706.
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According to Nixon, the executive privilege covering presidential
communications had to be absolute to protect the frank and candid
communications between the President and those who advise and assist him in
performing his Article II duties. In supporting his particular claim of privilege,
however, Nixon did not assert a specific need for confidentiality, such as
protecting military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, but relied
on “an undifferentiated claim of public interest in the confidentiality of such
465
conversations.”
Lack of a specific need for confidentiality became a
significant problem for Nixon because when the courts weigh “the public
interest protected by the privilege against the public interests that would be
served by disclosure in a particular case,” the balance will lean toward the
466
specific needs of a criminal investigation.
Arguing against Nixon’s general claim of executive privilege, the special
prosecutor asserted a very specific need, derived from the constitutional commitment that no individual will be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, with467
out due process of law.” The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees all defendants the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him”
468
and “to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.”
Ensuring that the guilty are punished and the innocent are acquitted after a fair
trial requires the development of a full and complete factual record, a fundamental principle underlying the American criminal justice system. The invocation of evidentiary privileges flies directly in the face of this principle. The
469
criminal justice system gives the public “a right to every man’s evidence,” and
therefore any exceptions to this right—whether found in the Constitution, statutes, or the tradition of common law—should not be “lightly created nor ex470
pansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.” This
is especially true when a politically accountable member of the executive
branch is being investigated.
Although the Supreme Court recognized that “the valid need for protection
of communications between high Government officials and those who advise
and assist them in the performance of their manifold duties . . . is too plain to
471
require further discussion,” it found no guarantee of “an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circum472
473
stances.”
Although beginning with a presumption of privilege, the Court
found that the specific need for the production of relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding could outweigh the privilege if the prosecutor could establish a
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.

Id.
In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 742 (quoting Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Id. amend. VI.
In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 756 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972)).
Id. at 749.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974).
Id. at 706.
See id. at 713.
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474

specific need for each and every piece of evidence subpoenaed.
The Court
was not concerned that infrequent disclosures of presidential conversations in
the context of criminal prosecutions would have a chilling effect on the candor
of presidential advisers because it felt that an in camera review of the materials
475
in question would provide sufficient safeguard. Affirming the district court’s
decision that the material was essential, and requiring the information to be
produced, the Supreme Court held that the President enjoyed a qualified but
476
not an absolute executive privilege. The Court left open the possibility that if
a President could show a specific need to keep particular communications confidential, that showing might prevent the need for information in a criminal in477
vestigation from overcoming the executive privilege.
3. Subsequent Cases Involving Claims of Executive Privilege.
a. The Reagan years. In the controversy that would result in Morrison v.
Olson, President Reagan instructed EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch to
withhold from Congress certain documents requested during the independent
counsel’s investigation of the “Superfund” clean-up. After the district court
ordered the two branches of government to settle their differences without
judicial intervention, Reagan agreed to release some documents, thus seeming,
in the face of increasing political pressure, to back away from asserting the
478
executive privilege.
Reagan did, however, assert executive privilege in
response to a request for a memorandum written by then-Associate Justice
Rehnquist regarding the nomination of Antonin Scalia to the Supreme Court.
Reagan withdrew his privilege claim when the Democrats on the Judiciary
479
Committee threatened to refuse to confirm Scalia.
Although President Reagan invoked the executive privilege in response to
two other subpoenas—when asked to produce his diaries and when requested
to testify about conversations regarding the Iran-Contra affair—the courts did
480
not review the scope or function of the privilege in either situation.
Recognizing that the executive privilege was implicated, the district courts nevertheless reviewed the subpoenas only for conformity with Federal Rule of Criminal
481
Procedure 17(c).
In one case, the defendant, former National Security Adviser John Poindexter, was eventually pardoned, and the district court’s order
482
was never reviewed. In the other case, however, the court of appeals did review the district court’s refusal to enforce a subpoena of President Reagan to
474. See id.
475. See id. at 714-16.
476. See id. at 712-14. President Nixon eventually waived his claim of executive privilege. See
SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, WATERGATE REPORT 99 (1975).
477. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 712-14.
478. See Weiner, supra note 438, at 803.
479. See id.
480. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 743-44 & n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
481. See id.
482. See id. (citing United States v. Poindexter, 921 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
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testify in the trial of Lt. Col. Oliver North. Although the court found that the
subpoena should have been enforced, it held that the error was harmless because “there was no indication [Reagan] would have provided evidence that
483
was material or favorable to North.”
As a result, the issue of the privilege
484
was not raised in the court’s opinion.
485

b. In re Sealed Case, June 1997. Responding to an independent
counsel subpoena issued during an investigation of President Clinton’s former
Secretary of Agriculture Alphonso Michael Espy, the White House claimed
that the executive privilege protected the White House Counsel’s notes of
internal meetings concerning Espy, along with notes regarding conversations
486
between Espy or his counsel and White House employees.
Following an in
camera review of the notes, the district court denied the motion to compel the
production of the notes, holding that the White House had properly asserted
the privilege without actually discussing the documents or providing an analysis
487
of the grand jury’s need.
On appeal, the Office of the Independent Counsel (“OIC”) argued against
the applicability of the executive privilege on three grounds. First, it claimed
that the White House had waived the executive privilege by releasing the final
investigative report, stating to the press that it would comply with the sub488
poena, and unduly delaying its invocation of the privilege. Second, OIC asserted that because President Clinton never saw any of the documents in question (with the exception of the publicly released final report), the executive
privilege could not protect materials that were neither “sent to [nor] received
489
from the President.” Third, OIC insisted that even if the executive privilege
applied, the district court erred in applying the Nixon standard for determining
the weight of the grand jury’s need for the documents because that standard
490
applied to a criminal trial subpoena, not a grand jury subpoena. According to
OIC, greater weight should have been given to a grand jury subpoena, which, in
491
this case, should have outweighed the executive privilege.
Among its responses, the White House denied that the privilege was waived. It argued that
the claim of executive privilege rested on the fact that the documents were cre-

483. Id. (citing United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 888-92 & n.25 (D.C. Cir.), vacated in part, 920
F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
484. See id.
485. 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
486. See id. at 734-35. Espy was being investigated for allegedly “improperly accept[ing] gifts from
individuals and organizations with business before the U.S. Department of Agriculture.” Id. For a
discussion of other aspects of the Espy investigation, see supra notes 281-303 and accompanying text.
487. See 121 F.3d at 736.
488. See id.
489. Id.
490. See id.
491. See id.
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ated in response to the President’s request for advice about whether to retain a
492
cabinet officer—advice concerning a core Article II function.
The court agreed with the White House that the privilege was not waived.
The press statement was seen as an unofficial response to the subpoena, saying
simply that the White House would “comply” with the subpoena without ex493
plicitly saying that it would forgo any and all claims of privilege.
Furthermore, the White House had informed OIC that some of the material was privileged shortly after the press statement was issued, despite having no obligation
494
to formally invoke the privilege in advance of a motion to compel.
With respect to the release of the report, the court distinguished the executive privilege from the attorney-client privilege, in which the voluntary disclosure of some privileged material waives the privilege with respect to the remaining material. The court reasoned that voluntary disclosure would be
encouraged by allowing executive branch agencies to release some material
without compromising their potential claims of executive privilege to protect
the remaining material. Therefore, although the final report was no longer
privileged, the rest of the documents remained protected by the executive
495
privilege.
After determining that the privilege had not been waived, the court turned
to the question of how far removed a conversation could be from direct presi496
dential involvement to remain within the scope of the privilege. Because the
privilege arises from the President’s role as the chief constitutional officer of
the executive branch, the court construed the privilege “as narrowly as is consistent with ensuring that the confidentiality of the President’s decision-making
497
process is adequately protected.” The privilege had to be interpreted broadly
enough to enable the President to carry out his Article II functions, without excluding too large an array of materials from public view (which would harm
both the criminal justice system and the American system of political account498
ability).
To carry out his Article II functions, the President relies on the advice of his
aides and advisers. Because conversations among advisers and the documents
they produce are important components of the advice ultimately given to the
499
President, they are “usually highly revealing” of the ultimate decisions. If information were protected only when it reached the President in finished form,
the concept of executive privilege would lose its meaning and inhibit the freedom of presidential advisors to voice opinions fully and frankly. To prevent a
chilling effect, the court therefore had to determine the point at which failing to
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.

See id.
See id. at 740-41.
See id. at 741.
See id. at 741-42.
See id. at 746-53.
Id. at 752.
See id. at 749.
Id. at 750.
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protect such conversations would “impede the President’s ability to perform his
500
constitutional duty.”
In the court’s view, communications of presidential advisers made in the
course of preparing advice on official government matters for the President
were within the scope of the privilege regardless of whether the President was
501
present:
“[C]ommunications authored or received in response to a solicita502
tion by members of a presidential adviser’s staff” were also covered by the
privilege because presidential advisers often rely on their staffs “to investigate
503
an issue and formulate the advice to be given to the President.”
To be consistent with Nixon, however, the court could not recognize an absolute executive privilege. OIC could overcome the White House’s claim of
executive privilege if it met the standard of need established by Nixon. Specifically, OIC first would need to show that “each discrete group of subpoenaed
materials likely contains important evidence” that would be directly relevant to
504
the central issues of the trial. Second, OIC would need to prove that the ma505
terial could not be available elsewhere with “due diligence.”
To overcome
such a showing, the White House would have to provide a detailed explanation
of why the material must be privileged. The court then would weigh the competing public interests of ensuring the confidentiality of the presidential deci506
sionmaking process and of maintaining an open and accountable government.
On the merits, the court held that although the executive privilege could
apply to all the documents because “OIC has demonstrated a sufficient showing of need to obtain certain information in some of the documents,” the case
was remanded to the district court to determine what information should re507
main privileged and what should be released.
508

c. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, May 1998. In support of their refusal
to answer questions during a grand jury investigation, top White House aides
509
Bruce Lindsey and Sidney Blumenthal claimed that the executive privilege
protected the confidentiality of their conversations with President Clinton and
510
other White House officials concerning Monica Lewinsky and Paula Jones.
500. Id. at 751 (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988)). The court distinguished the
more general deliberative process privilege, finding that it offered inadequate protection for communications that needed to remain confidential because it did not protect purely factual material. See id. at
750.
501. See id. at 752.
502. Id.
503. Id.
504. Id. at 754.
505. Id. The second element raises the standard of need above the requirement of relevance necessary for a subpoena under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c). See id.
506. See id. at 756.
507. See id. at 757.
508. 5 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 1998).
509. Bruce Lindsey holds positions as both Deputy White House Counsel and Assistant to the
President. Sidney Blumenthal is an Assistant to the President.
510. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 24.
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According to the White House, the conversations were privileged because they
concerned possible impeachment proceedings, domestic and foreign policy
matters, and assertions of official privileges—all of which aid the President in
511
carrying out his constitutional Article II functions.
To prove that the
privilege was not being abused, the White House pointed out that although
Lindsey had testified before the grand jury three times, he invoked the
executive privilege only when questioned about communications designed to
512
aid the President in the execution of his official duties. In challenging OIC’s
interpretation of Nixon, which suggested that all private conversations are
outside the sphere of the executive privilege, the White House pointed out that
513
in Senate Select Committee, Nixon’s conversations with John Dean about
514
alleged criminal acts were held to be presumptively privileged.
The White
House emphasized that these conversations concerned official matters,
including the official conduct of the President, to which the executive privilege
should certainly apply. According to the White House, although Nixon
established that a specific showing of need during the course of a criminal
investigation could outweigh the executive branch’s general need for
515
confidentiality, there was no such showing here.
In moving to compel the testimony of Lindsey and Blumenthal, OIC argued
that the privilege did not apply because the communications did not relate to
official decisionmaking or to advice regarding the execution of Article II duties.
Private communications fall outside the sphere of the executive privilege because the President does not carry out Article II responsibilities in his capacity
516
as an individual.
According to OIC, without a “‘need to protect military,
diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets,’ the President’s ‘generalized
interest in confidentiality . . . cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of
517
due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice.’”
Absent actual proof that the conversations did not relate to some aspect of
the President’s official duties or to presidential decisionmaking, the district
court did not consider the communications to be outside the limited scope of

511. See id. at 26 (noting that the court received sworn affidavits regarding the content of the conversations).
512. See Memorandum of the White House in Opposition to OIC’s Motions to Compel Bruce R.
Lindsey and Sidney Blumenthal to Testify Concerning Conversations Protected by the AttorneyClient, Presidential Communications and Work Product Privileges, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F.
Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 1998) (Mar. 17, 1998) (on file with authors) [hereinafter, White House Opposition
Memo].
513. Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activity v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
514. See White House Opposition Memo, supra note 512, (citing Senate Select Committee, 498 F.2d
at 730).
515. See id.
516. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-06 (1974).
517. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, at subheading “Reasons for Granting the Writ” ¶ 3, Office of President v. Office of Independent Counsel, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998) (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706, 713) (on
file with authors).
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518

executive privilege. In fact, the court received sworn affidavits that the con519
versations concerned official duties.
The court found no precedent for declining to treat presidential communications as presumptively privileged on the
ground that they discussed the personal rather than official conduct of the
520
President.
Due to the constitutional uniqueness of the presidency and the
ramifications of a President’s personal conduct, separating purely personal
conversations from official conversations is extremely difficult. Even OIC conceded that certain communications concerning the President’s personal conduct, “such as those discussing how the President should respond to the Lewinsky matter during [British Prime Minister] Tony Blair’s visit,” were “protected
521
by executive privilege.”
Consistent with earlier precedent, however, the court also held that the presumption of privilege could be and actually was rebutted by a sufficient showing of need. OIC had established such a need by meeting the criteria outlined
in In re Sealed Case, which requires the prosecution to show “first, that each
discrete group of the subpoenaed materials likely contains important evidence;
522
and second that this evidence is not available with due diligence elsewhere.”
Simply asserting the OIC’s general power to investigate would not suffice. Although the court could not describe the contents of the evidence subpoenaed
because Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2) prohibits revealing any
part of a grand jury proceeding, the court decided, after an in camera review,
that the information was likely to contain evidence important to the investigation. Furthermore, OIC lacked other means to obtain information regarding
conversations that these men had with the President and his aides and advis523
ers.
On the merits, the court held that Lindsey’s and Blumenthal’s legitimate
claims of executive privilege were outweighed by the need for the evidence in a
criminal investigation, and, consequently, their testimony was compelled by the
524
court.

518. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d 21, 26 (D.D.C. 1998).
519. See id. at 26.
520. See id. at 25; see also In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Nixon, 481 U.S. at
708. The subpoenaed materials in Nixon were considered presumptively privileged despite the fact
that they concerned the President’s alleged criminal involvement in the Watergate break-in.
521. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 26.
522. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 28 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 754
(D.C. Cir. 1997)); see also supra Part V.A.3.b (discussing In re Sealed Case in detail). According to the
court, requiring that the desired evidence be directly relevant to the central issues of the trial would
not have much impact because Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c) already limits the use of a
subpoena to relevant information.
523. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 29.
524. See id. at 27. The claims of executive privilege were not raised when Lindsey appealed the decision that a governmental attorney-client privilege did not apply. See In re Bruce R. Lindsey (Grand
Jury Testimony), 158 F.3d 1263, 1267 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Office of President v. Office of
Independent Counsel, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
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4. Conclusion. Although general claims of an executive privilege have been
overcome by the specific need for information in grand jury investigations, the
limited case precedent keeps open the possibility that a specific need for
confidentiality may prevail. Neither the Supreme Court nor the executive
branch has been willing to establish a bright-line rule defining when the
privilege will or will not apply. In fact, the executive branch has avoided such a
rule by failing to appeal lower court decisions limiting the scope of the
525
executive privilege.
Because the independent counsel statute does not
address the issue of privileges and because the issue has not been widely
litigated, Congress may find it necessary to establish the privilege’s scope more
clearly within the context of an independent counsel investigation.
B. Attorney-Client Privilege
1. The History of Attorney-Client Privilege. Federal Rule of Evidence 501
provides that “the privilege of a witness . . . shall be governed by the principles
of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
States in light of reason and experience.” The Supreme Court has recognized
that “[t]he attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest of the privileges for
526
confidential communications known to the common law.”
In an adversarial
system, an attorney needs to be trusted with “all that relates to the client’s
reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried
527
out.”
The reassurance that all communications are protected is critical in
encouraging clients to fully disclose all pertinent facts to their attorneys in
528
order to receive the best legal advice.
The attorney-client privilege exists between attorneys and corporations as
529
well as between attorneys and natural persons. However, the application of
the privilege in the corporate context presents different problems. Often, those
persons receiving legal advice and making decisions may not be the persons
who can best supply the facts. Therefore, to protect the exchange of both facts
and professional advice, the application of the privilege is not constrained to a
single person within the corporate hierarchy, but instead includes conversations
for the purpose of the corporation’s legal representation between the corpora530
tion’s attorneys and any employees. Although the Supreme Court has recognized that the privilege applies to both individuals and corporations, it has
never established whether the attorney-client privilege exists between govern525. See, e.g., id. at 1267.
526. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
527. Id. (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)).
528. See id. The attorney-client privilege “is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice,
which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequence of the apprehension of disclosure.” Id. (quoting Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888)).
529. See generally id. at 386 (holding that the attorney-client privilege was applicable in the corporate context).
530. See id. at 390-91.
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ment attorneys and government institutions, and, in fact, has repeatedly turned
531
down the opportunity to do so.
2. Special Problems Concerning a Governmental Attorney-Client Privilege.
A governmental attorney-client privilege cannot be established by analogy to a
corporate attorney-client privilege because government and private entities
raise different problems of accountability. Government entities, for example,
532
cannot be held criminally liable for employee actions. Without this liability,
they have less incentive to investigate employee misconduct and courts have
less reason to establish an attorney-client privilege protecting confidential
communications in order to ensure that the results of internal investigations are
533
shared. Another difference exists between the nature of the responsibilities
of government employees and the nature of the responsibilities of private
employees. For example, a conflict may develop between the private interests
of an executive branch employee and the public interests he or she represents
534
when acting in an official capacity.
A private employee, on the other hand,
does not have to consider the public’s best interests.
The many characteristics that distinguish government attorneys from private attorneys further hinder this analogy. While private attorneys have a single duty to represent their clients zealously, government attorneys must balance their dual roles as law enforcement officials and zealous advocates for
individual clients. Government attorneys must ensure that their government
clients are faithfully following the law, and that in doing so they are pursuing
535
the public’s best interest. The tensions among the different responsibilities of
the government attorneys create problems for courts deciding the scope of the
governmental attorney-client privilege. On the one hand, government attorneys are servants of the public, and as executive branch attorneys, they have
the duty to counsel for openness and transparency in the government. On the
other hand, they must zealously represent the legal interests of the government,
a responsibility that requires the same guarantee of confidentiality that a private or corporate lawyer does. The competing responsibilities of government
attorneys and the disparate interests of the government employees they represent raise two unanswered critical questions: Who is the client, and what re536
sponsibility does the government attorney have with respect to that client?

531. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 920 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Office of President v. Office of Independent Counsel, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997); see also
In re Bruce R. Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony), 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Office of President v. Office of Independent Counsel, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
532. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 920.
533. See id.
534. See id. at 922.
535. See Federal Bar Association Ethics Committee, The Government Client and Confidentiality:
Opinion 73-1, 32 FED. B.J. 71, 72 (1972).
536. See generally Symposium, Government Lawyering, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Winter &
Spring 1998).
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Executive branch employees have a statutory duty under 28 U.S.C. § 535(b)
to report the criminal wrongdoing of other employees to the Attorney Gen537
eral. The statute provides that “[a]ny information received in a department
or agency of the executive branch of the Government relating to violations of
title 18 involving Government officers and employees shall be expeditiously re538
ported to the Attorney General.” This requirement has been interpreted in
two different ways. According to one interpretation, the requirement simply
gives the Attorney General the authority to conduct investigations. Under another interpretation, full disclosure of all possible criminal violations would be
539
required, even information relayed under a belief of privilege between a government lawyer and an employee. In the case of an independent counsel investigation, possible criminal violations would have to be reported to the independent counsel, who holds the responsibilities of the Attorney General for
540
that particular investigation.
The latter interpretation vitiates the attorneyclient privilege.
A government attorney also has a responsibility as a public servant that
may militate against his client’s interest by voiding their common law attorneyclient privilege. In their capacity as public servants, government attorneys must
541
“favor disclosure over concealment” because the public has the right to know
what its representatives are doing and what stands they are taking on the important issues. For this reason, the government lawyer’s obligation to “uphold
542
the public trust” may conflict with his client’s need to use the in-house counsel “as a shield against the production of information relevant to a federal
criminal investigation”; allowing a government lawyer to create barriers that
prevent transparency in government “represent[s] a gross misuse of public as543
sets.”
While the public has an interest in knowing what occurs behind the closed
doors of government, it also has an interest in making sure that public officials
are able to fulfill their constitutional and statutory responsibilities. For this
reason, the President and other executive branch officials must be fully informed about the legal consequences of any decisions they make. To provide
the best possible legal advice, government attorneys, like attorneys for individuals or private corporations, need complete disclosure of factual informa544
tion. If the need for full disclosure of facts justifies an attorney-client privilege for natural persons and corporations, that same need should justify the
privilege in the governmental context. The conflict between disclosure and
537. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 920.
538. 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (1994).
539. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Hell, Handbaskets, and Government Lawyers: The Duty of Loyalty and Its Limits, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 96-101 (Winter 1998).
540. See In re Bruce R. Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony), 158 F.3d 1263, 1274 n.6 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Office of President v. Office of Independent Counsel, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
541. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 920.
542. See In re Bruce R. Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony), 158 F.3d at 1273-74.
543. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 921.
544. See id. at 926 (Kopf, J., dissenting).
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confidentiality is further complicated when the client is the President of the
United States and the privilege is invoked in a criminal investigation. The
President, as the sole organ of the executive branch, is ultimately responsible
for enforcing the law. Because the invocation of the attorney-client privilege
hampers law enforcement by preventing the disclosure of evidence, the President, as chief law enforcement officer of the United States, must have good
reason to invoke it. This is especially true in the context of a criminal investigation because investigating and prosecuting federal crimes is central to the duty
of members of the executive branch, who are bound by oath to uphold their
constitutional responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe545
cuted.” Invoking a privilege that impedes a federal grand jury’s investigation
seems to contradict this important responsibility of the office. For these reasons, asserting a governmental attorney-client privilege requires more than a
simple claim of presidential need for confidential relationships with his gov546
ernment attorney. More specialized rules may be needed to “take account of
the complex considerations of governmental structure, tradition and regulation
547
that are involved.” Just what these special considerations may include, however, has yet to be determined.
A final consideration in the debate regarding governmental attorney-client
privilege arises from its overlap with executive privilege, both of which aim to
ensure that the President receives full, open, and honest communications with
his aides, advisers, and attorneys. Although the attorney-client privilege is absolute in the private sphere, the unique responsibilities of executive branch
lawyers may require qualifying the attorney-client privilege in the public
548
sphere—in the same way that the executive privilege is qualified. Some argue
that the attorney-client privilege should not be used to shield communications
that would not be covered by the executive privilege, because doing so might
allow the President to avoid the recognized limitations of executive privilege.
On the other hand, the two privileges are intended to cover very different types
of communications. The application of the appropriate privilege should depend upon whether the communications involved political, strategic, or policy
issues (executive privilege), or legal advice (attorney-client privilege).
Until the Clinton
a.
Watergate and the Iran-Contra affair.
Administration, the White House generally avoided litigation with OIC
concerning the scope of the attorney-client privilege. For example, Nixon
White House Counsel Fred Buzhardt testified before the Watergate grand jury
549
without invoking the attorney-client privilege.
This willingness to testify,
however, did not mean that the privilege could not be invoked, as the Bush
545. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
546. See In re Bruce R. Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony), 158 F.3d at 1271-72.
547. Id. at 1272.
548. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 926 (Kopf, J., dissenting).
549. See In re Bruce R. Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony), 158 F.3d at 1275 (citing Anthony Ripley,
Milk Producers’ Group Fined $5,000 for Nixon Gifts, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1974, at 38).
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Administration made clear when complying with OIC requests during the IranContra investigation. Bush White House Counsel C. Boyden Gray and Deputy
White House Counsel John Schmitz made compliance with subpoenas
contingent upon agreement by OIC that their right to claim evidentiary
privileges, including the attorney-client privilege, was not waived. Once this
550
agreement was reached, some of the requested documents were turned over.
Reagan White House Counsel Peter Wallison even produced his diary for OIC.
These investigatory requests, unlike those during the Clinton Administration,
were not made in an investigation regarding the criminal activity of the
President or the First Lady, and OIC did not subpoena testimony from either
551
Reagan or Bush.
552

b. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, April 1997. In refusing to
comply with OIC’s subpoena for “all documents created during meetings
attended by any attorney from the Office of the President and Hillary Rodham
Clinton . . . pertaining to several Whitewater-related subjects,” the White
House claimed that the executive privilege, the attorney-client privilege, and
553
the attorney work-product doctrine protected the document’s confidentiality.
Treating this assertion of attorney-client privilege as a de novo assertion of
privilege, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that although the
governmental attorney-client privilege existed in some situations, it did not
554
exist with respect to a grand jury investigation.
The two parties approached this question from diametrically opposed positions. OIC viewed recognition of a governmental attorney-client privilege as
an unacceptable expansion of the common law privilege, “tantamount to estab555
lishing a new privilege.” Because government attorneys, as law enforcement
officials in the executive branch, have a duty under 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) to report
criminal law violations by executive branch officers to the Attorney General
and because of their responsibility to protect the public interest, OIC argued
that the government attorney’s relationship to governmental clients was different from the relationship between private attorneys and private clients. Due to
these fundamental differences, OIC claimed that a privilege protecting conversations between private attorneys and private clients could not be used to protect conversations between government attorneys and government clients. Ac-

550. See id. (citing 1 WALSH, supra note 113, at 478-79 & n.52 (1993)).
551. See id.
552. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 910.
553. Id. at 913 (quoting Subpoena Rider at 1). This investigation concerned matters “relating in
any way to James B. McDougal’s, President William Jefferson Clinton’s, or Mrs. Hillary Rodham Clinton’s relationships with Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Association, Whitewater Development
Corporation or Capital Management Services, Inc.” See Order at 1-2, In re Madison Guar. Sav. &
Loan Ass’n, Div. No. 94-1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 5, 1994).
554. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 915.
555. Id.
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cording to OIC, protecting the latter would require impermissibly expanding
556
the privilege, something that judges are generally very reluctant to do.
The White House, on the other hand, argued that as the oldest known
privilege in the common law, the absolute attorney-client privilege, applies to
557
individuals, to corporations, and to the government. The White House found
support in federal legislation that assumes the existence of a governmental attorney-client privilege. Specifically, Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence
503(a)(1) defines a client as “a person, public officer, or corporation, associa558
tion, or other organization or entity, either public or private.”
The White House also referred to other civil and criminal cases in which a
claim of governmental attorney-client privilege had been invoked, but the court
559
found none of these cases persuasive. In the criminal cases, the courts never
actually applied the attorney-client privilege to block the investigation because
560
the cases were remanded before the issue was addressed.
In the civil cases,
the inherent disparity between requests made under the Freedom of Information Act and requests made in the course of a federal criminal investigation
prevented the former from establishing a precedent applicable to the latter.
Without clear precedent either establishing or rejecting the governmental
attorney-client privilege, the court examined the two main cases from which the
561
parties drew inferences regarding its scope.
When determining the applicability of these cases, the court kept in mind two general principles: (1) “the
public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence” and (2) “privileges, as excep562
tions to the general rule, ‘are not lightly created nor expansively construed.’”
Although Nixon dealt with a claim of executive privilege, the court felt that
its basic premise—that the government’s general need for confidentiality may
be outweighed by a specific need for facts in a criminal investigation—
counseled against establishing an attorney-client privilege in this case. According to the court, the White House’s analogy to the common law attorneyclient privilege recognized in Nixon and applied to corporations in Upjohn was
inapposite because of the substantial differences between governmental and
563
nongovernmental organizations and attorneys.
Both this duty and the general responsibility of public servants to “favor disclosure over concealment” in
556. See id.
557. See id.
558. PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 503(a)(1), reprinted in 36 F.R.D. 183, 260 (1972).
559. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 917-18.
560. See id. at 917.
561. The parties relied primarily on United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), and Upjohn v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
562. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 918.
563. See id. at 920. The court compared this situation to the Supreme Court’s refusal to recognize a
work-product immunity for public accountants based on the differences between the public and private
interest. Independent auditors have a public responsibility which transcends any duty to their clients
because of the special duty they have to inform the public about the true financial situation of the corporation. The court argued that a government attorney is in a similar situation: the duty to inform the
public that elected officials are violating the law that transcends the attorney’s responsibilities with respect to the government official. See id.
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a representative government would be undermined if a governmental attorney564
client privilege prevented facts from being disclosed.
The court further reasoned that the absence of an attorney-client privilege in this context would not
have the chilling effect on internal investigations of possible liability-creating
misconduct that it would in the corporate context because the White House
565
does not have the same incentive to conduct such investigations. Employees
of the executive branch are under a statutory duty to report the criminal
566
wrongdoings of other employees to the Attorney General, and cannot themselves subject the White House to criminal liability for their actions.
In addition, the court held that government officials are free to speak with
567
Because a government atprivate attorneys when confidentiality is needed.
torney’s role is to explain the law so that public officials can obey it, these types
568
of communications would not be chilled by the possibility of disclosure.
The court also rejected the White House argument that the commoninterest doctrine extended the attorney-client privilege that Mrs. Clinton
shared with her personal attorney to cover communications made in the pres569
ence of White House attorneys. According to the White House, two clients
were present at the meetings, Mrs. Clinton in her personal capacity and Mrs.
Clinton as a representative of the White House, and both shared a common interest in obtaining an accurate understanding of their legal situation and the
570
courses of action available. The court found no such interest. In her personal
capacity, Mrs. Clinton wanted to minimize the possibility of prosecution by
571
OIC, but the White House, as an institution, had no such interest. The court
therefore rejected the argument that the attorneys were allocating responsibility among themselves in order to achieve a common goal that went beyond
simply obeying the law. Obeying the law itself was not sufficient justification
572
for the application of the privilege.
Lastly, the court rejected the argument
for confidentiality based on Mrs. Clinton’s belief that the conversations were
privileged, reasoning that the law rarely factors in the actor’s beliefs at the time
573
of the action.
The panel of judges, however, was neither unanimous in its decision nor in
how it approached the issue. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Kopf advocated

564. See supra text accompanying notes 533-535.
565. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 920-21.
566. See 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (1994).
567. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 921.
568. See id.
569. See id. at 922. The common-interest doctrine expands the attorney-client privilege in certain
situations. “If two or more clients with a common interest in a litigated or non-litigated matter are
represented by separate lawyers, and they agree to exchange information concerning the matter, a
communication of any such client that otherwise qualifies as privileged . . . that relates to the matter is
privileged as against third parties.” Id.
570. See id.
571. See id.
572. See id.
573. See id. at 923.
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574

the application of the Nixon balancing test.
He argued that Nixon did not
stand for the proposition that the White House altogether lacked the attorney575
client privilege.
He found support for a governmental attorney-client privilege in common law precedent, the proposed Restatement of the Law (Third)
Governing Lawyers, and Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503. According
to the Restatement, the attorney-client privilege “‘extends to a communication
of a governmental organization’ and to ‘an individual officer, employee, or
576
other agent of a governmental organization.’”
Proposed Rule 503 “plainly
grants the White House the attorney-client privilege” by extending the privi577
lege to “‘organizations or entities, either public or private.’” Although Congress failed to enact it, the Supreme Court’s recommendation of the proposed
rule to Congress implicitly supported the existence of such a privilege. Furthermore, Judge Kopf felt this interpretation accurately reflected the federal
578
common law of attorney-client privilege. He rejected the argument that the
privilege would not apply in criminal cases involving government entities, and
he argued that Proposed Rule 503 does not distinguish between civil and criminal cases, and that no case law suggests the privilege has been denied in crimi579
nal situations. In fact, courts have supported the use of the governmental attorney-client privilege, consistently holding “that the public interest is
580
furthered by extending the privilege to governmental entities.”
In addition to finding judicial support for a governmental attorney-client
privilege, Judge Kopf found a history of recognition by the government. According to a 1982 opinion issued by Assistant Attorney General Theodore Olson of the Office of Legal Counsel, both the inclusion of the governmental attorney-client privilege in the Freedom of Information Act and the functional
analysis that established a corporate attorney-client privilege in Upjohn sup581
ported a governmental attorney-client privilege.
The functional analysis for
determining if the privilege is necessary focuses on two issues: (1) whether a
governmental attorney-client privilege would protect and encourage candid
communication and (2) whether it “would encourage the communication of
582
relevant and helpful information.” Because the Upjohn decision did not rely
on the possibility of criminal liability for corporations, the inapplicability of
583
such liability to governmental entities was insignificant to Judge Kopf.

574. See supra Part V.A.2 (discussing the balancing test established in Nixon, which weighs the
general interest of the President in keeping his communications confidential against the specific need
for evidence in a criminal investigation to establish whether the executive privilege should apply).
575. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 926-27 (Kopf, J., dissenting).
576. Id. at 930 (Kopf, J., dissenting) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 124 (1996)).
577. Id. at 928 (Kopf, J., dissenting) (quoting PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 503(a)(1)).
578. See id. (Kopf, J., dissenting).
579. See id. at 929 (Kopf, J., dissenting).
580. Id. at 930 (Kopf, J., dissenting).
581. See id. at 930-31 (Kopf, J., dissenting).
582. Id. at 931 (Kopf, J., dissenting).
583. See id. (Kopf, J., dissenting).
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With the establishment of a governmental attorney-client privilege, Judge
Kopf found 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) to be consistent with, rather than inapposite to,
584
the privilege. Agreeing with the view held by then-Assistant Attorney General Antonin Scalia, he found it would be “inappropriate to infer a congressional purpose to breach the universally recognized and longstanding confiden585
tiality of the attorney-client privilege.” Its existence does not affect the need
of DOJ or any other government attorney to ensure the confidentiality of
586
communications in order to provide adequate legal advice.
To overcome a governmental attorney-client privilege, Judge Kopf believed
that material should be subpoenaed by a grand jury. He would then require
that “the special prosecutor make an initial threshold showing before the district court that the documents are: (a) specifically needed; (b) relevant; and (c)
587
admissible.”
The court then would review the documents in camera to de588
termine which actually were relevant and admissible.
In this case, Judge
Kopf would refuse to enforce the subpoena for three reasons. First, the courts
had yet to decide whether a proper showing of need could overcome the governmental attorney-client privilege. Second, Mrs. Clinton has various constitutional rights that are implicated by intercepting her privileged communications
589
without warning.
In the future, however, the White House attorney-client
privilege could give way to a grand jury subpoena as long as the procedural pro590
tections laid out in Nixon are recognized. Third, the common interest, which
applies whenever communication was made to provide clients with needed legal services, expanded Mrs. Clinton’s private attorney-client privilege to cover
591
the conversations in question.
Because the White House and Mrs. Clinton
jointly decided to turn over the White House billing records to OIC, both clients, Mrs. Clinton as a representative of the White House and Mrs. Clinton in
her private capacity, “legitimately needed the advice of separate lawyers in or592
der to carefully and candidly respond to the Independent Counsel.”
593

d. In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 1998. Grand jury witness Bruce Lindsey
claimed that the attorney-client privilege protected his conversations with other
584. See id. at 932 (Kopf, J., dissenting).
585. Id. (Kopf, J., dissenting).
586. See id. (Kopf, J., dissenting).
587. Id. at 927 (Kopf, J., dissenting).
588. See id. (Kopf, J., dissenting).
589. See id. at 938 (Kopf, J., dissenting). Unlike the Nixon case, which weighed the government’s
interest against the public interest, this case pits an individual interest against the public interest. Mrs.
Clinton, as a private individual, is protected by both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and a violation
of the attorney-client privilege might be a violation of her constitutional rights. Because such individual liberties were not at stake in Nixon, that case fails to provide complete guidance.
590. See supra Part V.A.2. The procedural protections established in Nixon include showing a specific need and relevance for each piece of evidence, showing that the information could not come from
any other source, and presenting the evidence for an in camera review.
591. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 939 (Kopf, J., dissenting).
592. Id. (Kopf, J., dissenting).
593. In re Bruce R. Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony), 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Office of President v. Office of Independent Counsel, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
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grand jury witnesses, their attorneys, the President, White House attorneys,
and the President’s personal attorneys when OIC moved to compel testimony
about the conversations during the investigation of the Monica Lewinsky
594
matter.
Lindsey argued that, given his role as Deputy Counsel to the
President, conversations regarding legal matters, such as the assertion of
official privileges and the possibility of impeachment proceedings, were
absolutely protected by a governmental attorney-client privilege. Additionally,
he argued that the privilege protected advice given to the Office of the
President concerning the continued fulfillment of the President’s institutional
595
duties in the face of other civil litigation that involved him. Lindsey claimed
that the common-interest doctrine protected his communications with the
596
President’s personal attorneys.
In support of an absolute governmental attorney-client privilege, the White
House argued that the President’s need for full and frank communications with
his attorneys is comparable to that of a private individual or corporation, both
597
of which enjoy a well-established attorney-client privilege.
In this case, the
legal advice of the White House Counsel was required to respond to a resolution introduced in the House of Representatives, which called for an inquiry
598
into possible grounds for impeachment.
Although both parties agreed that
the White House Counsel could represent the President in the impeachment
process, the White House Counsel’s actual role in the fundamentally political
process had not been determined. According to OIC, no absolute governmental attorney-client privilege existed, and even if a qualified privilege existed,
OIC argued that because impeachment was a political rather than a judicial
process, advice given by White House Counsel might not be legal in nature and
therefore would not be protected by even a qualified attorney-client privilege.
This was especially true given Lindsey’s dual roles as Assistant to the President
and as Deputy White House Counsel. Because the legal advice concerning impeachment did not have to come from the White House Counsel, OIC argued
that the President could have relied on his personal lawyers if he wanted to en599
sure confidentiality.
The Court of Appeals found that a qualified governmental attorney-client
privilege existed. The court held that the privilege was overcome in this case by
a sufficient showing of need for the subpoenaed communications in the context

594. See id. at 1267. The investigation resulted from an expansion of the Whitewater investigation
of President Clinton’s financial transactions when he was Governor of Arkansas. The inquiry included
allegations of possible perjury, obstruction of justice, intimidation of witnesses, and other violations of
federal law in connection with Paula Jones’s sexual harassment suit against the President.
595. The President was involved in civil litigation with Paula Corbin Jones. See generally Clinton v.
Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997).
596. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d 21, 30 (D.D.C. 1998).
597. See supra Part V.B.1.
598. See In re Bruce R. Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony), 158 F.3d at 1276 (citing H.R. Res. 304,
105th Cong. (1997)).
599. See id. at 1276-77
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600

of a grand jury investigation. The court first established that a governmental
attorney-client privilege existed before it faced the question of whether the
privilege was absolute. It found authority establishing a governmental attorney-client privilege both in the law and in persuasive legal principles. Exemption five of the Freedom of Information Act excuses from mandatory disclosure “intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by
law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency,” protecting
those materials that otherwise would be protected by a governmental attorney601
client privilege. The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers ex602
tended the attorney-client privilege to government entities, and Proposed
Federal Rule of Evidence 503 defined “client” in this context to include “a person, public officer, or corporation, association, or other organization or entity,
603
either public or private.”
Although Rule 503 was not enacted, the court
found that it accurately reflected what other courts, including the Supreme
604
Court, have recognized as a common law practice.
The practices of executive branch attorneys also evinced an understanding
that governmental attorney-client privilege applied in some contexts. According to Assistant Attorney General Theodore Olsen of the Office of Legal
Counsel, the privilege “functions to protect communications between government attorneys and client agencies or departments” in addition to protecting
605
private attorney-client relationships. Previously, the Office of Legal Counsel
had recognized that the privilege protected communications between government attorneys acting as private counsel for federal employees sued in their in606
dividual capacities.
After establishing the existence of a governmental attorney-client privi607
lege, the court addressed the larger issue of “whether an attorney-client
privilege permits a government lawyer to withhold from a grand jury information relating to the commission of possible crimes by government officials and

600. See id. at 1278. The Eighth Circuit had earlier held that a governmental attorney-client privilege did not exist at all. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 921 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Office of President v. Office of Independent Counsel, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997).
601. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1994). The justification for this exemption rests on the ground that the
agencies need full and frank communications with their attorneys, the same ground that justifies private and corporate attorney-client privileges. See In re Bruce R. Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony), 158
F.3d at 1268-69.
602. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 124 (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, 1996).
603. PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 503(a)(1), reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 235 (1972).
604. See In re Bruce R. Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony), 158 F.3d at 1268-69.
605. Id. at 1269 (quoting Theodore B. Olsen, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel,
Confidentiality of the Attorney General’s Communications in Counseling the President, 6 Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 481, 495 (1982)).
606. See id. (citing Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Disclosure
of Confidential Information Received by U.S. Attorney in the Course of Representing a Federal Employee (Nov. 30, 1976)).
607. The D.C. Circuit did not distinguish its holding that a governmental attorney-client privilege
existed from the Eighth Circuit’s holding that a governmental attorney-client privilege did not exist.
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608

others.”
In doing so, the court had to determine whether the privilege was
absolute or qualified. Although a governmental attorney-client privilege existed, neither “policy nor experience” suggested to the court that a federal governmental entity could maintain the ordinary common law attorney-client
609
privilege. In making this distinction, the court highlighted the special respon610
sibilities that government lawyers have in light of their status as civil servants.
The President’s attempt to prevent disclosure of information to a grand jury inherently conflicts with his responsibility of investigating and prosecuting fed611
eral crimes, which stems from his constitutional responsibility to execute the
612
laws faithfully. The privilege also runs counter to the strong public interest in
uncovering illegal actions of government officials. Because “openness in government has always been thought crucial to ensuring that people remain in control of their government,” the court determined that an absolute governmental
attorney-client privilege that sequestered information from the public would
613
represent a “gross misuse of public assets.” The court found the position of a
government attorney analogous to that of a corporate attorney who tries to
keep communications with corporate officers confidential from other officers
and shareholders—an unacceptable practice that is not always in the best inter614
ests of the corporation.
The court found further support for a qualified attorney-client privilege by
comparing it to the well-established executive privilege. The court did not believe that communications outside the scope of the qualified executive privilege
should be covered by an absolute governmental attorney-client privilege. In
fact, the court found no grounds for distinguishing the President’s legal advice
615
from political advice concerning executive constitutional duties.
The court
did not expect that a qualified attorney-client privilege would chill candid
communications between the President and White House Counsel because it
616
would still protect all communications that did not relate to criminal activity.
Furthermore, if the President required complete confidentiality, he could con617
sult private counsel.
Nor did the court fear that a qualified attorney-client privilege would irreversibly affect future Presidents faced with the possibility of impeachment pro608. 158 F.3d at 1271.
609. Id. at 1266.
610. See supra Part V.B.2.
611. See In re Bruce R. Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony), 158 F.3d at 1271-73.
612. See U.S. CONST. art II, § 3 (stating that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”).
613. In re Bruce R. Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony), 158 F.3d at 1274 (quoting In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 912 (8th Cir. 1997)).
614. See id. at 1276 (citing Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding that attorney-client privileges between corporate attorneys and corporate officers were not absolute, and accordingly that corporate officers must be aware that their conversations with corporate attorneys may
not be kept confidential from shareholders)).
615. See id. at 1266.
616. See id. at 1276 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 712-13 (1974)).
617. See id.
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ceedings. The court rejected the idea that communications would be chilled;
although OIC would pass information discovered by the grand jury to Congress, the court did not recognize the fact that the exception to the governmental attorney-client privilege for grand jury investigations would abrogate the
absolute protection the attorney-client communications otherwise would have
618
enjoyed in congressional impeachment proceedings. The court could not determine what the common law attorney-client privilege would protect in impeachment proceedings because neither the House of Representatives nor the
Senate had established procedures or evidentiary rules for the political impeachment process. Furthermore, if the advice were deemed political rather
than legal, the attorney-client privilege would not apply because the advice
619
would fall under the purview of executive privilege.
A qualified governmental attorney-client privilege was further supported by
the strong congressional preference for executive branch employees to disclose
all evidence of criminal activity. According to 28 U.S.C. § 535(b), “[a]ny information . . . received in a department or agency of the executive branch of the
Government relating to violations of title 18 involving Government officers and
620
employees shall be expeditiously reported to the Attorney General.” Although the Office of the President does not clearly fall within the meaning of
“office” or “agency” as defined by the statute, the court interpreted the statute
to suggest that “all government employees, including lawyers, are duty-bound
621
not to withhold evidence of federal crimes.”
This interpretation was reinforced by the practice and policy of the Clinton Administration, which officially
recognized a duty under § 535(b) to turn over criminal evidence to the Attor622
ney General.
On the merits, the court found that communications concerning legal advice
given in connection with the Paula Jones civil suit were not privileged because
the jurisdiction of OIC’s investigation did not yet include issues arising out of
that lawsuit. The President would have no reason to discuss impeachment in
relation to the civil suit until OIC had jurisdiction in that area.
The court rejected White House arguments that, in the event the governmental attorney-client privilege applied, the private attorney-client privilege
shared by Clinton and his personal lawyer protected the communications in
623
question.
Although conversations between attorneys and clients made
through intermediaries are sometimes protected by the attorney-client privi618. See id. at 1276-77
619. See id. Only the issue of attorney-client privilege was raised on appeal.
620. 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (1994).
621. See In re Bruce R. Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony), 158 F.3d at 1274-75. This position is also
supported by former White House Counsel Lloyd Culter and Solicitor General Robert Bork, both of
whom expressed a belief that they had a statutory duty to report any evidence of criminal wrongdoing
within the executive branch to the Attorney General. This included any criminal activity by the President.
622. See id. at 1275 (quoting Reply Brief for the Office of the President at 7, Office of the President
v. Office of the Independent Counsel, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997) (No. 96-1783)).
623. See id. at 1279-80.
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lege, the court did not consider this intermediary doctrine to be applicable to
Lindsey. The district court was not convinced that the White House needed to
use Lindsey as an intermediary, and even though the Court of Appeals would
not second-guess the decisions of the executive branch as to what measures
were necessary “to avoid undue disruptions to the President’s ability to carry
624
out his official responsibilities,” the court questioned the veracity of Lindsey’s intermediary role. Lindsey had added his own legal opinion and changed
the nature of the legal advice rendered in the message, behavior inconsistent
625
with the purpose of the intermediary doctrine. Furthermore, the court ques626
tioned the propriety of using a government attorney in this manner.
The court also rejected the argument that the common-interest doctrine
protected the conversations between Lindsey, Clinton, and Clinton’s private attorneys. The court found Lindsey to have “a fundamentally different position”
than a private attorney because his “obligation not to withhold relevant information acquired as a government attorney remains the same regardless of
whether he acquired the information directly from the President or from the
627
President’s personal counsel.”
As a result of this duty, his communications
before the grand jury were protected neither by the governmental attorneyclient privilege nor by the common-interest doctrine.
As in the Eighth Circuit, the decision regarding the existence and scope of
the governmental attorney-client privilege was not unanimous. In his dissenting opinion, D.C. Circuit Judge Tatel expressed concern that the court unnecessarily limited the attorney-client privilege for future Presidents without determining the precise nature of the Lindsey communications or whether they fell
628
within the ambit of the privilege.
He predicted a chilling effect on candid
629
conversations between the President and his government attorneys. Moreover, he considered inapplicable the qualifications pertinent to the constitutionally based, broader executive privilege to the narrower attorney-client privilege, which is based on the common law recognition of a lawyer’s special
630
function in rendering legal advice.
Unlike the majority, Judge Tatel found no difference in the responsibilities
631
of private attorneys and executive branch attorneys. Because the text of 28
U.S.C. § 535(b) does not specifically reference the Office of the President,
Judge Tatel did not feel that it imposed additional responsibilities upon the
President’s attorneys. In his view, compliance with the spirit of the statute requires neither the disclosure of conversations with the President of the United
States nor reporting any potential criminal violation by one presidential subor624.
625.
626.
627.
628.
629.
630.
631.

Id. at 1280.
See id. at 1281.
See id. at 1281-82.
Id. at 1283.
See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1284 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1285 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting).
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dinate, the President’s attorney, to another presidential subordinate, the Attor632
ney General. Because all attorneys take an oath to uphold the Constitution
of the United States, a distinction based on any special constitutional responsibilities of federal government attorneys could not be relied upon to eliminate
633
the traditional attorney-client relationship.
Judge Tatel further argued that reason and experience, the tools of Federal
Rule of Evidence 501, do not recommend the abrogation of that traditional attorney-client privilege in this context. Judge Tatel reasoned that, due to the
President’s “unique position in the constitutional framework” and the wide
range of responsibilities vested solely in him, his need for fully informed, confi634
dential legal advice is unparalleled. The public’s strong interest in the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duties further supports a privilege
635
that protects him from the distraction of “false or frivolous accusations.”
Being forced to draw a line between what should be discussed with private attorneys and what should be discussed with White House Counsel may distract
the President, whose individual persona has become increasingly difficult to
separate from his official one. This point is particularly salient in the wake of
636
Watergate and the resulting escalation in public scrutiny. Judge Tatel did not
believe that benefiting from the traditional common law attorney-client privilege would place the President above the law. In addition to the threat of
criminal penalties, his political accountability to the public and the possibility
637
of impeachment proceedings would deter him from criminal conduct.
If the
independent counsel reported to Congress that critical grand jury information
had been withheld, Congress could then determine in the proper political setting whether the information was needed without fundamentally weakening the
638
governmental attorney-client privilege.
On the merits, Judge Tatel believed it necessary, due to Lindsey’s dual roles
as Deputy White House Counsel and Special Assistant to the President, to determine the content of the conversations in question before deciding whether
the attorney-client privilege applied. The White House would have to demonstrate that the services provided were in fact legal services for the attorney639
client privilege to apply.
Judge Tatel found no reason to address a governmental attorney-client privilege if the privilege did not actually apply, and he
640
certainly found no reason to destroy it in this context.

632. See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting).
633. See id. at 1286 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
634. Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 579, 653 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
635. Id. at 1287 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
636. See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting).
637. See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting).
638. See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting).
639. See id. at 1288 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
640. See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting).
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e. Conclusion. The law regarding the existence of a governmental
attorney-client privilege is far from settled. The Eighth Circuit and the D.C.
Circuit took very different approaches in reaching their decisions, the former
starting with the premise that the privilege never existed, and the latter from
the premise that the privilege existed but might not apply. Both courts had
strong dissenting opinions, and the Supreme Court has yet to grant certiorari to
decide the issue.
3. Problems with the Work-Product Doctrine. The work-product doctrine,
which protects the documents prepared by attorneys in anticipation of trial, is
641
connected to the attorney-client privilege. Both seek to ensure that attorneys
can work on a client’s behalf without fearing the release of their
communications or documents, thereby exposing their trial strategy or rejected
theories of law. Claiming the protection of the work-product doctrine for
materials prepared by government attorneys involves the same conflicts as
claiming the protection of the governmental attorney-client privilege itself. In
both situations, the personal interest of the government employee in seeking to
642
avoid criminal sanctions may differ from his or her official interest.
The
Supreme Court has not made a definitive decision regarding the scope of either
the attorney-client privilege or the related work-product doctrine in the context
of government lawyers.
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum addressed the issue of the attorney work-product doctrine. The White House cited the doctrine in refusing to
comply with OIC’s subpoena for the production of “all documents created
during meetings attended by any attorney from the Office of the President and
Hillary Rodham Clinton . . . pertaining to several Whitewater-related sub643
jects.”
The White House claimed that its lawyers had been preparing for
OIC’s investigation and that their work-product for this adversarial proceeding
therefore fell under the purview of the work-product doctrine. The White
House further suggested that “anticipated litigation” included anticipated congressional hearings. Based on the distinction made between Mrs. Clinton’s per644
sonal and public personas, the court rejected the White House’s argument.
OIC was investigating Mrs. Clinton in her personal capacity, while the White
House Counsel represented her in her public capacity. The White House could
not claim work-product immunity for documents prepared on behalf of a third
person because the doctrine applies only to preparations made on behalf of a
client in anticipation of upcoming adversarial proceedings, including investiga645
tive legislative hearings. Even if the White House anticipated that a congressional investigation of the President might result from this OIC investigation,
641. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
642. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 920 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Office of President v. Office of Independent Counsel, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997).
643. Id. at 913 (quoting Subpoena Rider at 1).
644. See supra notes 570-571 and accompanying text.
645. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 924.
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the court refused to use the work-product doctrine to protect documents in order to prevent the possibility of future political harm.
C. The Protective Function Privilege
1. History of the Protective Function Privilege. The protective function
privilege was first claimed in 1998 by the Secretary of the Treasury in response
to a subpoena by OIC to compel Secret Service agents to testify before the
646
grand jury investigating the Monica Lewinsky matter.
Although agents had
647
testified in past judicial and nonjudicial proceedings, this was the first time a
grand jury had sought to compel their testimony about observations made
while executing their protective function. In response, the Secretary of the
Treasury, as head of the department responsible for the Secret Service, claimed
648
that the testimonies subpoenaed were privileged.
2. Problems with Recognizing the Protective Function Privilege. The
protective function privilege, like any other privilege, prevents the grand jury
or other investigative body from obtaining evidence during an investigation.
The privilege, as initially articulated by the Treasury Secretary, would protect
information obtained by Secret Service personnel while performing their protective
function in physical proximity . . . [, but it would] not apply, in the context of a federal
investigation or prosecution, to bar testimony by an officer or agent concerning observations or statements that, at the time they were made, were sufficient to provide
reasonable grounds for believing that a felony has been, is being, or will be committed.649

Unlike both the attorney-client privilege and the executive privilege, which
protect the confidentiality of communications, the protective function privilege
protects personal observations made by Secret Service agents while performing
650
their protective function.
According to OIC, such a privilege “is unprecedented in American law” and contradicts the “‘fundamental and comprehen651
sive’ need to develop facts in a grand jury investigation.”
As with other evidentiary privileges, tension arises when the protective
function privilege is used to prevent the disclosure during a criminal investigation of information held by the executive branch. Any steps taken to prevent a

646. The Office of the Independent Counsel’s jurisdiction in this investigation included “whether
Monica Lewinsky or others suborned perjury, obstructed justice, intimidated witnesses, potential witnesses, attorneys, or others concerning the civil case of Jones v. Clinton.” Letter from Kenneth W.
Starr, Independent Counsel, to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President, at 1 (Apr. 28, 1998) (on
file with authors).
647. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 98-148 (NHJ), 1998 WL 272884, at *3 (D.D.C. May 22,
1998) (noting that the Secret Service has testified in proceedings regarding Nixon’s taping system and
John Hinckley’s assassination attempt on the life of President Reagan).
648. See id. at *5.
649. In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
650. See Letter from Kenneth W. Starr, supra note 646, at 2.
651. Id.
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full factual record from being established run contrary to the executive
652
branch’s constitutional responsibility to enforce the law.
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 allows for the evolutionary development of
privileges and provides that new evidentiary privileges, such as the protective
function privilege, “shall be governed by the principles of the common law as
they may be interpreted . . . in the light of reason and experience.” According
to the Supreme Court, this standard requires the reviewing court to consider
(1) whether the privilege is “historically rooted in federal law; (2) whether any
states have recognized the privilege; and (3) public policy interests . . .
[specifically] whether the new privilege ‘promotes sufficiently important inter653
ests to outweigh the need for probative evidence.’”
Despite the Supreme
Court’s reluctance to create new privileges, it will be more inclined to do so “if
the public good transcend[s] the normally predominant principle of utilizing all
654
rational means for ascertaining the truth.”
Strong policy arguments both support and oppose the protective function
privilege. The main argument supporting the privilege begins with the assertion that the public has a strong interest in protecting the President’s life because “[a] President’s death in office has world wide repercussions and affects
655
the security and future of the entire nation.” A President’s lack of confidence
in the discretion of his protectors may deny agents the proximity needed to perform the “cover and evacuate” method of protection, which requires them to
be close enough to “literally put their hands on the President” and remove him
656
from harm’s way in a split-second.
If they knew that agents could be compelled to testify about their observations before a grand jury, Presidents might
feel increasingly reluctant to cooperate, thus endangering their lives and conse657
quently the public interest.
Full cooperation between the President and his
protectors is essential, as “the difference of even a few feet between a President
658
and his protective detail could make the difference between life or death.”
For example, according to studies of photographs of the assassination, President Kennedy might have avoided death had he not ordered Secret Service

652. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (The President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”).
653. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 98-148 (NHJ), 1998 WL 272884, at *1 (D.D.C. May 22,
1998) (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1996)).
654. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996) (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50
(1980)).
655. Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1969).
656. Opposition to the Independent Counsel’s Motion to Compel at 11-12, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 1998 WL 272884 (D.D.C. May 22, 1998) (No. 98-148 (NHJ)) (citing Declaration of Lewis
Merletti ¶ 7, Declaration of John W. Magaw ¶ 4, Declaration of Elijay Bowron ¶ 5).
657. See id. (citing REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF
PRESIDENT KENNEDY 506 (1964) (“Warren Report”)).
658. In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Declaration of Lewis C.
Merletti ¶ 12).

PRIESTERETAL.FMT

Page 5: Winter 1999]

06/07/99 12:00 PM

THE STATUTE: A LEGAL HISTORY

105
659

agents off the running boards of his presidential limousine. Proximity to the
President is crucial to protection, as indicated by the different outcomes of assassination attempts against Presidents McKinley and Reagan. President Reagan’s life was saved by an agent close enough to throw his own body between
the President and the assassin’s bullet, while President McKinley, the day be660
fore his murder, had removed the agent detailed to remain at his side.
Critics of the protective function privilege argue that other factors outweigh
any potential negative effects from the possibility of testimony by Secret Serv661
ice agents before a federal grand jury. For many years, the Secret Service has
been able to draw on a President’s strong interest in his own physical safety to
convince him that a close protective envelope is needed twenty-four hours a
day, 365 days a year. The President’s strong personal interest in receiving this
protection will not change if the protective function privilege is not recognized.
Only if the President were to engage in criminal behavior would close coopera662
tion with Secret Service agents become a problem.
663

3. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, May 1998 / In re Sealed Case, July 1998.
Presented with the Office of Independent Counsel’s motion to compel the
grand jury testimony of Secret Service agents, D.C. District Judge Norma
Johnson refused to recognize the existence of the protective function privilege
664
claimed by the Secret Service. Judge Johnson did not believe that the Secret
Service had met requirements for establishing a new evidentiary privilege
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 501. No federal or state history
665
supported the privilege, and the Constitution did not support it.
In
distinguishing this privilege from the recently recognized patient666
psychotherapist privilege, Judge Johnson emphasized the fact that the latter
privilege had some history of recognition in both federal and state appellate
courts and was among the nine specific privileges recommended by an advisory
667
committee proposing new evidentiary privilege rules. While affirming Judge
659. See Opposition to the Independent Counsel’s Motion to Compel, at 15. President Kennedy,
like his predecessors, demonstrated a strong desire to maintain his privacy and even refused to allow
the Secret Service to ride in the passenger compartment of his car. See id. at 16 & n.16.
660. See id. at 18.
661. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 98-148 (NHJ), 1998 WL 272884, at *4 (D.D.C. May 22,
1998).
662. See id. (“When people act within the law, they do not ordinarily push away those they trust or
rely upon for fear that their actions will be reported to a grand jury. It is not at all clear that a President would push Secret Service protection away if he were acting legally or even if he were engaged in
personally embarrassing acts.”).
663. In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998), is the appellate court opinion concerning the
district court’s decision in In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 98-148 (NHJ), 1998 WL 272884 (D.D.C.
May 22, 1998).
664. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 1998 WL 272884, at *5.
665. See id. at *2-*3.
666. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (recognizing the existence of a federal patientpsychotherapist privilege for the first time).
667. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 1998 WL 272884 at *3 (citing Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S.
at 7, 9 nn.7 & 14).
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Johnson’s analysis, the D.C. Circuit pointed out that given the novelty of OIC’s
demand for testimony from the Secret Service, the absence of precedent at the
668
state or federal level was not determinative.
Therefore, the Secret Service
would have to demonstrate that recognizing the privilege would “materially
enhance presidential security by lessening any tendency of the President to
‘push away’ his protectors in situations where there is some risk to his safety,” a
669
burden of proof it ultimately failed to carry.
In support of the privilege, three of the most recent Secret Service directors
and former President George Bush expressed concern that compelling Secret
Service testimony would have an irreversible negative effect on the relationship
670
between the President and his protectors. In an open letter to Secret Service
Director Lewis Merletti, President Bush assured Merletti that “had I felt they
would be compelled to testify as to what they had seen or heard, no matter
671
what the subject, I would not have felt comfortable having them close in.”
However, the effects of allowing testimony were far from unanimous, even
among former Presidents. Former Presidents Ford and Carter publicly supported the idea that Secret Service agents “should be required to testify” in the
672
context of criminal investigations.
Judge Johnson acknowledged that “[t]he physical safety of the President . . .
[is] clearly of paramount national importance,” but decided that this consideration was “not strong enough [either] to overcome the grand jury’s substantial
interest in obtaining evidence of crimes or to cause th[e] Court to create a new
673
testimonial privilege.”
The President’s strong interest in his own safety
would prevent him from pushing the Secret Service away when he was “acting
674
legally or even if he were engaged in personally embarrassing acts.” In fact, in
the past, Secret Service agents had testified in both judicial and nonjudicial
675
proceedings without asserting a protective function privilege, indicating that
absolute confidentiality was not required or even expected of Secret Service
676
agents. Secret Service agents do not sign confidentiality agreements, and although former agents have even published books based on observations made

668. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1076 (“This appears to be the first effort in U.S. history to
compel testimony by agents guarding the President. . . . In these circumstances, we do not regard the
absence of precedent as weighing heavily against recognition of the privilege.”).
669. Id. The D.C. Circuit argued that this type of high standard is not unique to the establishment
of the protective function privilege, noting that the Supreme Court has held that proponents of privileges must provide “a compelling empirical case” for their necessity. Id. (citing Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 693-94 & n.32 (1972)).
670. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 1998 WL 272884, at *4 (“The Secret Service did not present
any letter or declaration from President Clinton.”).
671. Letter from Former President George Bush to Lewis Merletti, Secret Service Director (Apr.
15, 1998) (on file with authors).
672. In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1076-77.
673. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 1998 WL 272884, at *4-*5.
674. Id. at *4.
675. See id. at *3.
676. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1077.
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677

while performing their official protective function, no evidence suggested that
678
such publications caused Presidents to push the Secret Service away.
Judge Johnson was further persuaded by the relevant legislation. Federal
law explicitly requires the President and the Vice President to accept the pro679
tection of Secret Service agents and defines some of the Secret Service’s responsibilities. Even though Secret Service agents of necessity would witness
some of these officials’ most private moments, the legislation makes no provi680
sions for the possibility of an evidentiary privilege.
Moreover, as employees of the executive branch, the agents have a duty to
report criminal activities to the proper authorities, a responsibility that would
681
be hampered if an agent’s observations were presumptively protected.
The
uncertainty created by the exception to the privilege could encourage the
President to push away his protective envelope just as much as he might with682
out the privilege.
After all, the President might not even know if the agent
were aware that he was witnessing a criminal act, and only if he were unaware
683
would that observation remain privileged.
Although Judge Johnson did not believe the privilege had been properly invoked in the case, she did not resolve the issue of who should assert the privi684
lege. OIC had argued that the President should control and, in this case, per685
sonally waive the privilege, as he would the executive privilege. On the other
hand, DOJ analogized the protective function privilege to the state secrets
privilege because both protected national security interests. It argued that the
privilege therefore belonged to the United States, and the Secretary of the
Treasury, as the head of the department responsible for the Secret Service, had
686
the power (though not necessarily the exclusive power) to assert it. Because
neither Judge Johnson nor the D.C. Circuit recognized the existence of a pro687
tective function privilege in this situation, which member of the executive
branch should control such a privilege is still unclear.

677. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 1998 WL 272884, at *4. Former Secret Service agent Seymour Hersh published THE DARK SIDE OF CAMELOT (1997), which describes four agents’ revealing
observations of President Kennedy, and former agent Dennis V.N. McCarthy with Philip W. Smith
published PROTECTING THE PRESIDENT: THE INSIDE STORY OF A SECRET SERVICE AGENT (1985).
See id.
678. See 1998 WL 272884 at *4.
679. See 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a) (1994) (excluding the President and Vice President from those who
can decline Secret Service protection).
680. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 1998 WL 272884, at *2.
681. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (1994)).
682. See id. at 1077.
683. See id.
684. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 1998 WL 272884, at *5.
685. See id.
686. See Opposition to the Independent Counsel’s Motion to Compel at 31-32, In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (No. 98-148 (NHJ)).
687. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (expressing “no opinion about the
propriety of asserting a protective function privilege in other legal proceedings”).
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In the civil litigation between Paula
4. Clinton v. Jones, January 1998.
Corbin Jones and President Clinton, involving claims of sexual harassment at
the time Clinton was Governor of Arkansas, lawyers for Jones attempted to
689
subpoena the testimony of Secret Service agents.
District Judge Susan
Webber Wright found “no need for this Court to determine the existence or
applicability of any privilege . . . as the issues raised by the Secret Service’s
690
motion can be resolved on other grounds.” Judge Wright denied the motion
to compel the agents’ testimony partly because the resulting evidence would
not be “essential to the core issue in the case,” presumably because the alleged
incidents had occurred before Clinton had been nominated for President and
691
before he had received Secret Service protection. She also based her decision
on concerns that such testimony could interfere with the independent counsel’s
concurrent criminal investigation, and possibly jeopardize the President’s safety
692
given “the numerous ‘leaks’ of the sealed information in the case.”
Although she never recognized an official protective function privilege,
Judge Wright did agree “that the discovery sought by plaintiff could possibly
provide critical information at the core of how the Secret Service actually functions and provide those with hostile intent toward the President with important
693
information to use in piercing the Secret Service’s protection.”
The risk of
such “unauthorized disclosure” was “unacceptable, especially where the information sought by the plaintiff from the Secret Service [was] not essential to her
694
case.” Even though she claims not to have reached a decision regarding the
existence of the protective function privilege, these statements seem to indicate
that Judge Wright would recognize a qualified protective function privilege. In
weighing the need for information from the Secret Service against the value of
protecting the details of their protective work, she seemed to use the balancing
695
test employed by the Supreme Court in Nixon to analyze the scope of the
qualified executive privilege.
5. Conclusion. Although Judge Johnson refused to recognize the existence
of the protective function privilege, the willingness of Judge Wright to consider
the consequences of Secret Service testimony on the President’s safety leaves
open the possibility that such a privilege may be recognized in the future.
Although the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari to resolve the issue,
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer dissented, expressing their view that the Court
696
should be the “definitive judicial arbiter in this case.” Justice Breyer argued
688. 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997).
689. The case was eventually settled out of court.
690. Order Protecting Secret Service from Testimony, Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-920 (E.D.
Ark. Jan. 30, 1998) (on file with authors).
691. Id.
692. Id.
693. Id.
694. Id.
695. See supra Part V.A.2.
696. Rubin v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 461, 461 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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that the law “should take special account of the obvious fact that serious
physical harm to the President is a national calamity—by recognizing a special
697
governmental privilege where needed to help avert the calamity.”
At this
698
time, however, the existence of the privilege is “legally uncertain.”
D. Conclusion: Privileges
The recent litigation by OIC deserted the previous system of case-by-case
compromise within the executive branch over the scope of governmental privileges. One effect of the independent counsel statute, therefore, was the creation of substantially more case law on the executive privilege, governmental attorney-client privilege, and protective function privilege. These decisions may
become largely moot if the Act is repealed and the prior practice of intrabranch and inter-branch compromise is restored. On the other hand, the restrictive language and interpretations of some of the decisions might have a
deleterious effect on the ability of the executive branch and the President to
carry out their constitutional functions. The long-term impact of privilege litigation under the independent counsel statute remains to be seen.
VI
CONCLUSION
The independent counsel statute has created a large body of law that, but
for the Act’s enactment, might never have been developed. Even if the Act
expires in 1999 and is never reenacted, the law the Act generated will remain.
While the technicalities of the triggering mechanisms may disappear, the balance that Congress fought so long and hard to strike properly—between too
much deference to and trust in the executive branch, and too easily and too often requiring an outside investigator—will endure. The law of the Act’s triggering mechanisms will inform and guide future debates about when and how
independent prosecutors ought to be appointed. Similarly, the legal issues
raised by the Act’s interaction with other actors in the political system will persist. Future independent counsels, under a renewed Act or otherwise, will no
doubt have contentious relationships with DOJ, Congress, the courts, and others. Politicians and investigators alike would be well served to learn from the
legal principles and problems the Act exposed. Finally, the scope of the government’s evidentiary privileges is now far more litigated than ever before.
The courts will continue to look to these cases for guidance, often in cases not
arising from independent counsel investigations. Whether the Act has damaged the government’s position in court is still unclear. In the end, the independent counsel statute may be but a short experiment in political accountability in our nation’s history. The law generated by the statute, however, is
timeless.
697. Id. at 462 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
698. Id. at 465 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

